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Teflon

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  1. Teflon
    Over a 7-year career ending in 1979, Twins DH Craig Kusick came to the plate 1461 times, compiling an unremarkable slash line of .235/.342/.392. Kusick may have had a briefer stay in the bigs, however,  if it was not for his uncanny ability to hit Frank Tanana of the California Angels  who was the most intimidating strikeout pitcher in the American League not named Nolan Ryan or Vida Blue. 
    Kusick ended up facing Tanana more than any other pitcher over his career – 59 times - which was about 4% of all his plate appearances. In those at-bats, Kusick went  16 for 42 (.381) drawing a Bonds-like 16 walks for a .542 on-base percentage. He also took Tanana deep 4 times in those 42 at-bats and drove in 11 runs.  Three of those home runs came in consecutive games against Tanana in 1976, after which Tanana walked Kusick 7 times in the next 5 times they met – twice intentionally.
    While Kusick was certainly not a Twins great, his inextricable linking to Tanana suggests an interesting related topic. Thanks to the Batter-vs-Pitcher data on Baseball Reference we can now ask and answer who were the opposing players Twins greats faced the most and who owned whom?
    * * * * * * * * * 
    For the first "Who Owned Whom?" we look at a recent Twins great, Joe Mauer.
    Over his 15-year career, Mauer played in 1858 games and had 7960 plate appearances. He batted .306, had an on-base average of .388, slugged .439 with 143 home runs, scored 1018 runs and drove in 939. His most frequent opposing pitcher over his career was none other than Detroit’s Justin Verlander who faced off against Joe in 97 plate appearances. Verlander, who has a career .228 batting average-against and OPS-against of .652, was definitely "owned" by Mauer as Joe finished with a slash line of .317/.423/.537 on 26 for 82 hitting with 15 walks. The 26 hits are the most by Mauer against any pitcher and the first one came in his first at-bat against Verlander in the second game of a Saturday double header versus Detroit on July 23rd, 2005 as Joe hit an 0-2 pitch deep to left field in Detroit for an RBI double.
    The other pitchers Joe faced frequently were Rick Porcello –who fared better than his Tigers teammate - (75 plate appearances, .243/.293/.329) and the unfortunate John Danks of the White Sox.  (71 plate appearances, .381/.451/.476) Coincidentally (or not), Danks is the only pitcher to have beaned Mauer more than once. CC Sabathia is the pitcher that struck Joe out the most   -17 Ks in 52 plate appearances - and, along with another lefty, Mark Buehrle,  most “owned” Joe.  Joe only managed  .196/.269/.239 against Sabathia and .197/209/.303 against Buehrle.
    Sabathia was also the first pitcher Mauer faced in the big leagues in his debut versus Cleveland in the Season Opener at the Metrodome on April 5th, 2004. Mauer, batting 8th, walked on 4 pitches against Sabathia in the 3rd and struck out swinging on a full count in the 5th. Sabathia pitched through the 7th and left with a 4-0 lead. The Twins rallied to tie the game, 4-4, in the 8th inning and Mauer's first big league hit would come on a single to center off Rafael Betancourt leading off the 9th. The game went to extra innings and Mauer got his second hit on a one-out, one-on single to right in the 11th off Chad Durbin, moving Nick Punto (running for Matt LeCroy who had walked) to third. After a Christian Guzman strikeout, Shannon Stewart lifted a Durbin fly ball deep to LF for a game-winning 3-run homer, bringing in Mauer and Punto and blowing 49,584 Metrodome fans from the exits hoarse and happy. What a memorable game to start a career!
    Watch for another installment of "Who Owned Whom" coming soon.
  2. Teflon
    ...at an average of 3 hours and 16 minutes, they ARE long.
     
    The average Twins game wraps up in a not-so-brisk brisk 3 hours and 16 minutes – the longest average game time in the MLB this year. A length of time in which you could individually microwave 245 corn dogs or complete the Boston Marathon AND watch two episodes of Cheers while you rehydrate. This is not to say the Twins are a pokey team. Due to extra innings, they’ve pitched more innings per game than any other team except the Cardinals. Their games have featured more combined plate appearances (79) than any other team except the White Sox. If you were to look at things at a more comparable level, say average time per plate appearance the Twins are only 5 seconds in excess of the MLB average.
     
    Of course there are only 14 seconds of variation between the quickest team per plate appearance, Kansas City, and the slowest, the Los Angeles Dodgers – meaning that if every team played at the Royals pace, the average MLB game would still only be ten minutes shorter, 2:55 instead of 3:05.
     
    Based on the above figures, pace-of-play rules alone don’t have enough ceiling room to make much of a difference. In order to do that, baseball has to address the two huge trends that are consistently lengthening the games each year. These are:
     
    1. Number of pitches per at-bat. Currently at 3.90, this number was 3.75 in 2000 and 3.61 in 1990. Largely a product of the increasing strikeout rate which is currently 8.25, up from 6.45 in 2000 and 5.67 in 1990.
     
    2. Number of pitching changes per game. Currently at 3.22 (per team), this number was 2.54 in 2000 and 2.02 in 1990.
     
    While baseball purists pooh-pooh any notion that the game needs shortening, (“What global warming?”) I doubt those purists actually are enthusiastic about these trends continuing and baseball getting more and more slogged down. While any number of extreme remedies could be imposed - from limiting 3rd strike foul balls to adjusting the strike zone, there is another solution that addresses the trends without fundamentally changing any part of the game play, number of innings or on-field rules - and is actually quite simple to implement.
     
    Limit the number of pitchers on the pitching staff. Eleven seems like a nice number. Ten would be better – but I’d settle for twelve for now and work downward over a couple of years.
     
    With a shorter bullpen, managers will make fewer pitching substitutions. Of course that also means each pitcher has to throw more innings now, right? What about injuries?
     
    Well, if pitchers continue to throw every pitch like it’s the last pitch in the World Series, yes, injuries would increase. If, however, they go back to pacing themselves accordingly (as pitchers used to do in the pre-internet 6 Ks per 9 inning days) they should actually reduce some of the wear and tear. A pitcher pacing himself also leads to the much desired outcomes of making strikeouts less prevalent and lessening the number of pitches thrown per at-bat.
     
    Scoring should rise as result, too, and the bulk of persons comprising a team's paid attendance are not averse to scoring.
     
    The pitchers teams would give up under this change are, literally, the worst pitchers in the league. The quality of the game should actually be improved by not having them around. (And yes, there will need to be some type of rule to keep teams from running an underground railroad of call-ups and demotions to continually restock the pitching staff with rested arms.)
     
    Unless the MLB were to trim total roster size along with this, limiting the pitching staff would also mean another bat or two on the bench. (Gardy could carry that 3rd catcher!) Teams could cover more lefty-righty matchups and make greater use of defensive substitutions. There could be more opportunities for 30-something veterans to stay in the game instead of becoming "special advisers."
     
    I’m interested in your feedback. Why is this a bad idea?
  3. Teflon
    http://images.onset.freedom.com/ocregister/gallery/m2ymrx-b78945001z.120120423182439000g9q1760s0.1.jpg
     
     
    The disappointing performance of the Twins prospects made me curious to see how the Twins compared with other teams in bringing good players to the majors. The quickest way to do this comparison was to look at the number of players receiving votes for Rookie of the Year since 2000 by team and to see, on average, what percentage of the votes they received. I then created a product of the two to power rank the teams.
     
    Guess where the Twins finished. For those of you with short attention spans, they are last. They have produced the worst assemblage of rookies in the major leagues since 2000 according to Rookie of the Year voters. (The list of those Twins rookies receiving Rookie of the Year Votes since the year 2000 is at the bottom.)
     
    You can't claim market-size bias on this information as the team at the top of the list is the Tampa Bay Rays. It just simply looks like the Twins do not bring players up to the majors who are ready - or all that good - and this has been the case for the entirety of the 21st century.
     


     
     
     


  4. Teflon
    http://www.clevescene.com/images/blogimages/2009/04/29/1241034084-tiant.jpg
     
    1968 was a pinnacle of pitching in the Major Leagues. Denny McLain won 31 games for the Tigers and Bob Gibson compiled a legendary 1.12 ERA for the Cardinals while throwing 13 shutouts. Easy to miss when browsing through the performances from that year was a Cleveland pitcher who went 21-9 with a 1.60 ERA, 264 strikeouts and only 152 hits allowed in 258 innings. When seen today, those numbers could easily be mistaken for something from the back of a Sandy Koufax baseball card - but those impressive pitching results didn’t belong to a Brooklyn-born lefty but a Cuban born right-hander named Luis Tiant.
     
    When Castro took control of Cuba, Luis was a 19-year old playing in the Mexican League. Being outside the country when the island was seized meant he could continue his career in baseball but also meant that he would not be able to return to his homeland or see his family again for many years.
     
    Tiant was signed by the Indians organization and pitched in the minors until 1964 when his 15-1 record for the Portland Beavers of the Pacific Coast League made it clear that the 23-year-old Tiant was ready for the big leagues. (Tommy John and Sudden Sam McDowell were also on that Portland pitching staff and would join Tiant with the Indians that year) Luis pitched in 19 games for Cleveland in the second half of the 1964 season making 16 starts and going 10-4.
     
    Over the next three seasons with Cleveland, Tiant was only 35-31 but led the American League in shutouts in 1966 and in strikeouts per 9 in 1967. In 1968, it all came together for Tiant. After a slow start to the season (1-2) Tiant shut out the next four opponents in succession, including a three-hitter against the Twins on May 19th. By the end of June, he was 12-5.
     
    The first start for Luis in July would be at home against Jim Merritt and the Twins. Merrit would be tough that day, limiting the Tribe to no runs and only 4 hits over 9 innings. Tiant, however, was masterful that day. He kept the Twins off the scoreboard for 9 innings as well, striking out 16.
     
    In the 10th, Rich Reese led off with a double to right for the Twins and Frank Quilici sacrificed him to third, reaching first base safely on a fielder’s choice. Tiant struck out the next batter, catcher Johnny Roseboro. Twins manager Cal Ermer sent in Rich Rollins to pinch hit for shortstop Jackie Hernandez. Tiant struck out Rollins. Jim Merritt, the pitcher, was due up next and Ermer chose not to pinch hit. Merritt had been impossible to solve for Cleveland that day and Ermer wanted to have him for the 10th. Tiant struck out Merritt. Tiant had come up with three strikeouts in the tenth to keep a shutout in order after having a runner at third with no outs.
     
    Merrit took the mound for the bottom of the 10th. Indians left fielder Lou Johnson led off with a single and took second on shortstop Cesar Tovar’s miscue on the play. (Tovar had played at third base all day and had just moved to short after Ermer pinch hit Rollins for Hernandez.) The next batter for Cleveland was catcher Joe Azcue who singled in Johnson to win the game. Tiant had a 10-inning shutout with 19 strikeouts.
     
    Luis continued to pitch great through July, improving his record to 17-6. August was a different story, Tiant struggled. He lost three starts and pitched in three no-decisions. After pitching a complete game on August 10th, he made 5 consecutive early exits, the last three all being less than 6-inning efforts.
     
    On September 9th, Luis Tiant took the mound at Metropolitan Stadium in Bloomington looking for his 20th win. He would once again match up against Jim Merritt. Minnesota got on the scoreboard early as thirdbaseman Graig Nettles homered in the bottom of the first. That would be all the scoring for the Twins, however, as Tiant only surrendered four more hits and struck out 16. Cleveland had no problems with Merritt this time around and won handily, 6-1.
     
    After picking up his 20th win, Tiant was shelved by the Indians for 12 days before making a two-inning relief appearance against the Angels. Following that, Tiant made one last start on September 25th. It was a gem – a 3-0 blanking of the Yankees in the Bronx although barely 5,000 were on hand to see it. Tiant held the Yankees to a single hit that afternoon (Mickey Mantle) and struck out 11.
     
    In looking back on Luis Tiant’s 1968 season, he led the American League in ERA, shutouts, and fewest hits per 9 innings. He was third in strikeouts behind his Portland/Cleveland teammate Sam McDowell and the Tigers’ Denny McLain. (Denny McLain took home both the Cy Young and MVP awards.) When applying newer metrics, Tiant was clearly the best starting pitcher his league, however, leading the AL in Adjusted Pitching Wins, Base-Out Runs Saved, Win Probability Added, and Fielding Independent Pitching.
  5. Teflon

    The MLB's Youth Movement

    By Teflon,

    In 1971, the average age of MLB non-DH starting position players was 28.9. This began rising steadily year-by-year to a peak of 30.1 years of age in 1996. One could assume this was due largely to players’ careers being extended artificially by PEDs – or one could possibly assume teams were selecting older players in the amateur draft or perhaps being more deliberate with their prospects. Based on how the trend changes following a senate hearing, a BALCO bust and a couple of Jose Canseco tell-all books, however, I mostly assume the former.
     
    And here’s how the trend changed. The average age of starting MLB position players has dropped by 3 years! (To 26.9.) This reverting-to-youth trend is observed at every position.
     


     
    Pitchers -who have been hovering around the same average age of 29 for the last 35 years - were younger in comparison to hitters through the 70s, 80s, and 90s but are now older in comparison – even though their trend has been moving slightly downward since 2004. (Dotted black line - based on the top-10 innings-pitched pitchers on each team each season)
     
     


     
    A three-year shift in the age of hitters means teams are increasingly built around the earlier contracts of players. A larger number of players at low-end salaries means even more money thrown into the fewer top-end salaries - meaning the pay gap gets bigger and bigger and the already-dwindling MLB middle class gets even smaller. (Basically one Donald Trump on the payroll and 24 fast-food drive-through employees)
     
    To me, these changes represent a major philosophical shift in the way baseball teams now make decisions but no one seems to be talking about it. A three-year shift in the average age of players is huge.
  6. Teflon
    http://www.vintagecardprices.com/pics/1830/166907.jpg
     
    After making his debut as an 18 year-old for the Baltimore Orioles in the final game of 1963, right-handed pitcher Wally Bunker earned a spot in the Orioles starting rotation in May of 1964 and pitched a 1-hitter in his first start of the season. The teenager from San Bruno, California surrendered no earned runs in his next start and a single run in the next (all complete games) eventually extending his winning streak to six consecutive starts before losing to Camilo Pasqual and the Twins on June 7th.
     
    Blessed with outstanding run support on the season, (The O’s scored 5.11 per game in Bunker’s starts, 3.99 in all others), Bunker’s tidy 2.69 ERA translated to 19 wins and only 6 losses in 29 starts, pacing the American League in win percentage. While not an overpowering thrower, (4.0 K’s per 9) Bunker still limited opponents to only 161 hits over 214 innings in 1964, translating to a .207 batting average against.
     
    Unfortunately for Bunker, the Twins' Tony Oliva was also a rookie in 1964 and Wally finished a distant second in Rookie of the Year voting to Oliva, the American League batting champion that year.
     
    Bunker also received votes in the MVP balloting, finishing 12th behind teammate Brooks Robinson. Bunker became (and remains) the youngest player to ever receive MVP votes.
  7. Teflon
    I was watching the excellent ESPN 30-for-30 feature on the Earthquake Series of 1989 and in recalling various players on that Oakland A’s team, was again struck by how far off the charts Terry Steinbach’s 1996 was from any other season in his career at the advanced-for-baseball age of 34. Steinbach slugged 35 homeruns that season after never hitting more than 16 before or after. His 34 homeruns as a catcher (the other was as a pinch hitter) was the highest total for a catcher at that time in the American League. It was surpassed by Ivan Rodriguez (35) in 1999 which is the current record.
     
    In all of baseball history, only two other players over age 30 put up career high homeruns exceeding 30 in a season which more than doubled any other season homerun total in their careers.
     
    Brady Anderson – hit 50 homeruns in 1996 at age 32. The next highest HR total for Brady in a season was 24.
     
    George Crowe – hit 31 homeruns in 1957 at age 36. The next highest HR total for George in a season was 15.
     
    Crowe hit his 31 homeruns in the only season he ever topped 400 at-bats so is easily explainable. Brady Anderson and Steinbach, not so. While steroid rumors have always surrounded Anderson’s aberrant 1996, Steinbach’s similarly aberrant 1996 has remained unquestioned as far as I can tell from Google searches despite the Oakland clubhouse of 1996 also being the home to McGwire, Canseco and Giambi.
     
    So how exactly does a 34 year-old catcher who never hit more than 16 homeruns before or since become the all-time single season league leader in homeruns at his position? In looking for explanations, I thought of the following:
     
    Renovation to the Oakland Coliseum
     
    In 1995-1996 the Oakland Coliseum was renovated to enclose the previously open outfield with a massive steep double-decked grandstand for Raiders football. (”Mt. Davis”) Prior to that, the stadium had a symmetrical curved outfield fence with dimension of 330 down the lines, 375 to the alleys, and 400 to center field. With the construction, the configuration of the outfield changed to a peaked diamond shape that kept the same foul line and center field dimensions but was constrained to shorter dimensions in the alleys.
     
    A’s fans have also written that there was previously a breeze that cooled the ballpark on hot day games that disappeared once Mount Davis was erected. This suggests that batters no longer had to deal with wind blowing in. Shorter power alleys and more favorable wind conditions could have helped Steinbach’s power numbers, right?
     
    Steinbach hit a home run every 38 at-bats at home in 1994, every 21 at-bats in 1995, and every 16 at-bats in 1996, while the rest of the A’s hit homers every 36 at-bats in 1994, every 30 at-bats in 1995, and every 24 at-bats in 1996 – so the park (or the team) was trending upward. Unfortunately for the ballpark theory Steinbach’s rates on the road were a homer every 36 at-bats in 1994, every 36 in 1995, and every 13 at-bats in 1996, meaning his homerun rate increased 32% at home in '96 but increased 164% on the road! Not the ballpark.
     
    The Strike of 1994-1995
     
    Steinbach lost at-bats that would have affected his overall homerun totals in 1994 and 1995. The 1994 season was wiped out after 117 games and the 1995 season started late and was limited to 145 games. Perhaps his aberrant 1996 power wouldn’t be as glaring in comparison if his two previous seasons had been completed. Projecting his production in those seasons to 1996 at-bat levels produces only 14 homeruns in 1994 (compared to 11 actual) and 19 instead of 15 in 1995. (For some reason the jump from 19 to 35 seems less staggering even though it’s still semi-staggering – especially given Steinbach’s age. Joe Mauer had his aberrant HR season at age 26, by the way.)
    Sold his Soul?
     
    With the lack of a better explanation, it’s possible Steinbach negotiated some kind of deal with Lucifer in exchange for his 1996 season. How else could you explain how following the greatest season of his career and one of the top seasons ever for an American League catcher, he inexplicably took two-thirds of his previous salary to join a moribund team Twins team that lost 90 games every season for the rest of his career.
  8. Teflon
    It’s an honor when an MLB player is recognized as the best offensive or defensive player at his position by his league but it’s an even greater honor when he’s recognized as both. Greater, but not all that rare, it seems. Since the Silver Slugger award originated in 1980, the two awards have been given simultaneously to players a total of 172 times or about 5 times per season out of the 17 possible occurrences.
     
    The first players to be awarded the combo platter* were Keith Hernandez, Willie Wilson, Mike Schmidt, Andre Dawson and Cecil Cooper in 1980. The first Twins player to earn the pair of awards together was Kirby Puckett in 1986. (Kirby went on to do it four more times.) The last Twin was Joe Mauer in 2010, the last of three consecutive seasons he did so. Only one other Twins player won a Silver Slugger and Gold Glove in the same season - Chuck Knoblauch in 1997.
    Ken Griffey Jr., Barry Bonds, and Ivan Rodriguez each won the pair of awards seven times– the highest totals in the 33 years that both have been awarded.
     
    Mike Hampton in 2003 is the only pitcher to win the pair together. Hampton actually has FIVE Silver Slugger awards, the same as Mauer, if you’re counting. (Mark Portugal even has a Silver Slugger award, Joe!)
     
    Inexplicably, there have been 16 occurrences of players being recognized as both their league’s outstanding offensive and defensive player at their position in a season in which they failed to reach the All-Star game. This actually happened to Matt Williams twice – in 1993 and 1997 – and most recently to Chase Headley and Adam LaRoche in 2012. This has never happened to a Yankee, however.
    * - No, I did not have a combo platter for lunch today. Egg salad, avocado, some sprouts and pepperoncini on a croissant. A little watermelon on the side.
  9. Teflon
    On a previous lunch hour, between bites of an All-P sandwich* I was wondering if there was a useable correlation between the number of All-Stars teams have and an expected number of wins. I thought if a team had a lot of all-stars and lower-than expected the wins, it might suggest a lackluster managing job. Higher than average wins per all-star, good managing. It turns out there actually is a very strong step up in average winning percentage for each incremental All-Star a team has. Roughly this: 1 All-Star – average winning percent of .458; 2 All-Stars, .501; 3 All-Stars, .542; 4 All-Stars, .557, and so on.
     
    The problem with using this information is the incredible market bias in all-star selections. To be able to evaluate Yankees managers and Twins managers on common ground, each team’s positive or negative bias in All-Star selections has to be compensated for.
     
    To do this, I counted the number of All-Star selections each year and totaled the number of total league wins. I then figured out each year’s average wins per all-star and applied this to each team’s winning percentage to determine the equitable number of all-stars each team should have had. Summing the actual number of All-Stars each team had historically and dividing this by the sum of equitable All-Stars historically creates an index value per team than can be used for the aforementioned manager evaluation.
     
    Which team has the biggest bias in All-Star team selection? Do I really have to ask? Of course, it’s the Yankees with nearly 52% more All-Stars than a fair distribution suggests given the team’s success. This is by far and away the highest bias as the next closest team, the Cardinals, are at +23%. Rounding out the top 5 are the Red Sox at +21%, and the Dodgers and the Reds both at 13%. Conversely, the Rodney Dangerfield teams of All-Star selections are led by the Rays at -20%, the A’s and Astros at -19%, the Pirates at -18%, and the Royals at -17%. The Twins, if you’re curious, are at -15% which is 9th worst.
     
    If you’re curious about which managers overachieved or underachieved in their careers relative to the number of All-Stars their teams had, (adjusted for All-Star bias) here are looks at the top 10 and bottom 10 calculated during today’s lunch hour between bites of a Waldorf salad. (Based on average seasonal difference between actual wins and expected wins – had to be the manager for the majority of a team’s games to be credited for that season, had to manage at least 5 seasons.)
     
    The Good
     
    1. Joe McCarthy +12.7 wins per season to expectation.
    2. Billy Southworth +11.2 wins
    3. Joe Girardi +9.9 wins
    4. Bobby Cox +7.8 wins
    5. Al Lopez +7.7 wins
    6. Earl Weaver +7.7 wins
    7. Walter Alston + 7.7 wins
    8. Pete Rose + 6.7 wins
    9. Billy Martin + 6.6 wins
    10. Jimy Williams +6.5 wins
     
    The Not-So Good
    1. Connie Mack -12.2 wins
    2. Jimmie Wilson -11.8 wins
    3. Billy Meyer -9.7 wins
    4. Preston Gomez -9.7 wins
    5. Buddy Bell -9.3 wins
    6. Ossie Bluege -8.1 wins
    7. Fred Haney -7.7 wins
    8. Del Crandall -6.5 wins
    9. Manny Acta -6.1 wins
    10. Mary Marion -6.0 wins
     
    And finally a look at the Twins managers , ranked best to worst:
     
    1. Billy Martin +6.7 wins
    2. Frank Quilici +3.2 wins
    3. Ron Gardenhire +1.5 wins
    4. Gene Mauch +0.7 wins
    5. Ray Miller -0.3 wins
    6. Sam Mele -1.2 wins
    7. Tom Kelly -2.4 wins
    8. Cal Ermer -2.6 wins
    9. Billy Gardner -3.9 wins
    10. Bill Rigney -5.4 wins
    * pastrami, prosciutto, provolone, peppers, poupon and pickles on pumpernickel
  10. Teflon
    While the criteria for players being voted into the Hall of Fame is often subject of debate, the accomplishments required for managers is much more consistent.
     
    Every MLB manager that accomplished any of the following conditions has been enshrined in the Hall of Fame:
     
    1. Win at least 2000 games. (most wins and not in –Gene Mauch 1902; most wins among active managers – Bruce Bochy 1593)
     
    2. Win at least 3 World Series titles. (Active managers with 2 titles- Bruce Bochy, Terry Francona)
     
    3. Win at least 1000 games with a winning percentage over .580 (AKA the Earl Weaver condition. Joe Girardi has the best winning percentage among active manages with over 500 wins. .561, 703 wins)
     
    4. Win at least 2 World Series titles with at least 1500 wins and a .520 winning percentage. (Francona has the two titles and a.531 winning percentage with 1181 current wins)
     
    Exceptions - Three managers are in the Hall of Fame without meeting any of the above conditions:
     
    Wilbert Robinson (1399-1398, .500, no World Series titles, 2 league pennants)
    “Uncle Robbie” doesn’t stack up to any other HOF managers on a basis of wins, winning percentage, World Series titles, or league pennants. Simply a sentimental selection by voters.
     
    Whitey Herzog (1281-1185, .532, 1 World Series title, 3 league pennants)
    Note: If Herzog is in the HOF, then Billy Martin who has superior qualifications to Herzog should also be in. (1253-1013, .553, 2 World Series titles, 3 league pennants)
     
    Ned Hanlon (1253-1096, .533, no World Series titles, 5 League pennants)
  13. Teflon
    http://hall-fame.com/cuellar.jpg
     
    Parker Hageman posed his thoughts on how the Twins can improve their rotation through free agency. The players he suggested were either once-good pitchers who are now in decline or once-promising pitchers who have failed to keep their promises. If you are the Twins GM and those are the best pitching options the team can hope for in 2014, you wonder if there might be a simpler (and much cheaper) solution that nobody's thinking of.
     
    The 4-man rotation.
     
    Like nearly everyone, you were ready to dismiss this as foolish or irrelevant in this day and age of delicate arms, guaranteed mega-contracts and pitch counts. But what if you didn't use it to divide more innings among fewer starters. What if you adapted it to address this fundamental premise:
     
    A mediocre starting pitcher's third trip through the lineup is usually crap.
     
    And to that end, you could attempt to optimize those opportunities for disaster by replacing them with something better.
     
    How would it work? First, you'll need to say arrivederci to your 5th starting pitcher and 3rd catcher. Replace them with two relievers and then smile inwardly just a bit because you know this fundamental premise to be true, but not leveraged: Serviceable relief pitchers are easier to find than serviceable starting pitchers. (Cheaper, too.)
     
    With your 25-man roster now aligned as needed, you then set these two rules for utilizing your mediocre 4-man rotation:
     
     

    Have no expectation to EVER pitch a starter more than 5 innings.

     
     

    Plan for regular use of a 6-man combo of middle relievers to share middle innings.

     
    Seems pretty simple. You're exchanging that third trip through an opponent's batting order by a mediocre pitcher for some fresh-armed innings of relief from an expanded relief corps. Hell, you can even do some lefty-righty match-ups you didn't have a chance to do before.
     
    You've looked at the K-rates and opposing batting averages of your pitchers for years acknowledging (but not exploiting) the fact that a player pitching out of the bullpen does better in those categories than when he starts. (You might be looking at Glen Perkins as you muse about this) You know that's because he can throttle-up in a much shorter appearance and he doesn't get exposed to any batter more than once. Why then, haven't you thought it would be advantageous to have more of those kinds of innings as opposed to the tail end of a Mike Pelfrey start?
     
    You shake your head when you realize that your team's old pitching philosophy was to let a mediocre starter pitch until he got into trouble. This meant that you were usually engineering a trouble situation to be your key to make your pitching change.
     
    This is definitely better, you think. It does all of the following:
     
     

    Takes away 25-30 starts from a horrible starting pitcher

     
     

    Doesn't add any innings to the 4 starters. Just shifts their innings from the ends of games when they're tired to the beginnings of games when they're fresh.

     
     

    Limits starting pitchers' exposure. Starters will not get a third time through a batting order.

     
    This really is just evolution, you think. This philosophy is already used for closers. They don't get used to respond to specific game situations but rather to optimize the 9th inning. Same with the setup pitcher. He optimizes the 8th inning. Why shouldn't you optimize the middle innings as much as possible, too?
     
    Is there a downside, you wonder? Your four starters will still pitch comparable innings to other starters so don't have to worry about how their stats compare at contract time - plus they should get a couple more wins because they're still going 5 and getting more starts. Hell, pitching more innings when they're fresh might even improve the quality of their stats. Quite possibly their health and longevity, too.
     
    Inter-league play? Does losing a bench player mean you lose an opportunity to pinch-hit? You still have 12 batters. You could still pinch-hit 3 or 4 times in a National League game. You can live with that.
     
    Workload for the bullpen? You're not getting them up in knee-jerk response as much and you added 120-140 innings worth of arms out there. Pretty close to the innings lost from a 5th starter.
     
    Prep time for the starters? Can they adapt to three off days instead of four? Is that adequate time to recover from a now lessened 80-pitch workload? That's going to be the main question to answer. Hopefully one you can test this season.
     
    Addendum:
     
    The Rockies Interesting Rotation Experiment
     
    Rockies four-man rotation gathering traction as season continues
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