Greggory Masterson

I get what you're saying, but I'm not sure that it would make any difference. Whether or not they say "It's our fault," "We were bitten by an uncontrollable injury bug" or anything in-between, they still should be judged by their process and results. Latching onto the contrived things they say to the public is just noise. One strange finding that's relevant to this conversation is that leaders who apologize for their mistakes are actually viewed as less competent on average for the same type of mistake, as opposed to leaders who don't apologize or don't even acknowledge their mistakes at all. I, personally, would love a completely transparent view and active feedback and self-assessment being communicated, like you suggested here, but even if it did happen, I think the reaction would be worse than you would expect. How much the fans' reaction should really matter is debatable, but it's still worth considering.

I do want to be clear, referencing object permanence wasn’t a dig. It was an example of how brains develop. I was hoping no one ended up taking it that way. The aim of this article was to challenge the tendency to latch onto public statements and whatnot and see them as representative and meaningful, as opposed to what we can actually see (transactions, results), so I think we’re on the same page here.

$500 may be too low for the amount of grief the shrink would have to sort through

I think most have some sport psychology presence. Many times they won’t be listed on the directory because they’re a consultant or a private firm. Bringing someone in from outside the org helps players, because they’re more open with people from outside the team.

Our brains play tricks on us. One is forgetting things exist when we don't see them. Image courtesy of © Joe Nicholson-USA TODAY Sports The human brain is fantastic, but it doesn't have the power to consider everything. For example, before you read this sentence, you ignored that you could see your nose. Your mind had been ignoring that because it's not essential. Cognitive psychologists refer to our brains' shortcuts as heuristics or cognitive biases. There's nothing wrong with them, but they're important to remember. They play a part in the way we watch sports. There are popular shortcuts that many people know about, such as anchoring, where we tend to base our opinions on something more in a first impression than information we learn later. I won't name names, but some schmucks may still think Miguel Sanó could be an MVP based solely on his 2015 rookie campaign. Confirmation bias leads us to latch on to evidence that supports our preconceived notions over evidence against them. Perhaps another person supports their disdain for Miguel Sanó because of his many strikeouts, ignoring his 500-foot moonshots. If this stuff interests you, check out this very approachable list of a few dozen different biases and heuristics). There's a well-known bias that explains what I'm going to discuss, so I'll dip into developmental psychology for this discussion. Two episodes from the last year or so stand out to me when I think about how our brains consume sports, not so much because of what happened, but because of people's reactions. 1. After a disappointing 73-89 2021 season, owner Jim Pohlad gave the front office an A+ grade. 2. During the 2022 season, the Twins were not completely transparent about Byron Buxton 's schedule as he worked through knee pain. In both episodes, fans and media were in the streets wailing and gnashing their teeth. Both instances were frustrating, but were they worth the consternation they received? One of the points in an infant's growth that developmental psychologists have identified is the development of object permanence. If you've ever played peek-a-boo with an infant, you will have seen it in action. When the adult's face hides behind the hands, then reappears, the infant gets excited because, before the face reappears, they didn't think it existed anymore. Infants struggle to understand that things they don't see can still exist. It is a bit wild to think about. Sometimes I'm, as an adult, convinced that I don't own buffalo sauce until my wife points out the bottle in the fridge and the bottle next to it from the last time I didn't think we had any. But enough about buffalo sauce, how does object permanence pertain to what I'm talking about here? In the first example, many fans took Jim's comments to mean that he genuinely had no issues with how the season went and was perfectly pleased. Because this was, for the most part, the amount of information fans had to go off of, it seemed like his complete thoughts on the topic. We, as fans, are not privy to the conversations behind closed doors between an owner and upper management of the team. Heck, others in baseball operations aren't made aware of every conversation. We can forget that. Instead, we latch on to the soundbite and forget that the group is constantly communicating for the other 364 days a year, working toward their shared goals. Because we don't see it, though, it doesn't exist. Please don't read this as me saying that there shouldn't be criticism of the group. We sometimes pay too much attention to the tiny bits of interaction with which we are privileged. The second example, regarding Bryon's knee, is a bit more egregious. Following his knee flair-up in Boston last April, his presence in the lineup was a bit scattershot, which was obviously frustrating for fans—if for no other reason than that fans want to see the best players play. However, there was a common attitude that Byron's seemingly haphazard presence in the lineup was evidence that there was "no plan" for him to play. Why? Because the team did not make any statement on his status on a day-to-day basis. In reality, the team was monitoring his knee and its pain and range of motion daily—adjusting whenever needed. It makes sense that no team personnel would make an official statement regarding his expectations because the situation was developing. This lack of information led some fans to see the handling as incompetent, and they believed that the team lacked a plan for getting him back out there. Instead, behind the scenes, Buxton spent hours every day working on getting his body ready to compete. His situation was fluid, and the team was adapting to new information daily. But we, as fans, had no explicit information telling us this, so instead, because we couldn't see it, our brains told us that nothing was happening. Perhaps there's an argument that teams should be more forthcoming with information so that fans can make more informed reactions. Still, we would have blind spots that our brains would fill in. It's important to remember that pro sports are filled with professionals working full-time jobs. The people on the other side of the glass spend their entire days making decisions about the team that we watch for four hours a day with a rain delay. They want to win more than you want them to (with minimal exceptions). If we fall into the trap of believing that what we see in press conferences or public statements is the entirety of the situation, our opinions can become relatively uninformed. Some people may be incompetent at their jobs and worthy of criticism, but that criticism should be based on what we can observe rather than the gaps our brains fill in. Remember that even if we don't see it, things are happening. View full article

An examination of the Twins roster in Derek Falvey's seventh year reveals four fundamental philosophies the organization has embraced. In our last chapter, we look at the organization's trend of trades for players with multiple years of team control. Image courtesy of © Nick Wosika-USA TODAY Sports As opposed to their approach to free agency, the Twins have shown more flexibility in trading for players on longer deals, especially pitchers. Some of these "longer deals" are arbitration years, again mitigating risk, but Kenta Maeda had four years remaining on his deal (though it was an incentive-laden deal), and Sonny Gray had at least a buyout for 2023 if he broke down or didn't perform. It appears that the team vastly prefers making trades for players with team control, targeting those players over one-year or half-year rentals, which can explain some inaction on the trade market, especially around the trade deadline. The table below excludes some trades that were for very marginal players (including the most recent trade for six years of A.J. Alexy ) or players traded for cash, but I still kept Ildemaro Vargas in the table because I like typing his name. As can be seen, very few of their trades have been for players in the final year of their contract. Michael Fulmer and Sergio Romo were deadline deals in which the Twins gave up marginal prospects, and the Twins signed Romo to a contract that offseason (and still could do the same with Fulmer this year). Jaime Garcia was hilariously flipped a week after he was acquired. Sandy Leon was a minor league veteran traded for another minor league veteran. Gary Sanchez was acquired to fill a hole at catcher, but also to offset the contract dump that sent Josh Donaldson to the Yankees, and he came to Minnesota with Gio Urshela, who had two years of control. Other than those four deals that cost the Twins very little, every other trade for an MLB player brought back players with multiple years of team control. These types of deals are much more palatable to the team and are clearly their priority when trading for major league assets. They seem to not value a single year of team control as valuable enough to give up any of their top prospects, or most recently, Luis Arraez . As a bonus, the years under team control, whether through arbitration or contracts signed with their former teams, are often quite team-friendly. Similarly, they work to sign current players to team-friendly contracts, though those are rarer, having only happened six times. Three of the current holdovers from Terry Ryan's time are only on the team because of extensions signed by the current brass. In 2019, Max Kepler and Jorge Polanco signed five-year contracts with team options. Even if they did not work out, the total money devoted to the two was a low risk. The third holdover on an extension is Byron Buxton, who also signed a team-friendly deal at $15 million guaranteed over six years. Most recently, the team signed Chris Paddack to a three-year extension for $12.5 million , hoping that he rebounds well from his second Tommy John surgery, another low-risk move given the money. The other two extensions look, in order, rough and laughable. Miguel Sano signed a three-year extension after his huge 2019 campaign with an option for 2023 that was declined. Randy Dobnak, who signed a five-year, $9 million extension with two team options. Much has been made about the move, though with an average of under $2 million per year, who cares? So that's it. That's how the Twins have chosen to construct their rosters since 2017. It's fairly straightforward. Develop a team of young, cost-controlled talent, target veterans to when needed, trade for players with multiple years of team control, and fill in the rest of the holes with one-year deals, except in very specific circumstances. This approach leaves a good deal of flexibility in both monetary and prospect capital. However, it still has to work, and those assets need to be spent effectively. Seven years in, the group has a team and farm system completely of their own construction. They spent seven years creating space to take a big plunge, and now it's happened with Carlos Correa. Going forward, the club’s performance will be entirely dependent on moves made by the current regime. Does anything stand out to you after having seen these transactions laid out? How do you feel about the way that Falvey and Levine have built this team? View full article

Waiver claim from Seattle. I didn’t write much about waiver claims, but they have gotten a number of solid players that way, most predominantly Cron and Wisler, off the top of my head.

Cron was actually a waiver-wire pickup. Going through all of the transactions makes you remember a lot of things that you forgot, like that Chris Giminez signed a MiLB contract before the 2017 season, never played a minor league game and caught 59 for the Twins, signed with the Cubs in the offseason, then was traded back to the Twins at the waiver trade deadline.

I've seen a fair deal of clamoring for Gordon to hit leadoff, so I wanted to throw his information out there. He's a free-swinger who doesn't walk much, though he is fast he sees the fewest pitches on the team (13th both past and projected), and his OBP is low (11th projected, 10th 2021-2022). His speed is second in projection to Buxton, but middle of the road between 2021/2022, because he was not a good baserunner last year. This is all with the caveat that, even if the Twins did choose their lineup based on an algorithm, it would be much more intense than a silly rank-ordering system like I did here. Just wanted to share what Gordon looked like in this exercise.

An examination of the Twins roster in Derek Falvey's seventh year reveals four fundamental philosophies the organization has embraced. Today we look at the organization's obsession with one-year contracts. Image courtesy of © Michael McLoone-USA TODAY Sports This is where the group leaves the biggest footprint. In the Falvey-Levine era, most of the veteran fill-ins discussed in Part 2 have come in the form of one-year contracts, or contracts with vesting, team, or mutual options for the second year. Based on my research, the breakdown in the length of free agent contracts can be seen below, prior to the second Correa signing, sorted from most recent to least recent, again color-coded by position. One-year contracts are something of a default option for most clubs. No-harm-no-foul, small commitments have a short-term risk. However, this club has shown a special proclivity for the one-year deal. This pattern emphasizes the importance of the farm system producing fruit in this organization. If the decision-makers refuse to find longer-term pieces in free agency, they need to be sure that their internal options are enough to win more games than they lose. They have made a few longer-term commitments, but those situations were special exceptions, such as shoring up the catching position with Jason Castro in 2017 and Christian Vazquez in 2022. Carlos Correa's three-year deal was a one-year deal with insurance, should he suffer a significant injury or forget how to play baseball, a risk the club was willing to take given his talent and clubhouse presence. Although the Josh Donaldson contract does not reflect favorably on them in hindsight, like with Correa, they saw his off-field presence to be valuable (i.e., “He’ll bring intensity”) regardless of his performance, which was expected to be high as well. As can be seen in the table, they do often try to get a bit of extra value out of these one-year deals—especially for bounceback candidates—in the form of options. Most recently, in 2022, they added team options for the Dylan Bundy and Chris Archer signings. If either of them had regained their past form, the team could have brought them back for about $10MM each, The options, though, however, have rarely been exercised, suggesting more duds than bouncebacks. The only option exercised by the team was for the second year of Nelson Cruz ’s 2019 contract. The Cruz signing has been the best in the Falvey-Levine era, netting 6.3 fWAR for about $18.5 million over his first, two-year deal. Exercising that option was a no-brainer. The majority of those moves have not paid off anywhere close to as well as the Cruz signing. A few times each offseason, they make attempts at players on multi-year deals. Before Donaldson and Correa twice, those attempts have not borne fruit. However, their steadfast adherence to their strategy generally prohibits them from the biggest move. As with many of the one-year deals, the Twins' signings of Donaldson and Correa were due in large part to other clubs' wariness over injury concerns. They instead made their interest known and provided a lower offer as a fallback. They attempted the same to no avail, for instance, with Carlos Rodon, Zack Wheeler , and Yu Darvish. Those types of moves, though, would largely prohibit future moves of a similar magnitude. Without the Donaldson trade, they likely would not have been able to sign Correa the first time around. It is possible that spending more money to land Wheeler would have precluded them from future flexibility, so they likely see value in never overextending themselves, especially on pitchers. For this reason, it’s imperative that the Correa signing pays off, because they likely will not have the ability to sign even another Donaldson-like contract in the near future. Given that the chips have been pushed in on a player like Correa, I feel pretty good about the odds, but all that needs to happen is the spontaneous combustion of an ankle to sink the ship. What are your thoughts on the one-year approach with specific exceptions? View full article

Good eye—this is just the 40 man roster. Martin hasn’t been added yet. In a couple days I’ll be going over their trade history on the Major League side. Cave isn’t discussed because he was traded for as a MiLB player at the time of the trade.

#1 may surprise you. Image courtesy of © Jesse Johnson-USA TODAY Sports Last Friday, the Twins finally bit the bullet and shipped Luis Arráez off to Miami in return for Pablo Lopez and two exciting prospects. It’s a sensible move, but the Twins will need to replace Arráez’s production on the field after his 3.2 fWAR 2022 season. Alex Kirilloff appears to be the heir apparent at first base, which was likely to be Arráez’s primary position in the field, with Joey Gallo, Kyle Farmer, Jose Miranda, and Edouard Julien in line to get time at the spot as well. The team shouldn’t struggle to fill the designated hitter spot, either, with the number of players that would benefit from half-days at DH. However, there is a role that Arráez filled with no clear replacement—leadoff hitter. It’s the biggest question right now about the Twins lineup, and Ted Schwerzler has already mentioned a couple of top candidates. But let’s crunch some numbers and see if any new cream rises to the top (of the lineup). There is some debate about how much having a stereotypical leadoff hitter matters to team performance, with some adamant that having someone at the top of the lineup who gets on base consistently leads to more runs. Others believe that the sequencing doesn’t necessarily matter and that the top players should hit as many times as possible over the course of the season, no matter the style. I’m not here to settle that argument, though it makes good reading from analysts wiser than myself. Instead, I want to look at the current roster to see which players fit the mold best. The common idea of a prototypical leadoff hitter is a player who gets on base, can run the bases, and, as Patrick Reusse asserts, sees a lot of pitches. There probably isn’t a player who checks all those boxes on the current squad. Luis probably didn’t either, given that his footspeed leaves a lot to be desired, although he is a good baserunner. I was interested, though, in seeing which players might be the best fit, based on those criteria. I looked at every hitter projected to make the team out of Spring Training based on Fangraph’s Roster Resource. I then compiled select stats from A) 2021-2022 and A) Steamer projections for each player. The players were ranked 1-13 based on their OBP, Fangraphs baserunning runs per 550 plate appearances, and average pitches per plate appearance (there aren’t projections for P/PA, so I used career averages for the projections). These three stats measure the player’s ability to get on base, run the bases, and see many pitches. Let’s see who fits the bill. Unsurprisingly, among the top four in both past performance and 2023 projections were the three players widely believed to be the Twins’ best hitters. The other may surprise some people. #4 Byron Buxton (4th Past, t-4th Projection) Past Rankings: 3rd OBP (.327), 1st BsR (7.5), 8th P/PA (3.84) 2023 Projections: 8th OBP (.304), 1st BsR (1.2), 8th P/PA (3.78) Buxton’s elite speed very much buoys his score on this exercise. As a free-swinger, he doesn’t see a lot of pitches, and his OBP is dependent on his average with his lack of walks. If he hits for an average over .300, as he did in 2021, he’ll be on base a good amount. The team will probably slot him in a more stereotypical power spot, given his ability to hit for extra bases. Nonetheless, he may get some run at the top of the order, as he has in past years. #3 Carlos Correa (3rd Past, 3rd Projection) Past Rankings: 1st OBP (.366), 8th BsR (-3.0), 2nd P/PA (4.08) 2023 Projections: 1st OBP (.351), 12th BsR (-0.9), 2nd P/PA (4.05) Almost the polar opposite of Buxton, Correa’s scores are weighed down by his lack of baserunning—the only player projected to lose more runs on the basepaths is Christian Vazquez. If it weren’t for those abysmal scores, he easily would have come out on top. He will, like Buxton, probably bat second or third, but it’s not unreasonable to think he may hit leadoff a bit, especially against lefties. #2 Jorge Polanco (2nd Past, t-1st Projection) Past Rankings: 2nd OBP (.332), 4th BsR (2.0), 4th P/PA (4.03) 2023 Projections: 2nd OBP (.332), t-4th BsR (0.0), 5th P/PA (3.97) Polanco is probably the best bet to serve as the leadoff man, and he barely missed the top spot in this exercise. He gets on base, runs well, and turns in good at-bats—so long as his ankle pain doesn’t cause him to pirouette out of the box on a swing. Leaning even further into the stereotype of a leadoff man, he’s also a middle infielder. He probably would have hit cleanup in a lineup with Arráez, but he’s a dependable option to plug in at the top of any order, given his balanced skillset and approach. #1 Joey Gallo (1st Past, t-1st Projection) Past Rankings: 5th OBP (.323), 3rd BsR (2.5), 1st P/PA (4.23) 2023 Projections: 6th OBP (.313), t-4th BsR (0.0), 1st P/PA (4.22) Oh no. The spreadsheets have gone too far. It doesn’t sound right, but by this definition of a leadoff hitter, Joey Gallo, of all people, is the top option. He leads players in pitches seen by a wide margin. He actually runs the bases well, even with his large frame. He gets on base at a good clip, too—the past performance metric includes his miserable play from the last season and a half. It sounds absurd, but we’re only three seasons removed from Rocco running out another unconventional leadoff hitter in Max Kepler . I wouldn’t be shocked to see at least a trial run of Gallo hitting leadoff in 2023. It seems in line with this front office. Don’t say I didn’t warn you. Speaking of Kepler, he tied Buxton in this exercise for fourth in the projections, and Trevor Larnach , of all players, landed in fifth in past performance. Another option not included is Edouard Julien, because he has no past performance, and Fangraphs only projects him for 26 plate appearances. Julien, though, gets on base as well as anyone, and if he hits at the Major League level, he’s undoubtedly a leadoff candidate. Admittedly, the three categories here probably shouldn’t be given equal weight, but it was still a fun exercise, and Gallo falls to third if the weight of OBP is doubled. Who do you want to see batting leadoff in 2023? View full article

An examination of the Twins roster in Derek Falvey's seventh year reveals four fundamental philosophies the organization has embraced. Today we look at how the organization has filled holes in their roster. Image courtesy of © Bill Streicher-USA TODAY Sports The core Falvey Philosophy is to fill out most of the Twins roster from their young core, but it is rare to see a team that manages to fill all areas of the roster with products of its own farm system, and the Twins are no different. The club generally does an adequate job of identifying areas of need and making moves to fill them--though the mileage on the moves may vary. Matthew Trueblood had a great piece on this, so I won't repeat his ideas in terms of the philosophy of said moves, but here are some examples. Coming off of a year in 2016 during which the catcher position was manned by Kurt Suzuki (on an expiring contract), Juan Centeno, and John Ryan Murphy with no imminent replacements, they signed Jason Castro to a three-year deal. The deal largely paid off, as Castro manned the backstop position serviceably and was a fixture in the lineup for three years. The club made a similar move ahead of the 2023 season signing Christian Vázquez, given their absence of a catcher not named Ryan Jeffers and no clear options in the high minors. We’ll see how it works a second time around. Heading into 2019, the club was in clear need of a third baseman with Miguel Sanó slated to miss the beginning of the season, at minimum. This led to the signing of Marwin Gonzalez, and given his positional flexibility, they were willing to go to two years to bring him in and find a role for him after Sanó’s return. In 2018, seeing a void in the bullpen both for that year and the future, the team sprung for Proven Closer™ Addison Reed, among others. The Reed signing is tied for the second-longest contract given to a pitcher in the Falvey-Levine era, and it went quite poorly, with Reed throwing 54 mediocre innings before his arm fell off, after which he never threw another Major League inning. The Reed signing may have played a part in the group's hesitancy to sign a pitcher of any kind long-term, because the only other pitcher signed for multiple years that they signed was Michael Pineda, twice. The first Pineda deal featured one rehab year in 2018 before paying him a full salary in 2019. He re-signed before the 2020 on something of a sweetheart deal due to his apparent appreciation of the team and his PED suspension. In both instances, the team had long-term holes in the rotation, so bringing in Big Mike filled a clear need at a reasonable price. They have shown some willingness to take risks on these veteran fill-ins, hoping either for bounce-back years or healthy seasons from oft-injured players, such as in the most recent signing of Joey Gallo or 2022’s signing of Chris Archer. This risk is often associated with their tendency to let the market play out. With fewer teams with which to compete, they can sign the remaining players at lower prices, which is how they managed to sign Josh Donaldson and Carlos Correa, twice.. Those remaining players are often still available for one reason or another. Perhaps the greatest risk was taken on Correa in 2022, though he is the best signing in the team’s history. If he were to have suffered catastrophic injury in 2022, the club would likely need to pay him $70MM over the following two years. Still, it was a risk that they were willing to take to effectively employ a top-3 shortstop as a placeholder for Royce Lewis . Do you have a favorite veteran signing for the Twins over the last 7 years? View full article

An examination of the Twins roster in Derek Falvey's seventh year reveals four fundamental philosophies the organization has embraced. Today we look at the organization's focus on their minor leagues. Image courtesy of John Bonnes, Twins Daily The Twins have a specific goal toward which all of their decisions are ordered: sustained success. Although it is more difficult to say to a fanbase that has seen an 0-18 playoff streak reaching nearly 20 years, the best way to win a World Series is to make the playoffs as many times as possible. Octobers are weird, and anything can happen. The Twins' strategy for reaching sustained success has become apparent. It can be summarized by a few precepts: develop a constructive core of young talent, fill remaining holes with veterans, and avoid long-term commitments that are not cost-controlled. Those guiding principles placed them in the position to sign Carlos Correa to a six-year, $200 million deal this month, perhaps the biggest breaking of their own rules, though not entirely out of character. I've combed through every transaction that the team has made since the 2016-2017 offseason, the first year that Derek Falvey and Thad Levine took over baseball operations, and I'd like to discuss some of them. Let’s start with the young core. Name a team that does not rely on amateur acquisitions, minor-league trades, and player development to provide the bedrock of its roster, and I will show you a front office not long for this world. (The jury is still out on the Mets, so hold on to that thought.) This thinking can go too far, such as in the pervasive attitude in the Terry Ryan regime that spending money on free agents was for poorly-run organizations, though those instances are few and far between. Nonetheless, this Twins front office has shown a commitment to developing talent and constructing the roster around homegrown products. As can be seen below, most of the players on the current roster were either drafted by the organization or traded for as prospects. I've color-coded the table with red being pitchers, blue being catchers, green being infielders, and yellow being outfielders. With the exceptions of Jordan Balazovic, Alex Kirilloff, Jose Miranda, Nick Gordon, Jorge Polanco, Max Kepler, and Byron Buxton, every member of this team has been acquired by the current regime. Balazovic, Kiriloff, and Miranda did not reach Class-A until 2018, and Gordon was in Class-A prior to the 2017 season, so their development has largely been a product of the regime. The other three have signed extensions. Of particular note is the amount of red (pitchers) in the "draft" and "MiLB trade" columns. The team has had six seasons to build up a harem of young pitchers, and it may be a make or break year in 2023 with so many homegrown hurlers in the majors or high minors. Regardless of the rest of the moves this offseason, the team will live or die based on the talent developed from within. Seeing this breakdown, is there anything that stands out to you? View full article

I checked about 130 Baseball Reference pages. I wasn’t about to check everyone who might be traded too

I hate to say it, but his name rhymes with Bemilio Bagán

On December 10th, it was announced that a few Twins had changed their jersey numbers. Trevor Larnach from 13 to 9, Emilio Pagán from 12 to 15, Kyle Farmer from 17 to 12, Bailey Ober from 16 to 17, and Griffin Jax 65 to 22. This is nothing out of the ordinary; a few players each offseason on any team will request a number change for one reason or another. However, this time, something peculiar happened shortly thereafter. Joey Gallo was signed less than a week later, and he claimed the 13 number, his number in Texas and New York, which had conveniently been vacated by Larnach. Is this a coincidence? My money is on no; it's incredibly meaningful. I did exactly what you have come to expect from old Gregg--I've scoured the list of remaining MLB free agents to see what this might mean for the rest of the offseason, and it leaves more questions than answers. Here are my findings: #9 (Taken by Trevor Larnach) The only remaining free agent who wears 9 is Dee Strange-Gordon, Nick Gordon's half-brother. Might there be a rift between Larnach and Gordon now that he's preventing his big brother playing for Minnesota? Probably. It's a good thing that Correa is back to try to help keep the locker room intact. Between this and fighting over left field playing time, things could get ugly. #12 (Vacated by Emilio Pagán; Taken by Kyle Farmer) Farmer really stepped on Pagán's toes here. It looks like Emilio may have been trying to open the door for Rougned Odor to don a Twins jersey, which makes sense given his history of sucker-punching opponents who homers off his pitchers. Having Odor at second base would definitely help keep Pagán's homerun numbers in check. Watch for a rift between these two teammates as well. #15 (Taken by Emilio Pagán) It's been a rough 24 hours in Twins territory with the last two #15 free agents signing elsewhere in Raimel Tapia and Brian Anderson. When will the team finally pull the trigger on the guys they really want? #16 (Vacated by Bailey Ober) This was the spot that showed the most promise, though with Trey Mancini coming off the board this week, the remaining pool is thin in Cesar Hernandez and Travis Jankowski. I would bet that the Twins were more in on Mancini than suggested, given that they clearly forced Ober to change numbers to attract him. #17 (Taken by Bailey Ober) Ober apparently looked Chris Archer in the eyes and said "This town ain't big enough for two five-and-dives" and took his number, preventing his return. Go get 'em, Bailey! #22 (Taken by Griffin Jax) Learned men like me know that there was no shot of the Twins getting Andrew McCutchen with this stunt pulled. Think of the team, Griffin! This also rains on Jeremy Nygaard's hopes to bring back Miguel Sanó. Surely the big man wouldn't come back if he couldn't get his number back from a relief pitcher. To make matters worse, this also eliminates Robinson Canó from contention. Sure, he switched his number for Roger Clemens in New York, but Jax is no Rocket; he's Air Force, not Space Force. This also removes Luis Torrens as an option. Sad day for those of you with Luis Torrens on your offseason bingo card. #65 (Vacated by Griffin Jax) There isn't even a potential free agent with Griffin's old number. So selfish.

Kepler, in a vacuum, is the platonic ideal for a fourth outfielder on a playoff team. Great defense in the corners, hypothetically solid enough defense in center to fill in for weeks at a time. Can even fill in at first in a pinch. A league average hitter with 20-30 HR pop, can always be comfortable with him hitting 6-8. And like you said, a good baserunner. In practice, it's not really a fit with the Twins given that he's left handed and pretty vocal about not liking to play center. Above all that, it's unclear that he would take an assignment like that. Who knows though.

The unprompted explanation about why he doesn’t have a smartphone in the middle of discussing the trade is tremendous