Otto von Ballpark

I hope not. They only bet $850k on Zumaya, and at least he blew out his elbow promptly and didn't drag things out. It's not like, say, the Padres' Josh Johnson deal ($8 mil for nothing). They also got Harden the following winter, although his timetable always seemed like he was a pretty big longshot. I really wanted Kazmir that winter, he had big question marks too but at least he was throwing for teams that winter. Harden seemed more like the recent Johan comebacks, he was always planning to throw / return to game action at some undetermined future date...

I actually like Sanchez inclusion -- it shows that the author wasn't cherry picking or relying too much on hindsight. If Sanchez was still owed 2/34, but we didn't have Nolasco at 2/25, I don't see a big problem. Interesting note. Sounds like the Twins offer was pretty weak, though (which makes sense given our next pitching moves were Marquis, then Correia and Pelfrey the next offseason): http://www.mlbtraderumors.com/2011/12/mark-buehrle-rumors-monday.html

Actually Morris got a 3 year, $7 mil deal, with salaries of 3/2/2 but with opt-outs after each year. Or, in other words, two player options. He earned $700k in incentives in 1991. Max value of the deal, with all incentives, was 3/11. K/9 rates were a lot lower circa 1989-1990, Morris was actually above league average both years. His ERAs were terrible, but he did lead the league in starts and complete games in 1990. It was a different time, so it's hard to compare. The risk of a "front-loaded" 3/7 contract with an opt-out seems so quaint. After 1992, Puckett was earning $6 mil AAV. Interesting that both Morris and Chili Davis were "new look" free agents, meaning they got to opt out of their current deals and become FA that winter as part of baseball's collusion settlement. This article suggests we failed to land Boddicker, Gibson, Gaetti, and Berenguer that winter before we landed Morris, Davis, Pagliarulo, and Bedrosian -- seems like a pretty busy offseason! https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=266&dat=19910206&id=HPQrAAAAIBAJ&sjid=QmoFAAAAIBAJ&pg=1472,3221114&hl=en

That's not what I'm saying at all. I'm saying if you can confidently project around 75-80 wins, competitiveness is an option with good luck. Your median projection is middling, but you have a meaningful best-case scenario which isn't without value. That's not really possible with a tear-down rebuild, once you're down to 60-65 wins, good luck only gets you to 75 wins, which is fairly worthless as a best-case scenario. And a projected 75-80 win team can still take flyers and flip assets for prospects as needed too, that's not an exclusive benefit of a torn-down rebuilding team. Unless you have an asset to sell immediately for a massive prospect haul (which the Twins did not in 2011), the rebuilding path basically gets you a few extra top 10 protected draft picks vs. mid-teens potentially forfeited draft picks. With the 2012 draft order already in place, I'd gladly trade down in the 2013-2015 drafts for a chance at contention (with good luck) each year.

This seems a little revisionist. Sure, the Twins didn't have elite guys like Sano, Buxton, or Berrios in the high minors after 2011, but they had Gibson (albeit delayed by TJS), they had Hicks, Benson, Parmelee, Dozier, even Plouffe dominated AAA in 2011 and looked like a decent utility guy. Plus, at the MLB level, they had Mauer, Morneau, Hardy (assuming extension), Span, Revere, plus they were adding Willingham and Doumit. That's a solid lineup with very good upside. Pitching was obviously worse, but adding Buehrle would have done wonders for that starting staff, and at that point, I'd argue re-signing Nathan (2/14) would have affordably fit in the strategy than re-signing Capps (1/4.5). Dumping Hardy for nothing prior to 2011 hurt a ton, as did basically doubling down on the shaky 2011 pitching staff for 2012. markos's scenario avoids both of those fairly obvious pitfalls, and thus presents a far less dire situation going into 2012.

An aside: I don't always understand B-Ref pitcher WAR. How is Buehrle's 2015 season worth 0.9 WAR, and his 2013 season worth 2.1 WAR? Unearned runs, opponent quality, park factor... factors worth considering but hard to pin down with any confidence. I wouldn't be so confident that Buehrle's 2015 was only a 1 win season. Those plus extending Hardy are 4 easy, affordable moves, though. And if that gets you to a baseline projection of 75 wins, plus one of the top farm systems in the game, that's a pretty good situation. Arguably gives you more options for benefit than a tear-down rebuild -- you can still gamble with guys like Feldman or Kazmir, but now your potential benefit isn't limited to selling them, with a little luck they could push you to a playoff berth. And you are good enough to take advantage of a potential buyer's market at the deadline too, like the Tigers did to the Marlins in 2012. You downgrade from Stewart, Gordon, and Jay to mid-teens first round picks in 2013-2015, and maybe you forfeit one of those picks if you indeed land a bigger FA like Martin. Not really a huge cost for the added potential benefits/flexibility.

Actually, I'd say the Twins equivocated after 2011 rather than do anything "at all costs." They didn't aggressively rebuild, but they didn't really try to notably improve the MLB club either. Either of those options would have been better than what they actually did. I just think markos lays out a pretty decent argument for the latter option.

Sorry if I wasn't clear, I wasn't really asking if you advocated a rebuild. I was suggesting that you can't really apply a general idea like "mid market teams can't contend that long" to a specific set of circumstances so easily. The 2011 Twins with Hardy had a decent amount of position player talent, a decent farm system that was likely to get better with the 2012 draft, and not many assets that were easy to move in an aggressive rebuild (Mauer and Morneau weren't going anywhere at that point, Liriano's value was low, even Span only netted one guy, etc.). I'm not sure you can chuck those facts out the window for a general theory about competitive life cycles.

I think Sanchez re-signed with Detroit because they offered the most money. The Span trade wasn't considered bad, but it was not without its doubters. Trading a controlled asset like that straight-up for a single high-variability pitching prospect in A-ball was a risky rebuilding move. Torii Hunter signed last winter with a 70 win team (us) over an 89 win pennant winner (Royals). Obviously it's an exercise in hypotheticals, so if you're going to nitpick his answer to this degree, then the question he was asked wasn't valid in the first place. I think extending Hardy, adding Buehrle, then Hunter, and thus keeping Span, doesn't take much hindsight and all follows pretty logically. With our farm system and 2012 picks, that's a solid foundation. You can quibble with the later moves and still come out ahead of what we actually did, or what your more aggressive rebuild would have yielded.

Whatever problem exists with the Jays and White Sox isn't easily solved by tanking and going full rebuild for 3 seasons. Those teams have made suspect moves in drafting and trading that have held them back. Their goal should be to avoid those bad moves, not tank for 3 years to get more opportunities to draft and sell. Would you really have called a meeting after the 2011 season and said, "mid market teams can't sustain success this long, let's blow this sucker up"? You've got to look at the assets you have, the system you have, the draft position you have guaranteed, the options on the FA market. If you can get that to a baseline .500 projection within 2 years, while staying within a reasonable budget and still maintaining a strong farm system, how do you not choose that?

But for what? You guarantee disastrous losing for 3 years. And at the end of it, do you really have a sunnier outlook than what markos' Twins would have? The Twins youth and prospect strength right now has very little to do with their losing from 2012-2014 -- it's based more on smart international signings circa 2009 and good drafting in 2012. And gaining a lot of value by rebuilding isn't always so easy -- you have to pick the right flyers (Feldman vs Marcum, Kazmir vs. Harden), you have to flip them to the right teams at the right times, and you have to develop those players you receive. It's actually probably easier and a more likely path to sustained success to focus on signing quality MLB players that can help you like Buehrle, and just sign/draft/trade as best as you can as opportunities present themselves, rather than going out of your way to create those opportunities by tanking for multiple seasons.

I think it's a good thing, and the Jays aren't really a fair comparison. That team was uninspiring more due to their AL East competition than anything else -- four times they hit 85+ wins in the 21st century prior to last year, and they never finished closer than 10 games out of first in those seasons. Meanwhile, the AL Central winner had 90 or fewer wins 5 times in that span of years. Then the Jays recent timing was bad -- when the second wild card was introduced in 2012, and the longtime NY/BOS division dominance perhaps waning a bit, the Jays put up two of their lowest win totals in recent history, 73 and 74 wins. Of course, markos' alternate universe Twins could have had similar bad luck and records those years, but they also could have had some good luck and broke through one year like the 2015 Jays, with 93 wins and one of the most electrified fanbases in all of sport.

And given that 2011 was still bad, you could still have reaped the rewards of the 2012 draft (Buxton, Berrios, Duffey, Rogers, Walker, Chargois, Melotakis, etc.). Your projected 2012-2014 records aren't so good as to prevent you from selling under the right circumstances like 2007 (so you could still potentially move Liriano for Escobar in 2012). Keeping Span and signing Hunter makes it even easier to deal Revere for May. You still have Hicks as an asset in your scenario too, who probably didn't lose his prospect shine so quickly in 2013 if you wanted to move him earlier, or you could have kept him too.

Awesome post, thanks. I must say, I really enjoy your contributions to this site. I think this kind of competitiveness gets under-rated by a lot on this board. There often seems to be an attitude that if you're not projected to win 85+ games, you shouldn't bother adding MLB talent, or perhaps you should even tear down and rebuild. But like you say, staying around .500 means you are in the hunt, potentially the whole season with the second wild card. Do that from 2012-2014, that's huge for fan interest -- I'd guess attendance could have held steady close to 34k per game, rather than dropping to 27k per game as it has, and TV ratings could have increased too (unfortunately it looks like our TV deal was last negotiated prior to 2011, but higher interest/ratings in the meantime would have only helped future negotiations/renegotiations).

Outstanding final month with the Miracle? Reed had a 5.1 K/9. He did have a solid AFL, but he did in 2014 too. He also had a couple tough appearances back in Chattanooga between his Ft. Myers and AFL assignments (2.1 IP, 5 runs), although I understand he did well in a couple AA playoff appearances.

Ah yes, July 2011. I remember getting excited as we snuck back into the race. But when we were 6 games out of the division lead, we were also 7 games under .500, in 4th place in the division, and a whopping 14 games out of the wild card. We were actually closer to last place (5 games) than any kind of playoff spot. We were sellers at the 2007 deadline in a far better position -- 4 games over .500, 5-6 games out of both the division and wild card, only trailing 3 teams in the wild card. And of course with Johan, Hunter, a healthy Mauer and Morneau, etc. In any case, as I noted in a post above, I don't think we had many good assets to sell in 2011, and the old free agent compensation system was still in place, ensuring we'd get good picks for them in the 2012 draft.

We got Berrios, Chargois, and Bard as compensation draft picks in 2012 for letting Cuddyer and Kubel depart as free agents. No shame in that. Also, Nathan was having a pretty dismal season coming back from injury in 2011 -- I don't think there was much of a market for him at the July 31st deadline.

Kazmir? Turning a couple months of Feldman into just Pedro Strop wouldn't have been bad either.

Kazmir. Had they not been contending, the Indians could have flipped him.

Stauffer was a mop-up man in San Diego. His three relief seasons in San Diego had the following leverage indexes: 0.77, 0.85, and 0.68 (and even those were broken up by an attempted return to starting). You might as well compare his numbers to 2013 Swarzak for all it mattered to his market value (and at least Swarzak was averaging multiple innings per appearance, which is probably more desirable in a mop-up man than one-inning stints). Heck, Stauffer himself was seeking the chance to start again in 2015, from what I understand. Clippard has a career leverage index of 1.44, Soria 1.67, Madson 1.33, Benoit 1.33, etc. They each have years of experience as top-flight, trusted setup men (if not closers). They've all previously reaped big FA contracts or strong trade returns. They are not comparable acquisitions to Tim Stauffer circa last winter. Why the heck would San Diego have held on to him in that role if he had anything close to the value of those top setup men? Stauffer's actual usage in Minnesota, where he was in full epic meltdown / injury mode, resulted in a 0.62 leverage index, not that much different than his usage in San Diego during his "good" years. He was not seen as a good pitcher by San Diego or arguably by anyone, given the deal he signed and the role he had in Minnesota.

It only changed on the front-page article, not in the forum view. In the forum view, it still shows "Started by Seth Stohs, Feb 19 2016 04:56 PM" with no mention of nick.

Good points that I had not considered. It does seem that once August rolled around, the conversations in Pittsburgh and KC were simply whether ownership would approve adding payroll for Morneau and Willingham. It does stand to reason that we could have kept the upper hand in negotiations by removing that question from the equation. Without having to convince ownership of anything, maybe we get the trade done July 31st for a lower level lotto ticket? Or at least younger fringe 40-man guys like we netted for Liriano's ace potential in 2012? Not a huge deal, but agreed it was an avenue worth exploring that we did not do.

The Twins didn't put a whole lot of fans in the seats the past few years... and what ones that came were there for the Target Field, warehouse district experience more than seeing Mauer or the Hunter reunion...

I think I just posted somewhere today how Stauffer's 2013-2014 was very different from the guys we wanted this winter. He was a mop-up man (and spot starter) in San Diego.

Yes. The 2013 rotation play was desperately devoid of upside. It screamed for Kazmir or at least a Liriano replacement. Looking back, Burton in 2012 could have fetched a return not unlike Jepsen did last summer. Nothing great, but almost certainly better than extending him through rebuilding seasons and delaying that opportunity. Perkins was probably signed with the understanding he wouldn't be flipped, so I'm less critical of holding onto him. In any case, more Burtons or Fiens in those years, or Uehara's or Andrew Miller's or even Liam Hendriks, instead of Grays, Roenickes, Guerriers, etc. would have been advisable.