Teflon

If the Pohlads truly treated this as a business as you wrote, wouldn't they have been more active in changing managers in a sport where that is a normal course of action? Instead, they gave both Tom Kelly and Ron Gardenhire the managerial latitude to each lose 90 games 4 years in a row - something accomplished only twice in the rest of baseball history. (And one of those other managers actually owned the team.) Also, if they were so concerned with saving money, dismissing Gardenhire with a year left on his contract doesn't make much sense since they now have to eat that money.

Jim Thielman wrote in his book, "The Cool of the Evening", that a long-standing joke about the team was that the TC logo on their hats really stood for "Twenty Cubans" since the team had a number of Cuban players in the 1960s like Oliva, Cardenas, Pasqual, Ramos, Valdespino, Versalles...

List of managers who have lost 90 or more games four consecutive years with the same team: Tom Kelly, Minnesota Twins, 1997-2000 Zack Taylor, St. Louis Browns, 1948-1951 Connie Mack, Philadelphia A's, 1940-1943

It’s an honor when an MLB player is recognized as the best offensive or defensive player at his position by his league but it’s an even greater honor when he’s recognized as both. Greater, but not all that rare, it seems. Since the Silver Slugger award originated in 1980, the two awards have been given simultaneously to players a total of 172 times or about 5 times per season out of the 17 possible occurrences. The first players to be awarded the combo platter* were Keith Hernandez, Willie Wilson, Mike Schmidt, Andre Dawson and Cecil Cooper in 1980. The first Twins player to earn the pair of awards together was Kirby Puckett in 1986. (Kirby went on to do it four more times.) The last Twin was Joe Mauer in 2010, the last of three consecutive seasons he did so. Only one other Twins player won a Silver Slugger and Gold Glove in the same season - Chuck Knoblauch in 1997. Ken Griffey Jr., Barry Bonds, and Ivan Rodriguez each won the pair of awards seven times– the highest totals in the 33 years that both have been awarded. Mike Hampton in 2003 is the only pitcher to win the pair together. Hampton actually has FIVE Silver Slugger awards, the same as Mauer, if you’re counting. (Mark Portugal even has a Silver Slugger award, Joe!) Inexplicably, there have been 16 occurrences of players being recognized as both their league’s outstanding offensive and defensive player at their position in a season in which they failed to reach the All-Star game. This actually happened to Matt Williams twice – in 1993 and 1997 – and most recently to Chase Headley and Adam LaRoche in 2012. This has never happened to a Yankee, however. * - No, I did not have a combo platter for lunch today. Egg salad, avocado, some sprouts and pepperoncini on a croissant. A little watermelon on the side.

On a previous lunch hour, between bites of an All-P sandwich* I was wondering if there was a usable correlation between the number of All-Stars teams have and an expected number of wins. I thought if a team had a lot of All-Stars and lower than expected wins, this might suggest lackluster managing. Higher than average expected wins per All-Star, perhaps good managing.It turns out there actually is a very strong step up in average winning percentage for each incremental All-Star a team has. Roughly this: one All-Star – average winning percent of .458; two All-Stars, .501; three All-Stars, .542; four All-Stars, .557, and so on. The problem with using this information is the incredible market bias in All-Star selections. To be able to evaluate Yankees managers and Twins managers on common ground, each team’s positive or negative bias in All-Star selections has to be compensated for. To do this, I counted the number of All-Star selections each year and totaled the number of league wins. I then computed each year’s average wins per All-Star and applied this to each team’s winning percentage to determine the equitable number of All-Stars each team should have had. Summing the actual number of All-Stars each team has had through its history and dividing this by the sum of equitable All-Stars creates an index value per team than can be used for the aforementioned manager evaluation. Which team has the biggest bias in All-Star team selection? Do I really have to ask? Of course, it’s the Yankees with nearly 52% more All-Stars than a fair distribution suggests, given the team’s success. This is far and away the highest bias, as the closest team, the Cardinals, are at +23%. Rounding out the top 5 are the Red Sox at +21%, and the Dodgers and the Reds both at 13%. Conversely, the Rodney Dangerfield teams of All-Star selections are led by the Rays at -20%, the A’s and Astros at -19%, the Pirates at -18%, and the Royals at -17%. The Twins, if you’re curious, are at -15%, which is 9th worst. If you’re curious about which managers overachieved or underachieved in their careers relative to the number of All-Stars their teams had, adjusted for All-Star bias, here are looks at the top 10 and bottom 10 calculated during today’s lunch hour between bites of a Waldorf salad. Results are based on average seasonal difference between actual wins and expected wins. And the manager had to be the manager for the majority of a team’s games to be credited for that season and had to manage at least 5 seasons. The Good: 1. Joe McCarthy +12.7 wins per season. 2. Billy Southworth +11.2 wins 3. Joe Girardi +9.9 wins 4. Bobby Cox +7.8 wins 5. Al Lopez +7.7 wins 6. Earl Weaver +7.7 wins 7. Walter Alston + 7.7 wins 8. Pete Rose + 6.7 wins 9. Billy Martin + 6.6 wins 10. Jimy Williams +6.5 wins The Not So Good: 1. Connie Mack -12.2 wins 2. Jimmie Wilson -11.8 wins 3. Billy Meyer -9.7 wins 4. Preston Gomez -9.7 wins 5. Buddy Bell -9.3 wins 6. Ossie Bluege -8.1 wins 7. Fred Haney -7.7 wins 8. Del Crandall -6.5 wins 9. Manny Acta -6.1 wins 10. Mary Marion -6.0 wins Twins managers: 1. Billy Martin +6.7 wins 2. Frank Quilici +3.2 wins 3. Ron Gardenhire +1.5 wins 4. Gene Mauch +0.7 wins 5. Ray Miller -0.3 wins 6. Sam Mele -1.2 wins 7. Tom Kelly -2.4 wins 8. Cal Ermer -2.6 wins 9. Billy Gardner -3.9 wins 10. Bill Rigney -5.4 wins * pastrami, prosciutto, provolone, peppers, poupon and pickles on pumpernickel Click here to view the article

On a previous lunch hour, between bites of an All-P sandwich* I was wondering if there was a useable correlation between the number of All-Stars teams have and an expected number of wins. I thought if a team had a lot of all-stars and lower-than expected the wins, it might suggest a lackluster managing job. Higher than average wins per all-star, good managing. It turns out there actually is a very strong step up in average winning percentage for each incremental All-Star a team has. Roughly this: 1 All-Star – average winning percent of .458; 2 All-Stars, .501; 3 All-Stars, .542; 4 All-Stars, .557, and so on. The problem with using this information is the incredible market bias in all-star selections. To be able to evaluate Yankees managers and Twins managers on common ground, each team’s positive or negative bias in All-Star selections has to be compensated for. To do this, I counted the number of All-Star selections each year and totaled the number of total league wins. I then figured out each year’s average wins per all-star and applied this to each team’s winning percentage to determine the equitable number of all-stars each team should have had. Summing the actual number of All-Stars each team had historically and dividing this by the sum of equitable All-Stars historically creates an index value per team than can be used for the aforementioned manager evaluation. Which team has the biggest bias in All-Star team selection? Do I really have to ask? Of course, it’s the Yankees with nearly 52% more All-Stars than a fair distribution suggests given the team’s success. This is by far and away the highest bias as the next closest team, the Cardinals, are at +23%. Rounding out the top 5 are the Red Sox at +21%, and the Dodgers and the Reds both at 13%. Conversely, the Rodney Dangerfield teams of All-Star selections are led by the Rays at -20%, the A’s and Astros at -19%, the Pirates at -18%, and the Royals at -17%. The Twins, if you’re curious, are at -15% which is 9th worst. If you’re curious about which managers overachieved or underachieved in their careers relative to the number of All-Stars their teams had, (adjusted for All-Star bias) here are looks at the top 10 and bottom 10 calculated during today’s lunch hour between bites of a Waldorf salad. (Based on average seasonal difference between actual wins and expected wins – had to be the manager for the majority of a team’s games to be credited for that season, had to manage at least 5 seasons.) The Good 1. Joe McCarthy +12.7 wins per season to expectation. 2. Billy Southworth +11.2 wins 3. Joe Girardi +9.9 wins 4. Bobby Cox +7.8 wins 5. Al Lopez +7.7 wins 6. Earl Weaver +7.7 wins 7. Walter Alston + 7.7 wins 8. Pete Rose + 6.7 wins 9. Billy Martin + 6.6 wins 10. Jimy Williams +6.5 wins The Not-So Good 1. Connie Mack -12.2 wins 2. Jimmie Wilson -11.8 wins 3. Billy Meyer -9.7 wins 4. Preston Gomez -9.7 wins 5. Buddy Bell -9.3 wins 6. Ossie Bluege -8.1 wins 7. Fred Haney -7.7 wins 8. Del Crandall -6.5 wins 9. Manny Acta -6.1 wins 10. Mary Marion -6.0 wins And finally a look at the Twins managers , ranked best to worst: 1. Billy Martin +6.7 wins 2. Frank Quilici +3.2 wins 3. Ron Gardenhire +1.5 wins 4. Gene Mauch +0.7 wins 5. Ray Miller -0.3 wins 6. Sam Mele -1.2 wins 7. Tom Kelly -2.4 wins 8. Cal Ermer -2.6 wins 9. Billy Gardner -3.9 wins 10. Bill Rigney -5.4 wins * pastrami, prosciutto, provolone, peppers, poupon and pickles on pumpernickel

While the criteria for players being voted into the Hall of Fame is often subject of debate, the accomplishments required for managers is much more consistent. Every MLB manager that accomplished any of the following conditions has been enshrined in the Hall of Fame: 1. Win at least 2000 games. (most wins and not in –Gene Mauch 1902; most wins among active managers – Bruce Bochy 1593) 2. Win at least 3 World Series titles. (Active managers with 2 titles- Bruce Bochy, Terry Francona) 3. Win at least 1000 games with a winning percentage over .580 (AKA the Earl Weaver condition. Joe Girardi has the best winning percentage among active manages with over 500 wins. .561, 703 wins) 4. Win at least 2 World Series titles with at least 1500 wins and a .520 winning percentage. (Francona has the two titles and a.531 winning percentage with 1181 current wins) Exceptions - Three managers are in the Hall of Fame without meeting any of the above conditions: Wilbert Robinson (1399-1398, .500, no World Series titles, 2 league pennants) “Uncle Robbie” doesn’t stack up to any other HOF managers on a basis of wins, winning percentage, World Series titles, or league pennants. Simply a sentimental selection by voters. Whitey Herzog (1281-1185, .532, 1 World Series title, 3 league pennants) Note: If Herzog is in the HOF, then Billy Martin who has superior qualifications to Herzog should also be in. (1253-1013, .553, 2 World Series titles, 3 league pennants) Ned Hanlon (1253-1096, .533, no World Series titles, 5 League pennants)

Based on SMASH, (my new favorite thing) Josh WIllingham was the 6th strongest Twin of all time. 1. Don Mincher 2. Harmon Killebrew 3. Jim Thome 4. Tim Laudner 5. David Ortiz 6. Josh WIllingham SMASH is simply SLG divided by BA. It measures the average number of bases associated to each hit. The ranking is based on the highest peak season SMASH value for each hitter.

Parker Hageman posed his thoughts on how the Twins can improve their rotation through free agency. The players he suggested were either once-good pitchers who are now in decline or once-promising pitchers who have failed to keep their promises. If you are the Twins GM and those are the best pitching options the team can hope for in 2014, you wonder if there might be a simpler (and much cheaper) solution that nobody's thinking of. The 4-man rotation. Like nearly everyone, you were ready to dismiss this as foolish or irrelevant in this day and age of delicate arms, guaranteed mega-contracts and pitch counts. But what if you didn't use it to divide more innings among fewer starters. What if you adapted it to address this fundamental premise: A mediocre starting pitcher's third trip through the lineup is usually crap. And to that end, you could attempt to optimize those opportunities for disaster by replacing them with something better. http://hall-fame.com/cuellar.jpg How would it work? First, you'll need to say arrivederci to your 5th starting pitcher and 3rd catcher. Replace them with two relievers and then smile inwardly just a bit because you know this fundamental premise to be true, but not leveraged: Serviceable relief pitchers are easier to find than serviceable starting pitchers. (Cheaper, too.) With your 25-man roster now aligned as needed, you then set these two rules for utilizing your mediocre 4-man rotation: Have no expectation to EVER pitch a starter more than 5 innings. Plan for regular use of a 6-man combo of middle relievers to share middle innings.Seems pretty simple. You're exchanging that third trip through an opponent's batting order by a mediocre pitcher for some fresh-armed innings of relief from an expanded relief corps. Hell, you can even do some lefty-righty match-ups you didn't have a chance to do before. You've looked at the K-rates and opposing batting averages of your pitchers for years acknowledging (but not exploiting) the fact that a player pitching out of the bullpen does better in those categories than when he starts. (You might be looking at Glen Perkins as you muse about this) You know that's because he can throttle-up in a much shorter appearance and he doesn't get exposed to any batter more than once. Why then, haven't you thought it would be advantageous to have more of those kinds of innings as opposed to the tail end of a Mike Pelfrey start? You shake your head when you realize that your team's old pitching philosophy was to let a mediocre starter pitch until he got into trouble. This meant that you were usually engineering a trouble situation to be your key to make your pitching change. This is definitely better, you think. It does all of the following: Takes away 25-30 starts from a horrible starting pitcher Doesn't add any innings to the 4 starters. Just shifts their innings from the ends of games when they're tired to the beginnings of games when they're fresh. Limits starting pitchers' exposure. Starters will not get a third time through a batting order.This really is just evolution, you think. This philosophy is already used for closers. They don't get used to respond to specific game situations but rather to optimize the 9th inning. Same with the setup pitcher. He optimizes the 8th inning. Why shouldn't you optimize the middle innings as much as possible, too? Is there a downside, you wonder? Your four starters will still pitch comparable innings to other starters so don't have to worry about how their stats compare at contract time - plus they should get a couple more wins because they're still going 5 and getting more starts. Hell, pitching more innings when they're fresh might even improve the quality of their stats. Quite possibly their health and longevity, too. Inter-league play? Does losing a bench player mean you lose an opportunity to pinch-hit? You still have 12 batters. You could still pinch-hit 3 or 4 times in a National League game. You can live with that. Workload for the bullpen? You're not getting them up in knee-jerk response as much and you added 120-140 innings worth of arms out there. Pretty close to the innings lost from a 5th starter. Prep time for the starters? Can they adapt to three off days instead of four? Is that adequate time to recover from a now lessened 80-pitch workload? That's going to be the main question to answer. Hopefully one you can test this season. Click here to view the article

Download attachment: metstadium1.jpg The Minnesota Twins started the 1980 season with a 12-game west coast road trip and didn't open at Metropolitan Stadium until late in April. I was going to college in Minneapolis at the time and when the day of the home opener dawned warm & sunny, there was no mistaking mother nature's intent for me to go to the ballpark and not my Tuesday classes. [PRBREAK][/PRBREAK] A buddy of mine had reached a similar conclusion so, seeing as I had the wheels, (a sweet mint green '73 Nova) we hit Zip's Liquor Store for a cooler of cold ones and Clark's Subs for sustenance and cruised down to Met Stadium for a day of tailgating and Twins baseball. Temps were already in the 80's and traffic was heavy as every college student in the Twin Cities and half the state workers had been likewise seduced. We inched the last half-mile down Cedar with our windows cranked down and stereos cranked up. We weren't worrying that it was taking forever to get into the Met parking lot, because, hell, it just felt awesome to sit and bake in the sun in the car for a while. One-by-one, we finally got in, paid our $2 to park and found our way to the grinning Indian sign in the Cleveland section of the lot. Darn racist, we often admitted, but sure easy to spot. We got in line to get tickets ($4 unreserved bleachers behind 3rd base) and went back to the vicinity of the Nova to kibbutz and nosh and quaff. There were already great smells and great sounds and Frisbees everywhere. We opened the trunk, got out the cooler, and set about formally making some toasts. To the weather. The girls in tube tops. Bombo Rivera... It's about this time that the details start getting less distinct. I recall the Twins started their crafty lefty Geoff Zahn. I don't recall the Angels' starter but in looking it up on Baseball Reference see that it was Dave Frost, who had pitched a 10-inning 4-hitter against the Twins a week earlier in Anaheim. No such luck for Frost in the rematch. Roy Smalley hit a 2-run homer in the bottom of the first and Minnesota never trailed after, adding 6 more runs on home runs by Hosken Powell and Ron "Papa Jack" Jackson, a double by Rob Wilfong and base hit by Butch Wynegar. Zahn went the distance, giving up only one run and 6 hits. I would have tacked onto the end of the previous sentence "sending the 36,268 in attendance home happy" but for the fact that the Twins, not envisioning 90-degree weather on the 22nd of April, grossly underestimated the walk-up sales and the beer supply required, exhausting their supply long before satisfying demand. This, of course, led to friction in the cases of the less-than-adequately lubricated fans. At least those who didn't have the foresight to stop at Zip's. I've had memorable, enjoyable, drama-filled games at the Metrodome and Target Field that I wouldn't mind reliving but to be 21 and do April 22nd, 1980 over again, would be my favorite, I think. Postscript: I saw on the box score on Baseball Reference that this game was protested by the Angels. Unless they were miffed by the Twins running out of beer I don't remember why this was. Anyone remember? Click here to view the article

Download attachment: delmon.jpg As reported in the Detroit Free Press, Tigers' GM Dave Dombrowski (who I occasionally confuse with this guy or this guy) announced that the Tigers weren't planning to bring back American League Championship Series MVP Delmon Young next season. Young, playing out a 1-year 6.75 million dollar contract, hit .267/.296/.411 in 151 games for the Tigers in 2012 with 18 HR, 74 RBI and a 20/112 walks-to-strikeouts rate. He began the season as Detroit's starting left fielder but was soon swapped with Andy Dirks and moved to DH limiting his defensive "exposure" to only 31 games. Delmon negated some of his lackluster performance over the regular season by putting together his best stretch of baseball in the postseason. Young went 6 for 17 with a pair of homeruns and 6 RBI in the ALCS and 5 for 14 with another homeun in the World Series. I'm assuming that Dombrowski and the Tigers saw beyond Young's one atypical week and a half of October hitting and instead saw a player who at only 27 can no longer can play defense and who produced worse offensive results over the 25 weeks of the regular season than the proverbial "replacement player." (-1.2 WAR) I'm assuming that unlike a lot of casual fans, the Tigers front office has not forgotten about this little incident, either. Who is the real Delmon Young? Is he a much-talented player that squandered what could have been a great career through indifference and an unstable temperament - or a vastly overrated prospect that couldn't live up to unrealistic expectations? (And what lies ahead for Delmon?) Click here to view the article

Download attachment: wed4.jpg My Twins season ticket renewal package arrived today in the mail. As per usual it's a beautiful and oversized PR masterpiece "dedicated to the greatness of our season ticket holders." In an attempt to come up with a theme to convince us to once again fill the seats at Target Field, the Twins are appealing to our loyalty for 2013. "There will be ups," the packet says. "There will be downs... Yet at the end of the day, the uniform remains." [PRBREAK][/PRBREAK] Over the next few weeks, many of us will be considering whether we want to make this rather major investment again in 2013. The Twins are banking on us (literally) to choose to re-up, but indications are that a pair of sub-70 win seasons have quickly cooled our infatuations. But to what extent? And might they have cooled anyway? In looking back at the history of the enormous wave of baseball-only ballpark construction that began with new Comiskey Park in 1991 and beautiful Camden Yards in Baltimore the next year, the question is just how quickly the novelty wears off of these new ballparks and when we might start seeing attendance levels more directly tied to the on-field product. To answer this, I looked at the average attendance per game in the first season that each new park was open and used this as a baseline to index the subsequent attendances for the next 10 years of each park. If a team drew 40,000 per game the first year and 32,000 the next year, for example, that would be an index of 80. Excluding Target Field, the average attendance index for all new ballparks opened since 1991 (20 total) goes in this sequence: 1st year - 100 (obviously), then 91, 87, 87, 88, 86, 85, 87, 81, 75. Since this includes teams that have both played well initially in their new parks like Cleveland and Atlanta as well as those that played poorly like Pittsburgh and Detroit, the effects of wins and losses are somewhat countered. I think it's safe to say that about 10-15 percent of the fan base at a new stadium will erode in the first couple of years unless the team plays great. We've seen that pattern repeated at Target Field as the Twins index based on per-game attendance has been 100 in 2010, 98 last year and 88 in the games played this year. Looking ahead, I tried to identify the teams and ballparks opened previously that had the best similarities in their first three year attendance trends to the Twins. Atlanta, Cincinnati, Houston, and San Diego as the most similar. While they all played slightly better baseball than the Twins, they were consistent enough from year-to-year in wins and losses that I trust their attendances to be indicative of their fans' levels of interest as the ballpark stops being a novelty. Their trends tended to mirror the overall average for the first 4 or five years, but then dipped farther below the rest around year 6. I look for the Twins to be more like this group. 2013 and 2014 should continue to see crowds of 80% to 85% of capacity eventually dropping and leveling out another 5% to 10% lower, assuming the Twins don't do something crazy like win 100 games. The attendance indices for the first 10 years of each ballpark along with their number of wins is shown in the chart below. Some data for ballparks that opened in the 90s is affected by the strike of 94 and 95. I noted these figures in red. Download attachment: chart1.jpg Click here to view the article

Good point. Last year's opening day obligation was $82 million and the Twins current 2014 obligation is currently around $76 million although that doesn't factor the returning ex-Twins Kubel, Bartlett, or Guerrier who signed minor league deals. The $22 million in salary they rid themselves of in jettisoning Morneau, Doumit, and Carroll was essentially redirected to Nolasco, Hughes, and Suzuki. To be more accurate, what's "uncharacteristic" is - not the money being spent in total - but the money being spent on free agents. Of course this raises the question of what the Twins are actually planning on doing with the additional $25 million they received as their share of the renegotiated national TV deal with MLB, doesn't it? They could have gone harder in pursuit of a top-tier pitcher or major-league quality shortstop.

Thank you 24-hour sports news media and the blogosphere for clamping onto Richard Sherman for dear life and not letting go since, if not for Sherman, all of this broadcast and blogging void would have had to have been filled with even more dissection of Peyton's use of the word "Omaha" at the line of scrimmage.

http://hall-fame.com/ricky_manny.jpg I think he looks more like Manny from Modern Family.

http://hall-fame.com/cuellar.jpg Parker Hageman posed his thoughts on how the Twins can improve their rotation through free agency. The players he suggested were either once-good pitchers who are now in decline or once-promising pitchers who have failed to keep their promises. If you are the Twins GM and those are the best pitching options the team can hope for in 2014, you wonder if there might be a simpler (and much cheaper) solution that nobody's thinking of. The 4-man rotation. Like nearly everyone, you were ready to dismiss this as foolish or irrelevant in this day and age of delicate arms, guaranteed mega-contracts and pitch counts. But what if you didn't use it to divide more innings among fewer starters. What if you adapted it to address this fundamental premise: A mediocre starting pitcher's third trip through the lineup is usually crap. And to that end, you could attempt to optimize those opportunities for disaster by replacing them with something better. How would it work? First, you'll need to say arrivederci to your 5th starting pitcher and 3rd catcher. Replace them with two relievers and then smile inwardly just a bit because you know this fundamental premise to be true, but not leveraged: Serviceable relief pitchers are easier to find than serviceable starting pitchers. (Cheaper, too.) With your 25-man roster now aligned as needed, you then set these two rules for utilizing your mediocre 4-man rotation: Have no expectation to EVER pitch a starter more than 5 innings. Plan for regular use of a 6-man combo of middle relievers to share middle innings. Seems pretty simple. You're exchanging that third trip through an opponent's batting order by a mediocre pitcher for some fresh-armed innings of relief from an expanded relief corps. Hell, you can even do some lefty-righty match-ups you didn't have a chance to do before. You've looked at the K-rates and opposing batting averages of your pitchers for years acknowledging (but not exploiting) the fact that a player pitching out of the bullpen does better in those categories than when he starts. (You might be looking at Glen Perkins as you muse about this) You know that's because he can throttle-up in a much shorter appearance and he doesn't get exposed to any batter more than once. Why then, haven't you thought it would be advantageous to have more of those kinds of innings as opposed to the tail end of a Mike Pelfrey start? You shake your head when you realize that your team's old pitching philosophy was to let a mediocre starter pitch until he got into trouble. This meant that you were usually engineering a trouble situation to be your key to make your pitching change. This is definitely better, you think. It does all of the following: Takes away 25-30 starts from a horrible starting pitcher Doesn't add any innings to the 4 starters. Just shifts their innings from the ends of games when they're tired to the beginnings of games when they're fresh. Limits starting pitchers' exposure. Starters will not get a third time through a batting order. This really is just evolution, you think. This philosophy is already used for closers. They don't get used to respond to specific game situations but rather to optimize the 9th inning. Same with the setup pitcher. He optimizes the 8th inning. Why shouldn't you optimize the middle innings as much as possible, too? Is there a downside, you wonder? Your four starters will still pitch comparable innings to other starters so don't have to worry about how their stats compare at contract time - plus they should get a couple more wins because they're still going 5 and getting more starts. Hell, pitching more innings when they're fresh might even improve the quality of their stats. Quite possibly their health and longevity, too. Inter-league play? Does losing a bench player mean you lose an opportunity to pinch-hit? You still have 12 batters. You could still pinch-hit 3 or 4 times in a National League game. You can live with that. Workload for the bullpen? You're not getting them up in knee-jerk response as much and you added 120-140 innings worth of arms out there. Pretty close to the innings lost from a 5th starter. Prep time for the starters? Can they adapt to three off days instead of four? Is that adequate time to recover from a now lessened 80-pitch workload? That's going to be the main question to answer. Hopefully one you can test this season. Addendum: The Rockies Interesting Rotation Experiment Rockies four-man rotation gathering traction as season continues

[ATTACH=CONFIG]4766[/ATTACH] Structure: 2 Leagues 16 teams in 4 4-team divisions, wherever possible preserving traditional league associations and rivalries. (Only exceptions - Colorado, Tampa Bay swap leagues to have closer divisional opponents) 1 western expansion team and 1 southern expansion team are needed to field even team numbers by league and division with symmetrical alignments. Schedule: Ideally no inter-league games. 18 games against teams in the division, 9 versus each team in the rest of the league. Should I not be as omnipotent as I thought and interleague play has to continue, 18 games against teams in division. 8 games versus each team in rest of league. 3 games versus each team in one interleague division – rotating divisions yearly. Rules: If interleague play stays, DH is universally adopted. If no interleague play, NL could stay in the dark ages although the DH would be used for the All-Star game and ALL World Series games. 5th umpire is added in replay booth to review close plays. Playoffs: No wild cards. Four division winners qualify. Teams with best records get home field advantage. AMERICAN LEAGUE AL East Baltimore Orioles Boston Red Sox New York Yankees Toronto Blue Jays AL Central Chicago White Sox Cleveland Indians Detroit Tigers Minnesota Twins AL South Colorado Rockies Houston Astros Kansas City Royals Texas Rangers AL West Los Angeles Angels Oakland A’s Seattle Mariners Expansion Team 1 (Portland?) NATIONAL LEAGUE NL East New York Mets Philadelphia Phillies Pittsburgh Pirates Washington Nationals NL Central Chicago Cubs Cincinnati Reds Milwaukee Brewers St. Louis Cardinals NL South Atlanta Braves Miami Marlins Tampa Bay Rays Expansion Team 2 (New Orleans?, Charlotte? Monterrey?) NL West Arizona Diamondbacks Los Angeles Dodgers San Diego Padres San Francisco Giants

Sounds like a good solution for the Twins and for Benson as well.

Mike Marshall had a doctorate degree in kinesiology - which is the study of the human body in motion - so was less a freak of nature than he was a studied master of his discipline. Marshall, like Campbell, (and Tug McGraw) threw a very effective screwball as an out pitch - something you don't see much anymore.