Otto von Ballpark

My point about Broxton and League is that the signing clubs were considering them as possible closers. They probably bid higher and more aggressively for them with that understanding. I haven't seen any relief FA suggested for the Twins with a Broxton or League level contract, so I don't think it is really fair to use those deals as comparables when considering how much money we would be risking.

Not trying to silence you, but you were repeatedly attributing things to Cameron that were not his (Cameron had no "non-closer" criteria, Broxton "signed the deal that Cameron is taking about" but Broxton isn't part of Cameron's article), I was frankly confused by that and I didn't want to hijack the thread to try to figure out what was going on. Looks like you were confusing the original Cameron article with jorgenswest's own data here? Like I said, I just didn't quite know what you were saying.

I am all for being critical of specific FA arms at specific prices, but the general ban on FA multiyear reliever deals for the 2016 Twins advocated by this article is pretty off base, in my opinion. The Twins pen was so shaky, with so many question marks even at the top, with such little progress from our bullpen prospects in 2015, that the Twins absolutely can't afford to pass on the market on principle.

FIP is what is being used to define the 0 WAR players and the monetary valuations in this article, so it is fairly important here. In any case, FIP isn't even the biggest issue with this analysis, see my other posts above. The Twins aren't in a place where they need bullpen arms? Did you see last season? How in the blazes could anyone conclude that? You really look at the 2015 season and say hey, we got Jepsen, let's just try this same thing again?

And there's probably more adjustments one can make. Gorzelanny started 10 games his first season in Milwaukee, and had only a 0.6 leverage index during his two years there, suggesting he was acquired to be a swingman or mop-up man rather than a set-up man. Frankly, Burnett might skew toward Fujikawa-level gamble too, as he missed time due to elbow inflammation and had minor elbow surgery just before signing his contract, which was quite low considering his age and coming off a 1.5 bWAR season. As noted previously, Affeldt was tremendous in the 2014 postseason for the Giants which was not included in his value estimate. Affeldt was also part of the Giants defending World Series champion in 2012 when he signed this contract, and another Giants title in 2010, so his value was probably greater to San Francisco than anywhere else which probably inflated his contract. jorgenswest called him arguably the biggest value suck on this list, but I strongly suspect the Giants disagree. Also, the analysis omitted the value from Soria's excellent option year (1.7 bWAR), and his two good to great trade returns during the life of the deal. Simply put: we are nowhere near proving that an expected contender with a weak pen is better off avoiding the free agent set-up market.

Going back and looking closely at the group, it appears there are lots of problems considering them and their contracts as comparables for a potential Twins bullpen signing. The list was defined as "non-closers" but the two biggest contracts (League and Broxton) were both acquired as closers from their previous teams and both ostensibly held the closer position immediately after signing these contracts (League to open the 2013 season in LA, and Broxton in spring training that year as the Reds were trying Chapman as a starter again). Also noted by others, Fujikawa was a Japenese closer with zero MLB experience. The fact that he ultimately signed with a rebuilding MLB team and forfeited his closer position suggests he was a gamble more than an attempt to get a solid MLB set-up man. Take these names off the list, and you drop $52 mil in salary obligations, and only lose ~$3 mil in Fangraphs value. All of a sudden, free agent set up contracts don't seem like such an obviously bad bargain that they are not even worth their modest investment.

Dave Cameron is not infallible, and not only did his quick analysis fail to note that FIP breaks at extremes (guys with high ERAs, exactly who we would expect around replacement level, often have much more favorable FIPs), he also assumed that 0 WAR = replacement level = whoever you can sign in any given offseason on minor league deals, without presenting any evidence to support that point. Unfortunately, this "update" didn't address those problems and actually added some more, which I will note in another post. International prospect signings are capped now, and the Twins have shown no indication that they will break that cap. And even if they did, they wouldn't need to take $4-$5 mil annually from the MLB bullpen to do so. And I think our "bevy of high upside arms" are just about as close to helping the MLB pen as they were a year ago (meaning, not that close).

Just like Affeldt clearly hurt the Giants, like your data showed? Go back to your list and find how many teams were actually "hurt" by these modest deals, rather than just failed your arbitrary WAR/$ threshold. I think you are WAY overrating the potential negative impact of a 3/15 signing, especially in a Twins pen that history shows has had no shortage of weak arms lately. The Twins are in no danger of holding back better relievers right now.

Have the Twins shown better aptitude for drafting and developing relievers? Have they built a playoff caliber bullpen with 1 year FA deals (Stauffer) and minor league free agents? Frankly the Twins haven't even tried signing a valued MLB FA reliever, I am not sure why you are so convinced they thoroughly lack that skill.

I read your article and Cameron's. Did you read any of my previous responses? The flaws with your data and conclusion go deeper than FIP. Chiefly, you don't analyze alternatives and their outcomes for comparison. Is there another place a team can spend $5 mil a year with notably better returns? A marginally better shot at a great relief season (like Affeldt's 2014, 1.5 bWAR plus an outstanding postseason) could easily be worth that modest investment for a contending team. You also state that the Twins method of bullpen building has been fine recently, which 2015 clearly suggests otherwise. You could analyze almost any group of free agents and conclude they are a bad investment as a group on a $/WAR level, but that doesn't mean signing any single one of them is necessarily a bad investment, especially when the cost is so modest and the need is so dire (i.e. present day Twins bullpen). A more accurate conclusion from your data is that it is inadvisable to try building a full 4-5 man bullpen in FA, but nobody is arguing for that at all.

Odds are too great according to what? You haven't really responded to any of the major issues with the data you presented.

Teams wouldn't have to give Pinto a 25-man spot yet, not until April. He won't clear waivers right now, maybe in March/April depending how his winter/spring goes.

With the Benoit and Kimbrel trades, it certainly seems like San Diego is moving toward the sell mode that many have predicted.

And that point wasn't really proven, at all. 3/15 isn't very expensive, it doesn't buy you much in those other investments either. So relievers at that price don't have to provide any kind of incredible return. (Of course, the article conveniently left out analyzing returns of any other strategies or investments, so we are left with nothing to compare with the FA relievers.) And we've seen what kind of bullpen is created by "bringing in a bunch of minor league free agents to see who sticks" and it isn't often pretty even when a guy like Boyer "sticks", and can really handcuff a team midseason. Would I want to build a complete 4 or 5 man bullpen out of these free agent signings, to the exclusion of all else? No, but nobody is asking us to do that. A targeted one or two of these signings can absolutely be part of a smart strategy to address a weak pen.

Nolasco clearly has negative trade value. To unload him, you have to eat most of his salary or sacrifice talent with him (or accept less in return, if paired with Plouffe, that's the very definition of negative trade value. Also, Nolasco is not currently a proven innings eater, he has failed to do so for two consecutive years and is coming off ankle surgery. Even aside from the guaranteed $24 million that someone has to pay, taking a flier on him also occupies a 40-man roster spot at a time of year when those spots are critical (either for protecting your own players or claiming interesting players forced out on other teams). If we are willing to eat a ton of cash, we might be able to move Nolasco somewhere this winter, but his name almost certainly torpedoes any deal where you hope to get talent back.

Actually, if we could have saddled the Royals with Aaron Hicks and whatever flotsam and jetsam from our minor league system circa 2011 instead of Cain, Escobar, and Odorizzi, that could very well have prevented their 2013-2015 run of success... EDIT TO ADD: the linked article suggested Hicks, Gibson, Revere, and Benson, and that we might try to not include all in the same deal. Imagine the Royals with those 4 instead of Cain, Escobar, and Odorizzi (and perhaps by extension, no Wade Davis?).

Yes. And that potential value return could blow away whatever we get from Murphy in a part-time role at catcher in 2016. Even if Hicks stagnated in 2016, I feel like he could have snagged Murphy or a similar catcher next winter. I don't necessarily mind the trade, but I get the feeling the Twins don't even plan to give Murphy much opportunity to break out in 2016 (if he even has that potential).

Sipp was terrific last year, but he was actually solid the year prior too, and also for a year or two earlier in his career with Cleveland (although much wilder then). If teams thought 2015 was "real", he'd probably get more than 3/21. FWIW, MLBTR predicts he stays in Houston with a 3 year $12 mil contract, which isn't that much more AAV than what the Twins paid Duensing last year ($2.7 mil) I don't know if relievers are that much different than other free agents, as far as reliably predicting future performance. Teams look at age, peripherals, track record, and upside in much the same ways, and the fact that these guys seem to hover around the modest commitment of 3/15 on the open market is a reflection of their roles and the realities of variable performance. A guy from last year that stood out was Zach Duke -- he really came out of nowhere to have a great relief season in Milwaukee. He got 3/15 because teams knew that one season wasn't "real" but it suggested he had joined the club of decent FA relievers in that price range.

MLBTR projects Plouffe to get $7.7 mil this winter in arbitration, could push $10 mil next winter. Probably the same as Todd Frazier will earn (guaranteed $7.5 mil in 2016, then arb eligible for 2017). They also predict Freese to ultimately get 3/30 from a market including the Angels, White Sox, and Indians, although they note the third year as possible due to the lack of a qualifying offer -- maybe 2/24 is in play if the QO effect is overblown for him... Would it be better for us to see our division rivals shut out at 3B upgrades, or to see them to take the top FA option off the board for the Angels? I'm not sure we get any strong offers for Plouffe as long as Freese is on the market.

Again, Nolasco has negative trade value right now. If you include him and his any part of his $24 mil remaining, you'd basically have to give Plouffe away.

The poster was referring to the period around the actual Greinke trades (2011-2012). Referring to Hicks as "the top prospect" in the deal should have been the dead giveaway, as Hicks hasn't really been considering a prospect since 2013.

To be fair, this "bet" is on two different things: Hicks being notably above average for his position, and Murphy being average for his. You could actually lose that bet on Hicks and still have him equal or exceed Murphy's contribution.

At its extremes, obviously you can give anybody the "take" sign against Shooter Hunt and Rick Ankiel at their worst. But it's not all clear Runtzler is in that extreme. Based only on these numbers, it's possible Runztler changed his pitch selection and approach in indy ball, as he didn't really gain a lot of additional strikeouts or allow significantly fewer hits as you might expect against inferior competition. If he used his old approach, maybe he would have had 14 K/9, 4 H/9, and 5 BB/9 or something. But who knows if the new approach will help him and to what degree back in affiliated ball. Still, I'll drop it as I agree with the rest, it's a good signing, and thanks for bringing it to our attention!

Analysis please? A guy like Maloney or Stauffer who fails and gets cut doesn't count much on the negative side of the ledger... but then who replaces them? A guy like Gray or Roenicke who struggles but sticks around doing low-leverage work to keep his WAR from dropping too low -- who takes the higher leverage innings? The Twins bullpen the last 4 years has seen a notable lack of plus performers, which was highlighted in this year's pennant race. I don't know if the Twins current recipe is really working all that well. Targeting a good, high strikeout reliever on a 3/15 type deal seems like it could be a really smart play for the modest commitment involved, unless you know a better way to invest that money.

Free agents are overpaid as a group because of baseball's service time structure, and this kind of analysis is always going to make the group look bad due to a few bad eggs. It's particularly bad with relievers and WAR, because great relief seasons often only tally 1 WAR anyway. Looking at your list, the first guy (Affeldt) had an average season, a stellar season, a postseason not included at all in your tally (with Affeldt pitching 11 games/innings without allowing a run or an inherited run to score), and a bad final season when they finished 8 games out of the playoffs anyway. Do the Giants really think they "lost" $24.6 million on that transaction? Also, Cameron concludes that you might as well sign minor league free agents, but he doesn't actually perform any analysis of minor league free agent relievers. Getting a minor league free agent reliever that costs nothing and produces nothing indeed seems better than a negative performance on paper, but what are the odds you actually get a plus performance like Grilli or Soria from a minor league free agent, or even a mixed bag like Affeldt? It only really matters if you think the money could have been invested elsewhere, and given the extremely modest amounts of money we're talking about here relative to MLB payrolls, that's far from clear. $6 mil AAV over 2-3 years is very difficult to better allocate.