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Comparing First Round Draft Pick Performance


jay

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First, the results. Then, how in the heck I got them. We’ll use Wins Above Replacement (WAR) to assess how well the Twins have drafted in the first round from 2003 to 2011 compared to the rest of the league.

 

From 2003-2011, the Twins’ first-round picks were:

23rd in expected WAR per pick. This is an indication of their consistently low draft position due to successful teams and supplemental round picks.

15th in total expected WAR. The Twins make up ground here due to the additional picks they gained in the supplemental round as compensation for losing free agents.

19th in actual WAR generated. The Twins draft picks from 2003-2011 have produced WAR at a lower rate than the league average.

19th in pick efficiency. This most directly ties to “how well they drafted” after accounting for both draft position and total number of picks. I’m defining pick efficiency as the ratio of actual WAR to expected WAR.

 

This has certainly had an impact on the poor results we’ve seen out of the team from 2011-2014. Many other avenues of talent acquisition exist, but for teams like the Twins and many others, the acquisition of amateurs plays a large role. The draft goes much deeper than the first round, but failing to get significant production there can be quite the challenge to overcome.

 

It’s amazing how a Mike Trout or a Clayton Kershaw can make your team look good at first round draft picks, as seen by the Angels and Dodgers. The Red Sox did poorly from 2006 going forward as shown in Parker’s recent analysis, but they get credit for Jacoby Ellsbury and a few others here. The Diamondbacks did well, but traded away Scherzer, J. Upton and Stephen Drew – their top 3 performing picks. You might also notice a pretty strong correlation between the teams at the bottom of the list and the teams that have stunk in recent years. Sure would hate to be a Phillies fan – that organization has managed to get negative WAR out of their first rounds picks – yow-ouuch.

 

The Twins didn’t hit any homers with their first round picks in this timeframe. However, expectations needed to be tempered in the first place. They’ve underperformed even to that lowered standard, but this analysis doesn’t show them to be among the very worst either.

 

Smack-dab middle of the pack in total expected WAR + below average pick efficiency + trading away the draft pick that represented over a third of the actual WAR generated (Garza) for a terrible left fielder = very little visible MLB production for the Twins out of the 2003-2011 first round picks.

 

2015 01 30 12 59 38

 

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Now, for those so inclined, the approach.

 

Over the last decade, a number of extremely smart statistical researchers have explored the value of draft picks. I am not one of them. For simplicity, I decided to use the figures created by Andrew Ball (which are quite similar to others out there):

Tier 1 – Pick #1 Expected WAR = 11.83

Tier 2 – Pick #2 Expected WAR = 10.09

Tier 3 – Pick #3-7 Expected WAR = 5.37

Tier 4 – Pick #8-15 Expected WAR = 5.21

Tier 5 – Pick #16-30 Expected WAR = 2.65

Tier 6 – Pick #31-60 Expected WAR = 1.41

 

It is important to note that the expected WAR figures represent only the first 6 years of a player’s career. This is done with the expectation that teams are paying market rates for players that have reached free agency and their draft value has been expended. Data on first round draft picks and the WAR they have generated was collected from Baseball Reference.

 

I wanted the results here to reflect on the struggles from 2011-2014, so I intentionally didn’t go any further back than 2003 because those players had largely used up their first six years early in that period or before it. An argument could be made to include the 2002 class since most of the big names wouldn't have reached free agency until the 2013 season (Greinke, Hamels, Cain, BJ Upton), but I’ve excluded them. Note that this leaves out Denard Span from 2002 and Joe Mauer from 2001, both resounding successes of first-round picks.

 

With our time frame selected and the expected values defined, I tried to account for the fact that the more recent draft years are unlikely to have utilized all of their pre-free agency years by discounting the expected WAR for those more recent draft classes. The expected WAR in the first 6 years for the 2007-2011 draft classes were reduced by the following factors:

2011 = 1/6

2010 = 2/6

2009 = 3/6

2008 = 4/6

2007 = 5/6

This factoring isn’t perfect, as players come up at different rates, but the ratios of actual to expected WAR within the draft class stay reasonably steady at these rates. This discounting is actually a benefit for teams that have already gotten MLB production from these recent draft classes, which seems fine to me with our goal of assessing impact on the 2011-2014 seasons. We also might get some WAR from the older draft classes beyond their first 6 years. To adjust for this, I looked at the individual players in the 2003-2005 classes with more than 5 career WAR, looked up their stats on BRef and reduced their WAR by any amounts earned beyond 6 years (this sounds like a lot of work, but it was really only like 20 guys).

 

In looking through the data, I’m satisfied that we’re at least close enough to get a good gauge of team drafting performance. If you’ve made it this far, I’d be happy to share the Excel file with anyone interested (send me a PM with your email). I’ve also done some analysis specific to the Twins’ picks and whether or not they made it to MLB in relation to league averages, so I might follow up with that.

 

I hope the info here provides some help in assessing the Twins’ recent first round draft performance. Thanks in advance for your comments, insights and feedback.

 

Photo credit to Mizzou Media Relations

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Really interesting stuff Jay.  Thanks for the blog.

 

One thing that jumped out at me was the teams at the top have a few guys with a ton of WAR.  Kershaw has accumulated 39 and Trout 27, for example. 

 

The other thing that jumped out at me, was the composition of the Twins picks.  Of the 8 position players, 7 were high school picks.  Of the 11 pitchers, only 3 were high school pitchers (none very low, Waldrop 25, Ranville 39, and Boyd 55).

 

We basically ignored high school pitchers with our lower picks and this is a group that yielded a lot of WAR.  Kershaw, Bumgarter, Strasburg, etc..  A few organizations have made this a focus. 

 

The two that jump out are the Giants, who drafted , Bumgarter, Wheeler, and Cain (2002).  They also drafted HS pitchers that didn't work out, Crick, Whitaker, and Alderson.  Lincecum was a college pitcher, but a MLB ready one as he was up quick.

 

And the Nationals, they drafted Strasburg, Giolito, Meyer, and two others that didn't work out as well (Willems and Smoker).  That is 5 HS pitchers from 2006 to 2012.

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Terrific stuff, jay, thank you! I think your methodology, and the review of more years, makes this an extremely credible and completely honest analysis.

 

That the Twins have middling results during this time frame doesn't surprise me. As I mentioned in the last thread, it's my belief that Carl Pohlad is in some large part responsible for these results. Despite being lobbied regularly about increasing the budget for scouting and player development, IIRC he acquiesced only a couple of times in any significant fashion, and those times pretty much coincided with increased revenue sharing in the first instance, and the luxury tax, which was agreed to in 2002, the next time around. And that was when they ramped up to build out the Latin American academies and bring on scouting personnel to belatedly establish a beachhead in the Dominican Republic and Venezuela, which Smith headed up.

 

Other factors are certainly a part of the explanation too. For example, as tobi suggests, perhaps it was a conscious and misguided decision to not draft HS pitchers, we don't know.

 

It sure would be nice if we could get Ryan, Johnson, and Radcliffe to sit down with Parker, jay, Bonnes, and some of the rest of our very knowledgable TD members for an open discussion of what went on and what changes have taken place during this period and since. Personally, I think we'd come away with a fairly upbeat assessment of the knowledge and skill levels in place at Target Field.

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Thanks, tobi.  Good insights.  Cain got left out here (like you noted) and Strasburg went to San Diego St, but here are the numbers for HS vs College pitchers from 2003-2011 using the same methods:

 

College pitchers - 133 total picks, 368.3 Actual WAR vs 324.35 Expected WAR

HS pitchers - 91 total picks, 171.4 Actual WAR vs 157.2 Expected WAR

 

College pitchers hold a slight edge here in "pick efficiency", which is actually more pronounced over bigger samples of college vs HS picks if you look at Sky Andrecheck's research: http://baseballanalysts.com/archives/2009/06/the_draft_and_w.php

 

There's a common perception that HS players are more boom or bust compared to safer college players (which I've held as well).  That didn't show up much within this limited data set.  10 college pitchers and 6 HS pitchers have > 10 WAR, 7.5% and 6.5% respectively from each group.  That changes to 4.5% and 1.1% (Kershaw) if you raise the bar to 20 WAR.  However, on the measure of simply making it to MLB, the two groups showed a big split -- 70% of the college picks made it to MLB whlie only 47% of the HS picks did.

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To be fair, the % of HS picks making it to MLB from this pool is bound to improve a bit with some big prospect names still out there from 2010 and 2011.  Taillon, Zach Lee, Syndergaard, Owens, Guerrieri, Bradley to name a few -- all HS picks.

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Great work Jay! Thanks for putting the time into this. 

 

A few thought...

 

1) A 1.70 WAR career is basically nothing. Based on this model, the Twins were expected to end up with a bunch of career minor-leaguers, bench players and bullpen arms, with a handful of average regulars to offset the players that didn't make it to the majors. As it turns out, that is basically exactly what they ended up drafting.

 

2) I think this also shows that the draft alone was highly unlikely to fill the gap in talent for 2011-2014. Some hand-wavy math: They were 60 games below .500 during those 4 years. Making up that deficit through the draft would require roughly 60 WAR in additional talent. In order to have that happen, the Twins would have had to have been the best drafting team by far. 

 

3) This reiterates just how difficult it is to find elite talent when drafting in the 20s and 30s. Stuck drafting in that position for years, there are basically 3 areas where the Twins could have acquired the type of high-end young talent that is normally only available at the top of the draft: trades, international markets and overpaying HS players in the old slot system. As others have pointed out already, the Twins were late to establish an international presence in Latin America and they never payed overslot for a player late in the draft. And the one trade that actually acquired an elite talent (Gomez) blew up in their faces when they traded that player away before he blossomed into an MVP candidate.

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To be fair, the % of HS picks making it to MLB from this pool is bound to improve a bit with some big prospect names still out there from 2010 and 2011.  Taillon, Zach Lee, Syndergaard, Owens, Guerrieri, Bradley to name a few -- all HS picks.

 

Yeah, given the headstart college pitchers had, it makes sense they make it quicker and accumulate more WAR.  Good stuff.

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To expand on the head-start for college players, obviously players taken earlier have an easier time accumulating WAR.

 

The Twins had four high school players in the 14-30 draft range from 2004 to 2008 reach the big leagues. 

 

Plouffe, 2004 draft. Reached the show in 2010 (6 years).

 

Parmelee, 2006 draft.  Reached the show in 2011 (5 years)

 

Revere, 2007 draft.  Reached the show in 2010 (3 years)

 

Hicks, 2008 draft. Reached the show in 2013 (5 years).

 

A for instance would be Kyle Schwarber versus Nick Gordon.  Looking out 6-7 years, Schwarber could have 5-6 under his belt verus 1-2 for Gordon.  Even the people really high on Gordon think he needs 4-5 years in the minors.

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Terrific stuff, jay, thank you! I think your methodology, and the review of more years, makes this an extremely credible and completely honest analysis.

 

 

Man. Would you look at all this sub-commenting...

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Great analysis.  Re: HS pitchers, it was speculated by some that it was not "risk" that kept us from drafting high upside 18-year-old arms, but rather an unwillingness to pay the large contracts associated with them.  It would be interesting to see the draft efficiency ranking and actual WAR ranking framed against their "draft day expenditures" to see if we were indeed getting more bang for our buck. 

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It would be interesting to see the draft efficiency ranking and actual WAR ranking framed against their "draft day expenditures" to see if we were indeed getting more bang for our buck. 

 

Neat idea... basically just replace expected WAR with draft bonus dollars.  Probably need to adjust for inflation, but that's doable.  

 

Anyone know where to find draft bonus data?  It'd be easy to plug in to my sheet.

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A few thought...

 

Great analysis!  I'm with you 100%.

 

The only thing I'd add to your second point is that we only looked at first-round picks here.  But, your point is right that the Twins would have had to somehow lead the league in total actual WAR from those picks to pick up +60 WAR.  That would equate to a "pick efficiency" ratio of almost 3... something ZERO teams did.  

If they had gotten into the top 5 in "pick efficiency", they would have picked up something like 30 WAR.  That still leaves plenty of gap to fill just to reach .500...

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Even though there is a reduction in factors for 2009-2011, the grades for those classes to determine success or failure can really only be an incomplete. What Gibson, Wimmers and Hicks will develop into is far from determined. If Hicks follows Hunter's career arc this could be his year. Granted he did not perform as well as Hunter did at a similar age, he still could develop to be above average. That would probably make the pick a winner for the slot over time. Gibson could be a better starter than a 1.2 WAR.

The numbers Ball came up with were to look at a fair sample size of a player's performance. None of these players have had the chance for that. I would not disagree that the arly numbers are a red flag

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