Search the Community

Over the past decade, pitch framing has become a hot topic, not only in how we've begun to identify its value, but also in finding methods to quantify it, and coming to grips with its influence on the game. However, I contend that our focus has been far too narrow, and we must look beyond the catcher- in fact, past the backstop, into the stands, up to the media boxes, and directly at the role of play-by-play broadcaster. How the game's on-camera talent describe the action shapes our measurement of every pitch, even when most telecasts have live strike zone graphics present. In this post, we'll be looking at the tendencies of long time Twins play-by-play broadcaster Dick Bremer, who has a very specific methodology: Since it sounds more impressive when a pitcher hits the corner of the strike zone, any and all parts of the strike zone and its immediate surroundings qualify as "The Corner", and will be described as such when the opportunity arises. Our analysis will include video breakdowns of the 11 instances of the word 'corner' being used by Bremer during the Twins' April 17th game versus the Toronto Blue Jays. To quantify each pitch, we will use an Actual Corner Value (how close a pitch actually comes to a corner of the strike zone) as well as a Broadcaster Corner Value (how close the pitch comes to the corner, as perceived and presented by Dick Bremer). Pitch #1: Bottom 2nd, 2 outs, 1-2 https://twitter.com/GoTwinkiesGo/status/1118572113256833025 Pitcher: Aaron Sanchez Throw: 96 mph fastball Result: Strike 3 Dick's call: "On the outside corner, didn't waste it at all. Buried it on the outside corner." Analysis: On a 1-2 pitch, Toronto pitcher Aaron Sanchez throws a 96 mph fastball at the outside edge of the plate, though it lands in the center third of the height of the zone with room to spare. Already, at this first sighting, we understand the challenge presented to Dick due to working on a television broadcast rather than radio, where pitch framing is sometimes less of an art and more the act of a used car salesman, free to invent whatever fiction will sell their desired narrative. Here, on TV, viewers can plainly see that this pitch is not on a corner. Dick, however, is unfazed, and reaches into his bag of tricks, declaring it on the corner not once, but TWICE - and not only stating its location, but insisting that it was BURIED there. This is the act of a seasoned professional, understanding that repetition and commitment are key to manipulating our perception, if not our very understanding of reality. Actual Corner Value (ACV): 4/10 Broadcaster Corner Value (BCV): 10/10 Adjusted score: +6 Pitch #2: Bottom 3rd, 2 outs, 0-0 https://twitter.com/GoTwinkiesGo/status/1118754724696641536 Pitcher: Aaron Sanchez Throw: 96 mph fastball Result: Strike 1 Dick's Call: "Strike on the outside corner." Analysis: Someday, electronic strike zones will lord over our game as unfeeling adjudicators, but until that day, they serve merely as proxy armchair quarterbacks - a tool we rely on as viewers to feel validated in our desire to maim and/or injure the home plate umpire for their imperfections. On this pitch, Fox Trax smugly refuses to fill in the outline of the ball's arrival point, declaring that this pitch was a ball and all those who disagree are filthy heretics. How comforting it is, then, for Dick to step in and remind all of us that in the end, the strike zone is defined solely by what the umpire says it is, no matter how many cameras and scanners say otherwise. This pitch is not outside. It is on the corner. The umpire's corner. ACV: 7/10 BCV: 8/10 Adjusted score: +1 Pitch #3: Top 4th, 1 out, 1-0 https://twitter.com/GoTwinkiesGo/status/1118755023842729984 Pitcher: Kyle Gibson Throw: 94 mph fastball Result: Strike 1 Dick's Call: "And now an outside corner fastball to even the count." Analysis: Kyle Gibson started the 2017 season as someone fans understood to be roster filler, but ended it on an underappreciated upward trend. In 2018, he broke out with his best season to date and cemented his position at the front of the Twins rotation. Now, in 2019, he has started off somewhat shaky, with a suspect ERA and the need to make it deeper into ball games. On this pitch, Dick has his pitcher's back, finding the corner where one does not exist. Catcher Mitch Garver positioned his glove exactly on the corner, and while Kyle missed his target high, he still found the edge and a called strike. For Dick, this is enough. He has earned approbation in the eyes of the telecast. ACV: 5/10 BCV: 8/10 Adjusted score: +3 Pitch #4: Top 6th, 0 outs, 0-1 https://twitter.com/GoTwinkiesGo/status/1118755338788851712 Pitcher: Kyle Gibson Throw: 93 mph fastball Result: Strike 2 Dick's Call: "On the outside corner with a fastball." Analysis: Freddy Galvis must be listening to Dick through AirPods under that helmet, because his face says what we all know in our hearts: That was a meatball of a pitch, and Dick Bremer is a hero for carrying on the cause, however lost it may be. ACV: 2/10 BCV: 7/10 Adjusted score: +5 Pitch #5: Top 6th, 2 outs, 0-0 https://twitter.com/GoTwinkiesGo/status/1118755513288626176 Pitcher: Ryne Harper Throw: 74 mph breaking ball Result: Strike 1 Dick's Call: "Breaking ball on the outside corner, strike one." Analysis: Is this pitch actually in the corner of the strike zone? Yes! The arc of the baseball tucks itself into the furthest nook available to it. In times like these, where no deception is necessary, you might expect that Dick Bremer would bluster and harangue us with unfettered righteousness, knowing that there can be no doubt as to where the ball landed. However, Dick finds a gentle touch in his commentary, content to let the pitch speak for itself, a simple declaration of its corner-ness being satisfactory. It needs no help, and will be allowed to lift its own weight. ACV: 9/10 BCV: 9/10 Adjusted score: 0 Pitch #6: Bottom 6th, 0 outs, 0-0 https://twitter.com/GoTwinkiesGo/status/1118755746894639104 Pitcher: Aaron Sanchez Throw: 94 mph fastball Result: Strike 1 Dick's Call: "Strike on the outside corner." Analysis: A location extremely similar to pitch #2, though now delivered with an additional hint of defeat, as it arrives against the hot bat of Jorge Polanco. Immediately after listing his current bona fides, Polanco falls victim to the quantum state of the umpire's zone. While he was fooled, Dick was not, and he wearily sheds the burden he has carried throughout this pitch, allowing us all to taste from the tree of knowledge. ACV: 9/10 BCV: 9/10 Adjusted score: 0 Pitch #7: Bottom 7th, 2 outs, 0-0 https://twitter.com/GoTwinkiesGo/status/1118756058548170752 Pitcher: Thomas Pannone Throw: 74 mph breaking ball Result: Strike 1 Dick's Call: "Breaking ball over the inside corner." Analysis: The work of a true master is present here, and we must parse the commentary carefully. The Twins are behind, but the tying run is at the plate. Now is the time for hope, and Kepler has watched a first pitch strike sail past him. Does the pitch find the corner? By exact definition, no. However, it is an excellent pitch - if one ignores that catcher Danny Jansen is set up on the exact opposite spot of the strike zone. Dick refuses to give Pannone the total satisfaction of finding the corner - stating that it is simply OVER the corner - while still testifying that it is a fine pitch. By Dick's standards, this is a backhanded compliment. ACV: 8/10 BCV: 9/10 Adjusted score: +1 Pitch #8: Top 8th, 0 outs, 2-2 https://twitter.com/GoTwinkiesGo/status/1118756254917120000 Pitcher: Tyler Duffey Throw: 95 mph fastball Result: Strike 3 Dick's Call: "On the outside corner. 95 on the outside edge or thereabouts, one away." Analysis: NO! This is Duffey's first game back in the majors this season, and wanting to bolster his confidence, our protagonist has overextended himself, daring to go where others fear to tread, well outside the zone and at the exact vertical center. Corners have not existed in these parts since the days of Marty Foster's gift-wrapped delivery of Joe Nathan's 300th save. And yet, with zero hesitation, Dick plants his flag - immediately realizing that he has made a grave error. It will not be enough to double down on his argument, as was the case on Pitch #1. He knows when he has been beaten, and he retreats at the first opportunity. It must also be noted that at the end of the clip, one can hear a chuckle from today's analyst, Jack "Back in My Day" Morris. This will be one of the few times during today's broadcast that I agree with him. ACV: 1/10 BCV: 0/10 Adjusted score: -1 Pitch #9: Bottom 8th, 0 outs, 3-0 https://twitter.com/GoTwinkiesGo/status/1119309223332986880 Pitcher: Joe Biagini Throw: 94 mph fastball Result: Strike 1 Dick's Call: "On the outside corner." Analysis: Matter of fact. All business. The pitch arrived enough within the margin of error that Bremer presents his truth with the cadence of a trusted newsman. ACV: 7/10 BCV: 8/10 Adjusted Score: +1 Pitch #10: Bottom 9th, 0 outs, 0-0 https://twitter.com/GoTwinkiesGo/status/1119309442338541568 Pitcher: Ken Giles Throw: 87 mph "fastball" Result: Strike 1 Dick's Call: "On the outside corner, strike 1." Analysis: The drama is beginning to rise, as the Twins are down to their final 3 outs, behind by a single run, and sending Nelson Cruz to the plate as a pinch hitter. Once again, the ball is only in the corner's general aura, but Dick knows we are too excited to notice, and continues past it without pause. ACV: 6/10 BCV: 8/10 Adjusted score: +2 Pitch 11: Bot 9th, 1 out, 3-1 https://twitter.com/GoTwinkiesGo/status/1119309817019944960 Pitcher: Ken Giles Throw: 97 mph fastball Result: Strike 2 Dick's Call: "Strike two on the outside corner... 97 in a REAL GOOD SPOT." Analysis: Perfection. Mastery. Finally, near the climax of this game, we find what has eluded us: A true corner, spotted in the wild for all of us to enjoy, and Dick refuses to let it go to waste. His initial hushed tones give way to wonder and amazement, before his final accentuation that not only hammers home the exact precision of this corner, but makes us feel that we too knew it all along, even if we didn't happen to be looking at the TV at the time. Even if we didn't know what a strike zone was. All of us, collectively, knew what we had seen. We are enlightened and made whole. We are one with baseball, and one with each other. ACV: 10/10 BCV: 12/10 Adjusted score: +2 Final Score: +20 Adjusted Corner Value This concludes part one of this series. Stay tuned for part two, when we extend our gaze to the rest of the strike zone, and learn about the subtext necessary when one is not allowed to call a professional baseball player a 'belly itcher' and get away with it for long. In the meantime, for my research purposes, please share any high-BCV highlights for your team of choice in the comments.

The Dodgers may win. The Red Sox could see their magic disappear - this is baseball after all, but there are some story lines that I have really liked and wanted to point out. One of which is that talent - not analytics wins games. Sorry Aaron Gleeman, but when we retire APBA and other games and get to the teams and games that count there is much more than probability. So what are my take-aways so far? Relief pitchers can't match great starters. Milwaukee was a fun experiment in defying the tradition of starters and relievers, but in fact their relievers wore out. This over emphasis on Bullpen arms has a draw back because no one can pitch 162 games - sorry Mike Marshall I know you tried. And by the end of the year the accumulated games wear the pitchers down. Did anyone see the same Jeffress in the play-offs that succeeded in the regular season? The key games for the Brewers were when Chacin and Miley started and took care of some innings to take pressure off the pen. The Red Sox Bullpen has been lights out - but Price and Sales took some innings off the board first. The Dodgers got too smart with all its match ups and not only called on Madsen one too many times but shut down Baez when he had the momentum to stop the Sox. Strikeouts do matter. Look at the Red Sox. Down two strikes they do not give in, they do not go for the big whiff, they put the ball in play and then something happens. Of course it does not work every time, but a strike out is an out - every time. Red Sox players are not without power, but they are also not without speed and excitement. This is a team exuding what the great Rickey Henderson once had. They upset the other team, the pitchers, the catchers, the managers. The Dodgers have shown in the first two games that you should throw out the book sometimes. They put their good hitters on the bench for match ups that have lesser results. Their formula looks old, although home cooking could fix that. I really do think that the best teams from each league are playing each other and that is great. While I rooted for the A's and the Brewers, their styles were fun and unconventional, I am still pleased to see the teams with the best stars and the best organizations playing for the championship. My last note for the Twins - forget the Kershaw sweepstakes. He is aging and will still want a long term contract that in the end will look like the Pujols deal.

On Wednesday, November 30, 2016 the Twins announced the signing of free agent catcher Jason Castro to a 3-year, $24.5MM contract. It was a move that was widely attributed to the members of the Twins’ new front office comfort with advanced analytics. Jason Castro is widely regarded as very good defensive catcher due in large part to his ability to frame pitches and steal strikes for his pitchers. In 2016 Castro ranked third in all of baseball in Baseball Prospectus’ Framing Runs statistic, with +16.3. Kurt Suzuki, the Twins primary catcher in 2016, ranked 92nd at -6.8. Suzuki’s main backup, Juan Centeno, ranked 97th with -9.7. Castro is a roughly average offensive catcher. He put together a 88 wRC+ in 2016, which ranked 17th among catchers with at least 250 PAs, via Fangraphs. For reference, the league average wRC+ for catchers in 2016 was 87. But, he got a $24.5MM contract primarily because of his framing and the Twins are expecting him to make an impact on their pitching staff. So where might the Twins pitchers benefit from better framing? Let’s look at the Twins pitchers (that are still with the organization in 2017) that threw at least 50 innings in 2016, sorted by innings pitched: Using this list of pitchers, we can utilize Fangraphs' excellent heatmaps tool to explore each pitcher’s distribution of pitches around the strike zone. For example, here is Kyle Gibson’s 2016 pitch% heatmap, which displays the percentage of pitches thrown to each particular segment in and around the strike zone (shown from the pitcher’s perspective). The rulebook defined strike zone is outlined in black. There are not many surprises here, as we can see Gibson most often pitches down in the zone, and to his arm side. This is likely driven in large part to the high number of 2-seam sinking fastballs he throws (27.2% of total pitches in 2016, per PITCHf/x data available on Fangraphs). What this data also lets us do, is explore each pitcher’s propensity for pitching to the edges of the strike zone. Let’s assume much of the benefit of pitch framing occurs at the edges of the strike zone, where pitches are less definitively a ball or a strike to the eyes of the umpire. By focusing on the edges of the zone we can identify which Twins pitchers might benefit most from better framing. For this analysis, I focused explicitly on the strike zone segments just inside and just outside the rulebook strike zone, which are the areas between the gold lines in the graphic below: Using the pitch data in these sections, I calculated a metric for each Twins pitcher labeled "Total Edge%". These data points are summarized in the table below and show us the percentage of pitches thrown on the edge, or just off the edge of the strike zone, by each Twins pitcher in 2016: What we can see is the Twins starting pitchers seemed to pitch toward the edges of the strike zone more than the league average and more than their reliever teammates in 2016, with the exception of Brandon Kintzler. Ervin Santana is approximately at league average, which was 44.7%. Kyle Gibson is significantly above, at almost 49%. Jose Berrios, Phil Hughes, and Hector Santiago are all up around 47%. So, as a starting point, we can assert that Gibson, Berrios, Hughes, and Santiago are the primary candidates to benefit from better framing. But how do they fare in getting called strikes around the edges of the zone? Using the same heatmaps tool, we are also able to visualize each pitcher’s called strike percentage (cStrike%), in each segment of the strike zone. Here is Gibson’s for 2016: As we would expect, pitches located in the middle of the zone are nearly always called a strike, evidenced by the bright red boxes and rates at or near 100%. As before, our interest is just on and just off the edge of the strike zone, which I again outline in gold. Here, we see more variation, with the called strike percentage ranging from as high as 88% in the zone to Gibson’s arm side, to as low as 27% inside the zone up and to his glove side. We also see, pitches just off the strike zone are called strikes at a much lower percentage than pitches just in the zone, as you would expect. But, we need a reference point. How do the Twins compare against the rest of baseball? Using this data, I calculated two additional metrics, labelled as "In-Zone Edge cStrike%" and "Out-Zone Edge cStrike%", which delineate the called strike percentage on the edge and in the zone, and on the edge and out of the zone. Focusing on these strike zone segments, I calculated the called strike percentage for each Twins pitcher. Also included are the MLB averages for each metric. What we see above, is that 6 of the 10 Twins pitchers to throw 50 innings last season had a lower than league average called strike rate on pitches on the edge and inside the legal strike zone. Ryan Pressly and Jose Berrios appear to be the most impacted, with called strike rates significantly less than the league average of 64.9%, at 52.8% and 57.5% respectively. But what about just off the edge? When we focus on the segments just off the strike zone we see this same trend play out, but even more significantly. The visual above shows that 8 of the 10 Twins hurlers had lower than league average called strike rates on pitches just off the strike zone. This indicates that they were not getting many strikes stolen in their favor. In most cases for the Twins, the difference from league average is quite significant. Berrios, Michael Tonkin, Pressly, Taylor Rogers, and Santiago each have rates right around half the league average of 10.4%. The net result, when we add up the In-Zone and Out-Zone Edge cStrike% for Total Edge cStrike%, is that 7 of the 10 Twins pitchers studied had called strikes rates around the edges of the strike zone that were decidedly less than league average. Now, this probably isn’t all that surprising intuitively. We know the Twins as a whole did not pitch well last year (29th in ERA, 27th in FIP, per Fangraphs), and we know the Twins catchers did not rate well as pitch framers. Kurt Suzuki and Juan Centeno combined to catch nearly 86% of the Twins defensive innings last season. But for as bad as the team pitched, it is also clear the pitchers were not getting much help from their catchers. But how many pitches are we talking about here? If we assume a league average called strike rate on the edges of the strike zone (which was 36.1% in 2016) for the Twins, we can estimate an additional number of pitches that would be called strikes. This is what we find: By this analysis, it seems that Jose Berrios, Ryan Pressly, and Ervin Santana would benefit the most from better pitch framing, with each gaining roughly 20 additional called strikes over the course of the season. But how much does a pitch being called a ball, instead of a strike, actually matter? Let’s look at the major league batting average by count in a plate appearance. The data in the table below is from a 2014 Grantland article written by Joe Lemire, and calculates the batting average for plate appearances ending on specific counts. For example, the batting average on plate appearances ending on the 0-1 pitch is .321. The data fluctuates slightly year to year, but in any given season, you’ll find a table that generally looks like this: By this measure, the value of a strike, depending on the count is quite significant. In a 1-1 count, for example, if the next pitch is called a strike, making the count 1-2, the batter’s expected batting average drops from .319 to .164. Similarly, if the pitch is a ball, making the count 2-1, the batter’s expected average increases to .327. That’s a .163 swing in expected batting average. Others have approached this differently by trying to calculate the expected outcomes by the result of the at bat that reaches each count. So, for example, what is the expected outcome for all plate appearances that reached an 0-1 count, regardless of whether it was the 0-1 pitch that the outcome of the plate appearance was created? Different approaches aside, we find a similar result according to a revisit of the idea by Matt Hartzell published on RO Baseball in 2016: While the differences here are not quite as steep as before, we still see the swings matter. Batting average after a 1-2 count is .178, where after a 2-1 count it is .247. That’s still a .069 swing in batting average. We also have added on-base percentage, and see the trend holds. OBP after a 2-1 count in 2016 was .383, versus just .229 after a 1-2 count. So, all of this helps us show the Twins have a pitch framing problem and pitch framing matters because getting more pitches called strikes leads to less runners on base. But can Jason Castro fix it? To try to find out, let’s look at the Houston Astros, Castro’s former employer. Using the same methodology as with the Twins pitchers, I again calculated the cStrike% on the edges of the strike zone for the all Astros pitchers that threw more than 50 IP in 2016. What we find is pretty telling: Of the 12 Astros to throw more than 50 IP, only one, Michael Feliz, had a lower than league average called strike rate around the edge of the strike zone. But even he was roughly league average (36.06% compared to league average of 36.11%). The rest of the pitchers studied were above league average, and in most cases, quite comfortably so. Six of them are clustered close together right around 41.0%. Now, to be fair, not all of this is directly attributable to Castro. These are different, and arguably, better pitchers. And Castro didn’t catch every pitch thrown (he caught 61.9% of the Astros defensive innings in 2016). But the difference is stark and by this rough measure, it seems Jason Castro will make a positive impact for the Twins pitchers. To the Twins credit, they recognized they had a weakness, and they used the free agent market to acquire a player they hope can help address it.

Work smarter, not harder. That’s a mantra which permeates the corporate world, imploring workers to take full advantage of tools and resources available to improve productivity. It’s cliche, to be sure, but there is something behind the notion that production can be improved by simply leveraging existing systems and processes. When it comes to getting the information into the hands of the hitters, the Minnesota Twins appear to have moved in the direction of working smarter.For almost a decade now baseball’s front offices have been harvesting analytical insight which could positively influence on-field performance. Well educated and highly trained individuals front office staffers have been slicing and compiling video, PitchF/X data, and now StatCast data in attempts to deliver potentially beneficial information to a roster of players who, by and large, have varying degrees of interest in receiving it. Since the conduit of communication is occasionally faulty, one of the growing trends over the last few seasons in Major League Baseball is that teams have been hiring analytically savvy coaches to work the dugouts and clubhouses. These new hires with real on-field baseball experience are able to distill the information into digestible bites for the players. The Twins recent hire Jeff Pickler doesn’t pretend to be a heady stat guy, but his experience with technology has made him uniquely qualified to dissect the video and data while working with players. As an assistant coach with the University of Arizona Wildcats in 2009, Pickler introduced the video BATS system to the program. The BATS system captures all plays on video, adds the necessary metadata, and is able to index and recall at-bats at a click of the mouse. “The thing about statistics — and this includes BATS — is that it allows you to explain the 'how' and 'why,' as opposed to just the 'what',” Pickler told the Arizona Daily Star in 2009. “We can all see the 'what' — we can see a guy's 3 for his last 14, that he might as well not be in the lineup tomorrow. The 'how' and 'why' is a little more complicated; that's what the data and video is able to show us. … We can figure out the how and why, and maybe fix things a lot sooner.” Pickler’s role with the Twins has not been crystallized and yet his addition could be necessary to maximize the growing mountain of information. And for coaches and players, the growing mountain of information can be overwhelming. As Tom Brunansky once said after he assumed the duties of the Twins’ hitting coach, he was fed enough data to “choke a cow” and that was before launch angles and exit velocity were in the common lexicon. Taking all of that info and trying to deliver the message to his hitters takes tact. The key to coaching is to be able to help players make adjustments to their weaknesses without drowning them in the numbers. Boiling it down, it's the old line from Tommy Boy about trusting the butcher. For instance, if the data shows fastballs on the outer-half of the zone have proven to be a hitter’s kryptonite, coaches should set up drills that helps address the issue. That way players can continue their careers blissfully unaware of the amount of computing and brain power went into solving that problem. While the insight can be valuable, using it can be a matter of personal preference for players. Some may crave it, others may avoid it at all costs. For Jose Bautista, one of the game’s most impressive and cerebral hitters, knowing the information is a key component of his success. In 2011 he shared with the Toronto Star how he uses this data. Bautista revisited a matchup with White Sox pitcher John Danks. “I know he only throws a change-up away and a cutter, which is a small slider, inside,” Bautista told the Star reporters. “He complements that with a fastball on both sides of the plate. He only throws like 7 [percent] curveballs. He threw me five curveballs. I didn’t swing at any of them because I eliminated that pitch from his repertoire before the game started. So I knew anything that had a big spin or that started up in the zone would either be a ball or a curveball.” Bautista’s preparation and knowledge allowed him to look for one pitch in one zone or one area. That being said, longevity plays a role just as much as being fed a detailed heat map or chart breakdown. Bautista was able to draw upon his years of experience to know what the shape of Danks’ curveball was. Or the tilt of his slider. There’s no substitute for major league reps yet a hitter can layer on information to better their odds. For instance, recent Oakland A’s acquisition Trevor Plouffe said that over his career he was able to internalize what certain pitchers were doing and pair that with the data nuggets in order to capitalize in certain situations. “I think you get to know pitchers around the league and understand what they are trying to do to you,” Plouffe said last spring training. “And also we have so much data now, we can look and see, 2-1 count, seventy percent of the time this [pitch] is coming. If you have seen a guy enough and you understand what his breaking ball does, why not look for it in that count? If he wants to throw it for a strike it’s probably going to go.” Historically, that information was available through observation. Players weren’t asked to trust the data like they can with PitchF/X and StatCast in the modern era. In the not too distant past they also had to simply trust the scout or peers. "When I came up, there was none of this," Atlanta's Chipper Jones told MLB.com in 2009 regarding the proliferation of video. "You basically relied on word-of-mouth from your teammates to get the pitcher's repertoire and what their tendencies might be." Former Twins third baseman Corey Koskie recently shared his thoughts on using analytics as a player earlier this month at the MinneAnalytics hosted SportCon at St. Thomas in Minneapolis. Koskie was asked by the moderator Mike Max how much information he wanted to know going into an at-bat. Koskie responded by saying he was a ‘see-ball, hit-ball’ player in his career. The more information he got, the more it clogged his brain. Past experience getting burned when playing the percentages had created a bit of a distrust for the big lefty. “I didn’t want to be the one guy that gets up in a situation where I’m like, 3-2, runners on second and third and this guy throws a change-up (at) 3-2 seventy-six percent of the time or eighty-two percent of the time and the pitcher throws a fastball right down the middle and I was sitting on a change-up,” Koskie told the crowd. Koskie pivoted and said that he did have one example where trusting the information paid big dividends for him and the team. “We were in the ALDS against the A’s and Tim Hudson was throwing,” Koskie said. “Paul Molitor, who the Twins had him doing some advanced scouting, and he comes up and says, Corey, I know how you feel about this stuff but when Tim Hudson gets 2-and-0 he throws a change-up ninety-seven percent of the time over the last four weeks.” As it would just so happen, Koskie found himself in the exact situation during the third inning of Game 1 of the 2002 ALDS. The Twins were in a 5-1 hole at the Coliseum courtesy of some shaky defense. With one out, Cristian Guzman laced a single to center, bringing Koskie to the plate. Hudson quickly fell behind 2-and-0. “So I’m stepping in and all this stuff is going through my mind. Should I chance it? Should I chance it? Timeout, timeout,” He recalled as Molitor’s advice came flooding into his mind. “I took a step out, I said, you know what? If I’m ever going to do this now is the time because I have a ninety-seven percent likelihood he’s going to throw a change-up here and I gotta sit on this thing because if I don’t sit on this thing and he throws it and I’m sitting fastball, I’m going to look like an idiot anyway, so why don’t I just sit on this thing?” Koskie, of course, sat on it: For hitters, there is no right or wrong answer when it comes to how much information you should consume. Koskie had a fairly solid offensive career relying on his own experience to guide him. Plouffe has found the data to be a good supplement to his internal catalogue of pitchers. Bautista, meanwhile, believes the information to be a vital part of his mental preparation. Coaches, on the other hand, need to examine all the data in order to be effective. From the outside, with the hiring of Pickler as well as James Rowson as the hitting coach, the Twins appear to be moving toward working smarter. Click here to view the article

In a miserable season destined for 100 losses, Twins fans can be sure that their team is a mess. But as the Sept. 18 episode of Gleeman and the Geek points out, most of that mess is as a result of just one side of the ball: pitching and defense. Aaron and John noted that the Twins are actually fairly decent when it comes to hitting, and raised an interesting question. How does the Twins run production stack up against the American League, if we ignore the games the league has played against the Twins? The Twins, despite their dreadful record, are almost exactly league average when it comes to offensive production. Collectively, Minnesota owns an OPS+ of 101, meaning they sport an OPS that is 1% better than average. They rank eighth in OPS (.745), ninth in home runs (186), third in doubles (272), and lead the league in triples (33). Perhaps most importantly, the Twins are tied for seventh in the American League in runs scored. Runs per game of AL teams through 9/19/16 So the Twins offense is decidedly middle-of-the-road. In fact, if their pitching and defense were simply bad, and not horrendous, the Twins would likely be hovering near .500. Instead, the Twins have allowed 827 runs this season, a full 114 more than the next worst team (Oakland). To put that into perspective, the gap between all other AL teams is 113 runs. If run prevention were a marathon, the other 14 teams would be bunched near the finish line, and the Twins would be at mile 15. The Twins pitching and defense is so bad, that it puts into question the team’s offensive rankings. Every other team on that list has had the opportunity to play against the Twins. They’ve all gotten fat by racking up runs against an outlier of a team. It's time to correct for that outlier. Using Baseball Reference’s Head-to-Head feature, it was fairly easy to look up runs scored and games played, then to subtract the totals from games played against the Twins. To further balance the playing field, I decided to also remove interleague games (which I also did for the Twins). Runs per game for AL teams and R/G adjusted to remove Twins games and interleague play. Good through 9/19/16. The Twins move up a slot, and claim sixth place, narrowly edging out the Blue Jays. While the Twins’ score went down slightly (the Twins scored slightly more often against National League teams), most teams saw their score drop by more. Only three teams actually improved their scores, most notably the Rangers, who never got going against the Twins, and who jump into second place offensively. The Red Sox are still in their own realm, but the gap has narrowed. Interesting to note that the three division leaders still retain the top three spots, and the last five teams are still the bottom five, just in a different order. The biggest loser was Toronto, which fell from fourth to seventh, due to a gaudy 50 runs scored against the Twins in just seven games. All-in-all, Twins fans can take solace in the fact that, by this crude measure, the Twins offense is solidly above average. But we can dig deeper. This approach still doesn’t take into account the wildly unbalanced schedule even within the same league. Some teams play each other just six times, while others play 19 times. And the Twins aren’t the only ones with particularly bad (or particularly good) pitching staffs. I decided to do the same exercise, only to average the R/G in each individual match-up to simulate a league in which every team played every other team the same number of games. Because the point of reference was the Twins, and the Twins can’t play themselves, I still decided to exclude the games against the Twins for all other teams. By also ignoring interleague games, the result was a league in which the other 14 teams each had 13 opponents, with their R/G of each match-up worth 1/13th of their over all score. The Twins had 14 opponents, so each match-up counts for 1/14th of their overall score. Remember, the goal here is to compare the Twins’ run production against the rest of the league, both by eliminating games played against the Twins, and by averaging out the the scores from all the teams to reflect their schedules. Let’s see how the Twins stack up: Runs per game, adjusted to remove Twins and inter-league games, and weighted for a balanced schedule. Good through 9/19/16. Top five! The Twins’ score stays the same (just a coincidence), but Seattle drops from fifth to seventh, making room for the Twins in the top five. Also note that the Indians fall down to fourth, with their lowest score yet. I’d be interested to see this same exercise done excluding games against Cleveland. After all, the Indians are the only team in the league that doesn’t have to face the stellar Cleveland pitching staff. Now I know this was a silly exercise, but it underscores three things: The Twins have been reasonably proficient at scoring runs. If offense was all that mattered, it’s conceivable that the Twins are a wildcard team. The Twins are really bad at preventing runs, and most teams have taken advantage of that. Scoring lots of runs isn’t enough, unless you can also find a way to prevent your opponent from doing the same. Because while the Twins are sitting in fifth place in these standings, they’re dead last in the ones that count.