Parker Hageman

Cruz’s ability to put the sweetest spot of the bat on the ripest part of the ball over the last several seasons has been near baby-making quality. According to StatCast, over the last four seasons he has ranked 8th-4th-8th-and-11th in Barrels per Plate Appearance. What’s more, when you limit the pool to players who have had 400 or more batted ball events during the season, Cruz’s rankings shift to 4th-3rd-3rd-and-4th. It is surprising to see teams forgo the opportunity to sign a player to a one-year deal (plus options) who has demonstrated this level of power consistency but somehow the Twins have coaxed Cruz into doing so. With the lumber he has been amazingly consistent, even at his advanced baseball age. Consider this: Over the last four years, the only person to barrel more pitches than Cruz’s 247 is Boston’s JD Martinez with 251. The barrel statistic is important because a vast majority of those batted ball types become extra base hits. And the MLBAM’s smart guys have conducted research that shows that barrels per plate appearances is a skill that profiles similar to a walk rate or strikeout rate year-over-year. In short, unless injuries or age foil, expect more of the same laser show from Cruz in Minnesota. That being said, 2018 was not Cruz’s best season, statistically speaking. There is no questioning his power -- 37 dingers is impressive -- yet there seems to be some signs of erosion. For instance, he posted his lowest batting average since 2007. Part of the reason may be facing the shift more. In 2018 defenses shifted him in 19.3% of his plate appearances -- a huge leap from 2017 when he saw shifts in 7.3% of the time. Whether it was the presence of the additional fielder on the left side of second base or pure coincidence, Cruz went 22-for-103 (.214) when confronted by the shift in 2018. Those kinds of results can inspire copycats. Another interesting statistic is that Cruz’s performance against the hard stuff (fastballs, sinkers and cutters) declined in 2018. On the surface, this drop can be worrisome. After all, reaction time vanishing with age is a real concern. It is perhaps one reason why Cruz’s market was reduced to just two teams (with the Rays reportedly never giving him a formal offer). When you look deeper however Cruz’s deteriorated performance against the fastball family appears to be less of a function of age and more of a level of luck. In 2018 Cruz hit more of his balls in the air in the left-center to right-center gaps rather than straight down the left field line. He isn’t a prototypical dead-red extreme pull hitter in the mold of say Brian Dozier or Josh Willingham who used Target Field’s inviting left field to their natural advantage. He pulled the ball in the air just 30% of the time this past season, below the league average. With balls hit in the middle of the park, it means some hard hit ones stayed in play (both Safeco and Target Field are two of the most difficult venues for right-handed hitters to hit home runs in the right-center gap). Combine that with more efficient defensive positioning and those hard hit balls became outs. Nevertheless, if you synthesize Cruz’s batted ball profile through the Statcast machine, it shows that Cruz’s actual .264 average and .542 slugging versus hard stuff could have been closer to a .302 average and a .622 slugging percentage. That’s potential upside. As we have seen, the baseball landscape has been changing, enriched with increased velocity and a newfound dedication to high spin fastballs up in the zone. Teams have changed their approach to hitters who normally would mash stuff at the bottom of the strike zone. One such low-ball masher was Nelson Cruz. From 2015 through 2017 Cruz hit 50 home runs on fastballs in the lower half of the zone while posting a monstrous .330/.406/.603 line -- 18th highest slugging percentage among qualified hitters in that time. (Miguel Sano, he wrote foreshadowingly, was 9th on that list.) In that period, the game began to shift. In 2015 the Boston Red Sox pitching staff threw their fastballs 30% of the time at the top of the zone. Baseball was paced by the Nationals’ pitching staff at 35%. In that time the FLY BALL REVOLUTION happened. Blood was shed. Balls were murdered. Families were fractured. Hitters had cultivated swings that acted like a ferris wheel, lifting balls from the bottom of the zone and launching them into orbit with total disregard for human life. Dissatisfied with being a constant punching bag, pitching analysts started to see the value in aiming higher. In time, teams started to replace fastballs with breaking balls and hitting the top of the zone with heaters. This past season, the Boston Red Sox led baseball in upper zone presence with a 45% rate. They would ride this strategy to the World Series. Cruz’s production inverted as opponents starting elevating their fastballs. After punishing the low hard stuff the previous three seasons, he posted a 238/353/390 line on fastballs down in the zone in 2018. Meanwhile he attacked fastballs up. He swung more frequently at heaters at the top of the zone and he made more and better contact. From 2015 to 2017 he connected with just 59% of fastballs in the upper third. In 2018 that number was 70%. Previously he struck out on 31% of fastballs up although he pared that down to 19% in 2018. In that three year window overall he managed to hit .210/.390/.425 with 14 home runs on fastballs up. This past year he hit .261/.455/.693 with 12 home runs. Cruz used to hit long fly balls on pitches down in the zone but that has morphed into a bit of a dead zone for him now as pitches left up in the zone are the ones he has been sending into the stratosphere. It may be a coincidence but given Cruz's track record for preparation, it would make sense that he is parrying along with the attack. An old dog learning a new tricks. A late stage reinvention. If nothing else, Cruz is one weapon in the lineup that won’t be stymied by the growing trend of high fastballs. Beyond that, with his reputation for mentoring others, it would seem that Cruz might be the perfect acquisition to guide other teammates into making the same adjustment. Which brings us back to the Twins. The Minnesota Twins’ offense has been near the bottom of the league when facing high heat. In 2018, they held a team OPS of .673 against fastballs -- 23rd in the MLB. At the top of the list? Boston (828 OPS) and their advanced analytical approach. The Houston Astros had the second highest OPS against fastballs up (.815 OPS) which is not surprising when you consider the level of preparation their team does before the games. Elite teams address weaknesses. There is no denying that Miguel Sano was a mess last year, requiring a trip all the way down to Fort Myers to attempt to reboot. Teams know there are two surefire ways to get Sano out. The first is the slider over the left-handed batters box that he will chase until his last breath. The other is the elevated fastball. Admittedly, Sano was flummoxed by all fastballs regardless of their location in 2018 but, historically, he hasn’t figured out how to deal with the high heat. Sano’s swing is the standard ferris wheel -- down and back up -- which is very potent but can leave hitters susceptible to pitches up. To his credit, he tried to combat the issue by laying off more. Whereas Cruz swung at nearly half of those fastballs, Sano cut down to 32%. If you can’t beat ‘em, layoff ‘em is a viable short-term solution. Still, with the game trending toward more fastballs up, there is opportunity there. And Sano isn’t alone in the lineup. While Cruz led baseball with the highest exit velocity on fastballs up at 97.5, Jorge Polanco had the lowest at 76.6. Not far from him at the bottom was Cruz’s former teammate Jonathan Schoop at 79.4. Max Kepler has hit just .149 vs fastballs up. If Cruz has indeed unlocked a secret to success in the evolving game, the entire Twins lineup could stand to benefit from his knowledge. This is one element of the game that Cruz’s proficiency at could prove useful to the Twins. Additionally, his reputation as someone who puts in work away from the field could be influential to the younger players. When the Houston Astros added Carlos Beltran in 2017, his ability to help the younger roster understand the game better was lauded as one of the reasons the organization was able to win the World Series. Veteran leadership can be a very important intangible. All said, a one-year deal with options that favors the Twins is a seemingly no-lose situation.

Statistically speaking, starting pitchers deteriorate over the course of a game. Perhaps due to familiarity or simply having their stuff wear down in the later innings, the advantage swings drastically to the hitter his third time facing a pitcher. From 2013 to 2017, the first time facing a pitcher, hitters posted a .249/.310/.396 (.706 OPS) batting line. That means every hitter the first time through is like Oakland’s Marcus Siemen, who posted a .706 OPS in 2018. By the third time facing a pitcher, however, hitters posted a .271/.333/.443 (.776 OPS), which means now everyone is Houston’s All-Star George Springer. Teams can combat that by swapping out the starter for a reliever, thus avoiding the dreaded third time through. After all, batters have hit .243/.317/.384 (.700 OPS) against relievers the first time facing them (hello, Cincinnati’s Tucker Barnhart). Using the opener also has the secondary purpose of protecting the primary pitcher — the pitcher who follows the opener — from a lineup’s top of the order, where most of the best hitters reside. With an opener in place, if a team does opt to allow the primary pitcher to go through a third time, chances are they're avoiding the top and middle parts of the order in that go round. In short, The Opener strategy: (1) limits a starter’s exposure to a third time through the order, (2) protects them against facing the team’s better hitters more than once, and (3) allows a manager to align a relief pitcher whose strengths better neutralize a lineup's top three hitters. “Can’t deny the logic,” Twins director of player personnel Mike Radcliff says regarding the strategy. Baseball is a boat race to 27 outs and, on paper, the opener concept could yield favorable results. While the Tampa Bay Rays were first to deploy the strategy, the Twins say they weren’t copycats. In fact, the discussion dates back to last offseason in Fort Myers. And it is likely no coincidence that one key figure in this discussion used to be employed by the Rays. Josh Kalk’s reputation for maximizing pitching results looms large within the game. In the early PitchF/X era, Kalk was a renowned data wizard, dissecting arms, arsenals and strategies, then posting his findings publicly at The Hardball Times. The forward-thinking, budget-ballin’ Rays scooped him up. Kalk’s work has become so highly respected that reportedly 10 teams were vying for his services last winter when he left the Rays organization. The Twins were geeked when they landed him. “He’s clearly an impact guy,” Falvey said of the Kalk hiring. “We had him down at our org meetings, meeting with our pitching coaches and staff. We feel like that's an area he has a certain level of expertise.” It was at those org meetings at the Fort Myers facilities — one dubbed the pitching summit — where the discussion of using a pitcher as a one-inning opener first began, according to Radcliff. At the core of the meetings, per Falvey, was answering the question: How do we get our young pitchers better. “We were wide-open to everything and anything,” Radcliff said of the organization. “We went in with the mindset that we are not afraid to try anything.” Among contributors in the room were guys like Kalk sitting next to former players like LaTroy Hawkins and Bob McClure, new major-league pitching coach Garvin Alston, and minor-league pitching guys like Pete Maki and JP Martinez. Different eras and different viewpoints were represented. The idea of the opener concept was floated, discussed, debated, argued and vetted. It seemed almost too simple — you protect your young pitchers by limiting their exposure as well as controlling the inning allotment. Minimize the risk and maximize the reward. Not all of the ideas shared were unanimously embraced and the use of the opener strategy was one. In general, the difference of opinions during the summit did not faze Falvey. In reflecting on it, he viewed what transpired as healthy. “We're never going to agree completely,” he said. “If we do, that just means we are saying yes to one idea. If we can disagree and actually, genuinely, talk about different perspectives, we've got a chance to make up ground and be better.” Ultimately the parties walked out of the room with an organizational pitching development strategy going forward, and the idea of the opener was back-pocketed. It wouldn’t take long to see the strategy in action. On May 19th the Rays started closer Sergio Romo, allowing him to get the first three outs in front of their primary pitcher, Ryan Yarbrough. Tampa would use the strategy a total of 55 times in 2018. The results were decent enough for the Rays and their young pitchers — especially Yarbrough. Tampa would win 90 games and the 26-year-old rookie would finish the year 16-6, throwing over 140 innings despite making just six traditional starts. In either capacity — starting or primarying — Yarbrough faced the same hitter thrice on a given day just 83 times, one of the lowest totals of anyone who amassed 100 innings in 2018. The Twins watched from afar as the Rays paired their young pitchers with one-inning openers. Unlike the Rays, the Twins were giving starts to veteran pitchers, such as Lance Lynn, Jake Odorizzi, Kyle Gibson, Jose Berrios and a little Phil Hughes while waiting for Ervin Santana to heal. But injuries and ineffectiveness exposed cracks in that facade. *** Want to read the rest of this story, and 70 pages of in-depth analysis of the offseason that’s about to get underway? Claim your copy of the 2019 Offseason Handbook, at a price of your choosing, and you’ll receive it right away.

If there is one thing you should remember from this article it is that Logan Forsythe rarely swings the bat. Over the last two seasons, Joe Mauer offered at 36 percent of pitches thrown his direction. The only person who swung less than that was Logan Forsythe. He deemed just 34 percent of pitches worthy of his lumber. So when a rare event like a Logan Forsythe swing transpired, you would want results that were worthy of the wait. He is sort of the infield version of Robbie Grossman -- likes to gamble that the pitcher can’t throw two consecutive strikes when down in the count. The Dodgers, however, were not fans of this passive approach of letting very hittable pitches scurry by. If there is a second thing you should remember from this article it is that Logan Forsythe did hit a healthy number of home runs, once upon a time. In 2015, Forsythe hit 17 home runs with the Rays. He followed that up with another 20 in 2016. His play was enticing enough that, when the Twins balked at trading Dozier in 2017, the Dodgers flipped a solid pitching prospect for Forsythe instead. However, upon his arrival to Los Angeles, he stopped hitting for power. There were various ailments cited -- a toe injury in April 2017 and a shoulder injury in April 2018 -- that zapped some of his power potential and limited his time on the field. While those are all factors for the power outage, there is also a component of his swing that changed significantly between 2016 and now. Watch the clip of his swing in 2016 (right) compared to 2018 (left): Both swings are against 93 MPH fastballs away from left-handed pitchers, thrown in plus-counts when a hitter should be hunting. For the most part the swings are similar but Forsythe has toned down his pre-launch bat movement since 2016. The added movement before the launch equated to more bat speed. It's simple: less bat speed, less exit velocity. For whatever reason -- a coach’s instruction, a tip from a player, his own development and feel, etc -- Forsythe has removed this element of his swing. In doing so, his average exit velocity has dropped, his average launch angle has decreased, and his ability to drive the ball to right field for power has declined as well (he hit 10 home runs to right in 2015-2016 and has zero since). There is a lot to like about Forsythe’s ability to get the barrel to the ball. He’s a barrel turner (as opposed to someone who hacks down). Watch as his hands turn the barrel rearward before rotating forward to contact. This gets the barrel on plane longer and allows for him to stay back longer instead of drifting toward the pitcher. The other thing to appreciate is that Forsythe actually has a two-strike approach -- something that isn’t always shared by his contemporaries. In two-strike situations Forsythe tones down, eliminating the leg kick and long distance hand load, to try to wait as long as possible and adjust on off-speed pitches: Forsythe rarely chases breaking balls out of the zone. According to ESPN/TruMedia’s data, since 2017 he’s reached on just 14.3 percent of breaking balls outside of the zone whereas the average hitter has done so on just over 30 percent. For comparison’s sake, Joe Mauer has even chased after 23 percent of breaking balls in that time. Forsythe will swing through some (8 percent, same as Mauer) and the results aren’t great when he does make contact (a .588 OPS vs .657 MLB average) but with baseball’s increasing reliance on nasty breaking balls, being able to wait back and keep from chasing after those pitches is rare skill set. Since coming over to the Twins, Forsythe has been some sort of bizarro Shannon Stewart and has been a spark plug for the offense. The offense, of course, isn’t going anywhere except home in October but Forsythe’s play has at least kept the team from improving its draft position. This isn’t meant to read as a sales pitch to the Twins to try to retain Logan Forsythe. A week ago, Seth Stohs asked “What To Do With Logan Forsythe” and the prevailing sentiment seemed to be “drive him to the airport”. When he was acquired, it was accepted that Forsythe was a placeholder until the end of the year. That should probably stay, but night after night he’s piled on the hits and has given the front office, at the very least, a mild case of the considerations. Truthfully, this is probably more of a sales pitch for contending teams interested in an additional bench bat or utility player. If someone is willing to surrender a prospect or project to have a high-contact right-handed bat on the bench for the playoffs (there’s got to be a team interested in a player who can put the ball in play in a pinch) the Twins should absolutely move him. What’s more, Forsythe would also come with untapped power potential if someone could convince him to rekindle his 2016 swing. If there is a third thing you should remember from this article it is that it ended.

According to the Pioneer Press’s Mike Berardino, manager Paul Molitor said that the team’s video scouts were scouring through tape to find any signs of tipping from Hildenberger, but Molitor felt that there wasn’t any signs of tipping. If that is the case how is it that opponents have gone from hitting .120 with nine extra base hits on his changeup and slider from the beginning of the year until July 15 to hitting .454 with eight extra base hits since July 15? The first element of Hildenberger’s second-half issues is predictability. There were patterns that started to emerge from early in the season that may have influenced the results in the latter portion. In his appearances against the Rays in Tampa, Hildenberger didn’t allow a hit off his secondary stuff. In the recent series in Minnesota, the Rays were 4-for-4. Joey Wendle was one of the Rays hitters to reach against his changeup. In the first two matchups in Tampa, Hildenberger struck Wendle out but he may have left a bread crumb for the left-handed hitter: In both meetings, Hildenberger threw a 1-1 changeup to him. At Target Field, facing yet another 1-1 count Wendle sat on Hildenberger’s changeup and laced it into center field for another hit. Another example was his battles with the Royals’ Whit Merrifield. From May 28 until July 21, Hildenberger faced Merrifield four times. In each occasion, Hildenberger started Merrifield off with a slider. The fourth time around Merrifield swung at the slider and knocked a single. In two ABs since that hit, Hildenberger has started him off with sinkers. But while the Royals and Rays did a number on Hildenberger, it has been the Cleveland Indians who have inflicted the most damage. Prior to the rough stretch, Hildenberger made three appearances against the Indians. During those appearances, he held the Indians hitless against his secondary pitches (0-for-5 with 2 strikeouts). Since July 15 Hildenberger has made four additional appearances against Cleveland and has had the same lineup trash his secondary stuff (6-for-12, 2 HR) -- including Francisco Lindor’s game-winning walk-off home run on August 8. What led up to Lindor’s game-winning tank shot? Leading into that August 8th match-up, Hildenberger had faced Lindor five times in 2018. In three of those occasions he started Lindor off with a changeup. If you are Lindor, chances are you can sit on the changeup and take a Daddy Hack. Hildenberger faced Jason Kipnis twice this year. Once at the beginning of the year where he started him with a sinker then two changeups in a row. In their second meeting -- an at-bat that preceded Lindor’s home run by two hitters -- Hildenberger once again started him with a fastball and then threw two changeups -- the second of which Kipnis lifted into left field for a base hit. The second element that may be behind Hildenberger’s struggles is a combination of the predictability and, yes, some pitch-tipping. According to Berardino’s article, Molitor appeared fairly confident that Hildenberger was not doing anything explicit to tip his pitches (flaring his glove or slowing his delivery to telegraph a particular pitch). And that may be true. But before we outright dismiss it, let’s consider there does seem to be a window in which Hildenberger could be tipping his hand. When Hildenberger breaks his hands, he does so away from his body. While he contorts, twists and bends, there appears to be a momentary flash where hitters can see the ball in Hildenberger’s hand. https://twitter.com/ParkerHageman/status/1029027967886913536 Compare Hildenberger’s away from his body hand break approach to the Padres’ submarining reliever Kazuhisa Makita. Makita keeps his hands close to his body and doe not give the hitter one iota of a glimpse at the baseball until it is frisbeeing towards the plate at the opposite of breakneck speed. https://twitter.com/PitchingNinja/status/977542488482353153 This slow motion side angle demonstrates how Hildenberger drops his hand from his glove with the circle change grip (the OK sign around the ball) facing the hitter. https://twitter.com/ParkerHageman/status/1029028462269530112 Most people will obviously say that’s an easy thing to pick up in slow motion but near impossible to decipher in real time. That’s where hitters like Alex Rodriguez and Frank Thomas would tell you you are wrong. In breaking down the changes Yankees’ starter Luis Severino made, Rodriguez commended the pitcher for hiding the ball more, starting his hands at the belt and breaking them behind his leg versus out away from his body. As Rodriguez shows in the video below, even a brief flash of the changeup grip would tip off a hitter. https://twitter.com/ParkerHageman/status/1029028586227986433 While not every team may be wise to his, the Indians may be one ballclub that has picked up on it. With the familiarity and perhaps an extra advantage in knowing what pitch may be coming, it wouldn’t be surprising to hear this is why Cleveland has been able to batter Hildenberger around so much in July and August. Again, the latter portion of this is a theory. The Twins have multiple camera angles, such as views from behind home plate, that could confirm this. Plus, if he were tipping, one of the members of the catching crew -- either Bobby Wilson or Mitch Garver -- likely would have mentioned something to the staff. If hitters are seeing something, catchers should definitely be able to as well. That being said, the Twins have little incentive to acknowledge or broadcast the notion that Hildenberger’s tipping pitches. If his mechanics are giving something away -- and again, IF -- the Twins would most likely want to get him quietly to the offseason where they could begin to address it (hiding the ball better like the aforementioned Makita).

First, take a look at the play https://twitter.com/MorrieSilver8/status/1027573652278177792 Let’s break this sucker down for a moment. The throw comes in from right field, relayed to third where Tigers’ prospect Dawel Lugo had just advanced. Astudillo, who catches the ball on a hop, looks around to find former Twins player Doug Mientkiewicz, the manager and third base coach of the Toledo Mudhens, approaching Lugo for a quick chat and confidence builder at the bag. Astudillo told MiLB.com’s Josh Horton afterward that this was when he knew they had a chance to pull it off. "As soon as I got the ball, I looked at the third-base coach [Toledo skipper Doug Mientkiewicz] and the runner, and they were looking different ways. Petit was the only one who knew that I had the ball in the glove, and then the pitcher, and it worked. It worked the whole time," Astudillo told Horton. On the mound at the time was recent acquisition Chase De Jong. From De Jong’s perspective, he thought Astudillo was messing around. "I'm starting to walk back to the mound and I'm upset. I'm asking [Astudillo] for the ball, and he sort of just gives me a quick head shake, like a quick 'no,'" the right-hander told reporters. "And he's kind of a jokester, so I'm thinking, 'All right, now's not the best time to be joking with me.' So I ask for the ball again and he shakes his head again and I'm like, 'OK, something's up.'” It was great salesmanship all around as Lugo, of course, started to wander off the base and Astudillo quickly applied the tag. It’s a rarity for sure, but things like the hidden ball trick are one of the reasons why baseball might just be the greatest game on Earth.