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Most of the Twins Daily readership is fully aware of the name Keith Law. He is the senior baseball writer at ESPN and can also often be seen on TV. His ESPN Insider articles often create some great discussion in our forums. On Thursday night in Minneapolis, you have the opportunity to rub elbows with and listen to baseball talk from Keith Law. You can even get a copy of his new book, Smart Baseball, signed.Keith Law will be one of three baseball authors on Thursday night at Moon Palace Books (3260 South Minnehaha Avenue) in Minneapolis. The event begins at 6:30 p.m. Law will be joined by Michael Fallon (author of Dodgerland: Decadent Los Angeles and the 1977-1978 Dodgers), and Peter Schilling Jr. (author of the novel The End of Baseball). I started the conversation with Keith Law by reading the full title of his book. "Smart Baseball: The Story Behind the Old Stats That Are Ruining the Game, the New Ones That Are Running It, and the Right Way to Think About Baseball.” My first question? “Can we just call it Smart Baseball for the rest of this interview?” “You can stick with that.” Uffdah! So why did Law write this book at this time? In his role on ESPN and through social media, he receives a ton of questions, and this book is a great way for him to answer many of them. “Readers had been asking me for years to recommend a book like this. What can I read to understand these new stats, to get up to speed on SABRmetrics?” Law continued, “There was never a book written for the lay audience that explains this stuff in plain English, without a lot of math or charts. I didn’t want to assume anything on the part of the reader. It doesn’t matter if you come into this with limited math or baseball background, you should be able to follow the stuff I’m saying.” The book itself came together quite quickly, however. “For years, the questions just kept coming. In the summer of 2015, I decided to put together a pitch and was very lucky. We put it out there, and Harper Collins bought it almost immediately. I started writing in March of 2016, wrote the last new content before the editing process between the Winter Meetings and Christmas of 2016. Then we put it to bed around Valentine’s Day this year, and two months later, it’s out.” The release of the book has made life pretty interesting for Law. Never a dull moment. “It’s go-go-go-go-go. Stop! Nothing for eight weeks, and then the book comes out and your life is never your own. The two weeks around the actual release was absolute insanity.” In fact, on Tuesday night, he was at an event in Atlanta. He will get to spend one day with his family before heading to Minneapolis for Thursday’s event at Moon Palace Books. So why Minnesota? How did this event come together? Well, based on his reasoning for writing the book, it came down to being asked a question by one of his readers. Law explains, “A reader of mine reached out on Facebook and said, ‘Come to Minnesota and do a signing.’ I said, ‘If you’ve got a book store there that does signings and is interested, I always have reasons to come to Minnesota for work anyway. Have the bookstore contact the publicist.’ “Linus” is the reader’s name. He made this happen. He got on the book store and stayed with them and kept in touch with me. They reached out, got everything arranged, found a date that worked for everybody. Moon Palace did a lot of work too. They got two other authors that will be there as well.” It should be a very fun event for any baseball fan, particularly fans of analytics, history and other baseball topics. The response to Smart Baseball has generally been very positive. “I know so many people in the industry at this point. People have reached out and told me they would recommend it to fans.” He noted specifically that Susan Slusser, beat writer for the Oakland A’s reached out and told him and said now she has a book to suggest for people who ask the question, ‘Are there any books you would recommend to help explain these statistics? Law noted, “That’s what we’re trying to do with the book.” While Law is well versed in the analytic part of the game, he also has a lot of experience as a scout and bringing the two together is an important piece for any front office. “I try to (blend stats and scouting). I don’t think you can discuss players without doing both. I think the blend varies by level.” Statistical analysis in baseball is certainly not new. Going back to the first box scores in the late 1800s, statistics have been a big deal in the game. Bill James is often considered the pioneer of advanced statistics. Moneyball, the book, is less than 15 years old. Law said that Moneyball played a role, but there were certainly other reasons that analytics took off in baseball, and probably one was more important than the rest. “Everyone says the publication of Moneyball was the big shift. That definitely raised the awareness in other front offices and among ownership groups. But I think just as much of a spur was with the Red Sox. When Theo Epstein took over, he was extremely public in his embrace of analytics. And then they won two World Series in the next five seasons. That has an effect. To have an old, old franchise, with plenty of money say we’re going to use this stuff and then go out and execute and build a world-class baseball operations department.” Law continued, speaking to the effect it had on other organizations. “I think that was just as much of a spur to every other team, that we have to at least consider this. This has to be part of our thought process. It took a long time for all 30 teams to get there, as you well know. But we’re there now. Everyone is doing it. Everyone at least has some sort of in-house analytics department. They're collecting data, the torrent of StatCast data right now. I don’t know that we know what that all means.” The industry had shifted. There has been a lot of change in the game and how it is analyzed and evaluated. But what’s next? What will the next big area of analytics be? According to Law, “The next advances are more likely to come out of Statcast information. Much of it may not be public, at least not at first. But when I spoke to executives for the last two chapters of my book - one is on Statcast specifically and the last is on what comes next - it was really about applications or insights from looking at Statcast data.” Law provided an example of what could come analytically, “Can we find that pitchers are fatigued in the data before they are actually hurt. His spin rate. His velocity is dropping. But he’s not hurt. He’s not reporting any soreness. But we can see his stuff is objectively not the same. That’s information that we simply never had before. I throw it out there in the book as a hypothetical, but if I could tell you that the Twins could save one DL stint for a starter every year using that data, what’s that worth to them? It’s probably worth seven figures a year.” So at this stage, we all realize that pitcher “wins” tend to be a pretty meaningless, overrated statistic. We understand better that batting average is not as important as on-base percentage. So when I asked Keith Law for an example of a stat that is ruining the game, he quickly responded. “‘Saves’ is the one that’s doing the most damage to the game. My guess is you know why. You could probably make the argument without reading the chapter in the book, and I’m guessing a lot of your readers too. If you watched the postseason last year, we know that too. Zach Britton not getting into the wild card game. You saw Andrew MIller being used very differently. People acted like Terry Francona’s usage of Andrew Miller was like Einstein discovering the theories of relativity. Teams used to do this all the time. I’m not taking any credit from Francona, but this is old and new. It’s new because it’s novel, but it’s not like no manager has ever done this before. Managers used to do this all the time before the save stat. So, that’s the one I always give when people ask me for a stat that’s really ruining the game of baseball. That’s the best general example.” There is another grouping of stats that Law mentions, “There’s a number of times in the book where I talk about the run expectancy table. In trying to allow readers, again without doing a lot of math, to get readers to understand the idea of tradeoffs. This idea that you’re going to try to steal second, but if you fail, there is a real cost here. So think about "What do I gain if I succeed?" What do I lose if I fail? I talk about bunts in that context. I talk about intentional walks in that context. That’s one where, it’s not so much a single stat that’s ruining the game but it’s an older way of thinking. The way that just thinks, "Well, I got the runner to second, that’s a good thing, right?" No… It’s not a good thing, but it took data to actually prove that to people.” And those examples let us know why this can be such an important book for baseball fans. We all have those friends that will say something like so-and-so wasn’t very good last year because he only hit .245, not noting that the same hitter got on base 35% of the time and hit 25 homers while playing Gold Glove caliber defense at an important defensive position. “We’re still fighting an uphill battle with the public. I think teams know this stuff if not all of it, but there’s still a big portion of baseball fandom that isn’t used to thinking about the game this way and I want to reach those people and reach them on their terms and in their language, not ours.” And now we have a book to help us with our arguments and increase the intelligent conversations with those friends. Smart Baseball is available in most bookstores and on the online bookstores. Pick up your copy(ies) today. ------------------------------------------------------------------- But for those of you near Minneapolis, consider joining Keith Law and several other Twins and baseball fans at 6:30 p.m. at Moon Palace Books in Minneapolis. You’ll be able to listen to some interesting baseball discussion, pick up some new reading material and ask Keith Law to sign your copy of Smart Baseball. -------------------------------------------------------------------- Over the next few days, I'll share more from my conversation with Keith Law on topics such as the new Twins regime, the Twins farm system and the upcoming MLB draft. Be sure to check back often. Click here to view the article

With the Twins expected to officially announce the hiring of Derek Falvey as President of Baseball Opportunities any day now, I thought it would be worthwhile to take a look back at how the Cubs' rebuild got started. Now the envy of the baseball world, the Cubs had fallen on hard times prior to hiring their current PBO, Theo Epstein. Epstein took over in October 2011 and his first move was to hire Jed Hoyer, his former right-hand man in Boston, to serve as his general manager. And it was all butterflies and rainbows in Wrigleyville from there, right? Well ... not so much.The first major league signing under the new regime was, drum roll please, David DeJesus! Not exactly a big splash, franchise-defining move. Their first trade didn't work out so well, either. They sent future All-Star, Gold Glover and possible 2016 NL batting champ D.J. LaMahieu to Colorado with Tyler Colvin for Ian Stewart (who hit .210/.292/.335 in one season for the Cubs) and Casey Weathers (who never made it out of the minors). Ooops. Luckily for the Cubbie faithful, they didn't misfire on another big trade they made that winter. On Jan. 6, 2012, the new-look Cubs front office, just a few months on the job, made a franchise-altering trade, though it didn't appear to be that impactful at the time. Despite the old adage that pitching wins championships, the Cubs sent young fireballer Andrew Cashner, the organization's first-round pick in '08, to the Padres for Anthony Rizzo. It was essentially a challenge trade, swapping two young players, one of whom (Cashner) Epstein and Hoyer couldn't have known too well, for one whom they were extremely familiar with. Epstein was the general manager of the Red Sox when they drafted Rizzo and Hoyer was the GM of the Padres when they traded for him. He was their guy. It wasn't exactly a popular trade at the time, seeing as Rizzo had just hit .141/.281/.242 in 49 games with San Diego, but it has turned out to be one of the better trades of the past 20 years. Over the past three seasons, only Mike Trout and Josh Donaldson have accumulated more fWAR than Rizzo's 16.3. Cashner never lived up to his lofty expectations. But it's not like it was all smooth sailing even after the Rizzo trade. The next offseason, Epstein handed out his first big money free agent contract with the Cubs. In Jan. '13, the Cubs signed Edwin Jackson to a four-year, $52 million deal and he rewarded them with a 5.37 ERA. To Twins fans, that deal looks eerily similar to the Ricky Nolasco contract. The Epstein-run front office had also struggled to find a manager. Only a couple of weeks after the new regime took over they fired Mike Quade (current Rochester Red Wings skipper) despite the fact he was under contract for the 2012 season. They brought in Dale Sveum as their hand-picked replacement, but his .392 winning percentage over two seasons didn't cut it. In 2014 they replaced Sveum with Rick Renteria, who served only one year on the job after some odd circumstances led Joe Maddon to take the reins. Chicago's love affair with Maddon started on Day 1, as he famously offered to buy everyone shots at his hiring press conference. The .619 winning percentage the team has posted since doesn't hurt either. To summarize, thing's didn't just turn over for the Epstein-led Cubs at the flip of (GM) switch, and their record was indicative of that. In the first season under the new regime, the Cubs actually lost 101 games. They didn't post a winning record until just last season, which was the fourth under Epstein's leadership. But ask any Cubs fan and they'll tell you it doesn't matter how long it took to get here. It was well worth the wait. Along with making improvements to Wrigley Field to ensure it will be a viable ballpark for the future, the Cubs have built both an elite roster and farm system. And best of all, this team appears to have a window of contention about as large as the windows that open up on the Vikings' new stadium. The Cubs have baseball's best record, but even if they can't break their 107-year World Series drought this season, when the bleacher bums say "there's always next year" instead of it being a sheepish rallying cry, they can really mean it this time. They appear to be well equipped for an extended stay atop the NL. For their efforts, the Cubs just gave extensions to Epstein, Hoyer and player development guru Jason McLeod. Looking at the Cubs' turnaround, the first thing that stands out to me is how little it mattered that the new regime was able to hire their own manager. They didn't really get their guy (Maddon) until the team was ready for contention. Many have argued that Jim Pohlad's insistence that Paul Molitor remain as manager is a cataclysmic mistake. It probably isn't the wisest move, but at the same time it probably won't really matter. It seems there's a very good chance Falvey will able to hire his manager for the 2018 season, at the latest. Of course, every team and every front office is different, and Twins fans shouldn't expect Falvey to take the Cubs rebuild as a blueprint. It is, however, worthwhile to note that what may eventually go down as one of the greatest turnarounds and front office tenures in baseball history took three years to get off the ground. Given the year we've suffered through, it may be painful to accept the fact the Twins may have a few more lean years ahead. But, if Falvey and company (whoever that may be) can deliver an extended run of championship-caliber teams it will be well worth the wait, however long it may be. That should be the ultimate goal, regardless of what it means for the 2017 season. Click here to view the article

This post is part of a series in which Mark Armour and I count down the 25 best GMs in history, cross-posting from our blog. For an explanation, please see this post. There is an ongoing debate in Boston as to how to divvy up credit between Theo Epstein and Dan Duquette for the 2004 World Series title. Duquette ran the team through 2001, so of course many of the better players on the 2004 club joined the team on his watch. This is all true, but undersells the difficulty of turning a good team into a great team.Epstein became the general manager of the Red Sox in November 2002, after the team was spurned by Billy Beane. In fact, Beane’s strong recommendation of Epstein helped him get the job. Owner John Henry had made his fortune as a commodities trader, developing a system that took the emotional element out of trading decisions. To run his team he naturally wanted someone with an analytical mindset, someone who made decisions based on data and evidence. The 2002 Red Sox had won 93 games, and featured Pedro Martinez, Nomar Garciaparra, Manny Ramirez, Derek Lowe, Tim Wakefield, Johnny Damon, Jason Varitek and Trot Nixon. It was a great core, though the team also had obvious holes and they were competing against a team — the Yankees — which had won 103 games and seemed primed to continue doing so. To fill these holes, Epstein, like Beane, would rely on a modern understanding of how to value players, and how players were likely to develop. Epstein had a very busy and productive first few months, landing David Ortiz, Bill Muellar, Kevin Millar, Mike Timlin, Bronson Arroyo and Todd Walker in low-cost deals. Several incumbents regressed in 2003, but Epstein’s tremendous haul got them up to 95 wins and, ultimately, a devastating seventh game loss to the Yankees in the ALCS. Epstein went after bigger fish the next winter, and landed Curt Schilling, Keith Foulke, and Mark Belhorn, along with manager Terry Francona. This got them to 98 wins, and, after finally slaying the Yankees in an epic ALCS, their first World Series title in 86 years. After Epstein got the job he repeatedly said that he wanted to build a “$100 million player development machine” to provide (1) young talent for the Red Sox, (2) depth to deal with injuries or poor performance, and (3) assets to trade to fill in holes. It all started with the amateur draft and young international free agents. The 2003-2004 teams had their success before Epstein’s machine had been built, but he did not lose sight of the future, the team he wanted to create. In the two offseasons following their 2004 championship, the Red Sox lost several high-priced free agents, including Martinez, Lowe, and Damon, while cashing in the additional draft picks they received as compensation. Meanwhile, the organization was developing the next generation of stars. The Red Sox drafted Kevin Youkilis in 2001, Jon Lester in 2002, Jonathan Papelbon in 2003, Dustin Pedroia in 2004, and Clay Buchholz and Jacoby Ellsbury in 2005 — extraordinary production, and all of them were largely developed in Epstein’s system. By 2007, all six had reached the big leagues and, along with a few trade acquisitions and free-agent signings, helped the Red Sox win another World Series. As sweet as the first title was, it was the second that validated Epstein’s approach. The Red Sox won 95 games in both 2008, resulting in an oh-so-close seven-game ALCS loss to the Rays, and 2009, a first round sweep by the Angels. The latter playoff exit, coupled with the hated Yankees' World Series triumph, made Epstein conclude that it was time to wait for the next team to develop. Although he believed the team could continue to compete with a few low-cost patches, “we all don’t want to sacrifice our competitiveness during the bridge just for the future. So we’re just trying to balance both those issues.” These comments were skewered in the press (“It’s nice that Theo has a passion for player development,” wrote Dan Shaughnessy in the Globe, “but asking fans to take a year off is outrageous. Henry is a billionaire and the Sox are making bundles of money.”) At least partly as a result of the backlash from fans and media, Epstein’s bosses told him to double down and spend more money. Within a few weeks the Red Sox signed John Lackey, Adrian Beltre, Mike Cameron, and Marco Scutaro. After the Red Sox, with the second-highest payroll in baseball, failed to make the postseason in 2010, the team opened the vault even wider, signing Carl Crawford (seven years, $142 million) and trading for Adrian Gonzalez and extending his contract (seven years, $154 million). Several of the signings cost the team draft choices, and the Gonzalez deal cost them three of the best players in their system. The Red Sox were hailed as a super-team heading into the 2011 season, and they played like it for five months. At the end of August they had an 83-52 record, the best record in the American League. Thanks mainly to dreadful pitching, they crashed to 7-20 in September, losing the division race and, on the final day of the season, the wild card as well. After this stunning collapse and multiple stories concerning turmoil in the clubhouse, Francona, sensing ownership had lost faith in him, resigned. A couple of weeks later Epstein followed suit, taking a job with the Cubs as President of Baseball Operations. “It was my fault,” Epstein lamented later. “I ****ed up by giving in to [the trades and signings]. I think [baseball ops] was really good at being true to our approach in the early and middle years, then toward the end—and I blame myself for this—we sort of gave in to it.” With the Cubs, Epstein has a better title and more rope but essentially the same job. He hired Jed Hoyer as the GM, but in reality Hoyer fills a role much like a traditional assistant GM. A modern baseball ops group has a lot to do and requires a much broader array of talent than it did even a generation ago. If things go well a lot of people will deserve and receive credit for it. Importantly, Epstein resolved to build his machine and fight for it. Unlike in Boston, he took over a team with little talent, so his patient approach offered little immediate relief for the faithful — the club finished 61-101, 66-96, and 73-89 his first three years. But there is hope. We hate to get ahead of the story here, but Epstein appears to have executed the first part of his plan wonderfully. There is a lot of young or mid-career talent and the farm system is loaded. Epstein signed Jon Lester, and traded for catcher Miguel Montero and outfielder Dexter Fowler, suggesting he feels the team is getting close. The team could contend for the post-season this year, and will be expected to do so starting in 2016. If Epstein pulls this off, if he wins in Chicago after winning in Boston, he will deserve a much higher ranking than this, well into the top ten and talk of Cooperstown. But for now we will leave him here, and follow along with the rest of you. To read more about the history of baseball operations and the GM, please buy our new book In Pursuit of Pennants–Baseball Operations from Deadball to Moneyball via the publisher or at your favorite on-line store. Click here to view the article

This post is part of a series in which Mark Armour and I count down the 25 best GMs in history, crossposting from our blog. For an explanation, please see this post. [This one is from Mark] There is an ongoing debate in Boston as to how to divvy up credit between Theo Epstein and Dan Duquette for the 2004 World Series title. Duquette ran the team through 2001, so of course many of the better players on the 2004 club joined the team on his watch. This is all true, but undersells the difficulty of turning a good team into a great team. Epstein became the general manager of the Red Sox in November 2002, after the team was spurned by Billy Beane. In fact, Beane’s strong recommendation of Epstein helped him get the job. Owner John Henry had made his fortune as a commodities trader, developing a system that took the emotional element out of trading decisions. To run his team he naturally wanted someone with an analytical mindset, someone who made decisions based on data and evidence. The 2002 Red Sox had won 93 games, and featured Pedro Martinez, Nomar Garciaparra, Manny Ramirez, Derek Lowe, Tim Wakefield, Johnny Damon, Jason Varitek and Trot Nixon. It was a great core, though the team also had obvious holes and they were competing against a team — the Yankees — who had won 103 games and seemed primed to continue doing so. To fill these holes, Epstein, like Beane, would rely on a modern understanding of how to value players, and how players were likely to develop. Epstein had a very busy and productive first few months, landing David Ortiz, Bill Muellar, Kevin Millar, Mike Timlin, Bronson Arroyo and Todd Walker in low-cost deals. Several incumbents regressed in 2003, but Epstein’s tremendous haul got them up to 95 wins and, ultimately, a devastating seventh game loss to the Yankees in the ALCS. Epstein went after bigger fish the next winter, and landed Curt Schilling, Keith Foulke, and Mark Belhorn, along with manager Terry Francona. This got them to 98 wins, and (after finally slaying the Yankees in an epic ALCS) their first World Series title in 86 years. After Epstein got the job he repeatedly said that he wanted to build a “$100 million player development machine” to provide (a) young talent for the Red Sox, ( depth to deal with injuries or poor performance, and © assets to deal to fill in holes. It all started with the amateur draft and young international free agents. The 2003-2004 teams had their success before Epstein’s machine had been built, but he did not lose sight of the future, the team he wanted to create. In the two off-seasons following their 2004 championship, the Red Sox lost several high-priced free agents, including Martinez, Lowe, and Damon, while cashing in the additional draft picks they received as compensation. Meanwhile, the organization was developing the next generation of stars. The Red Sox drafted Kevin Youkilis in 2001, Jon Lester in 2002, Jonathan Papelbon in 2003, Dustin Pedroia in 2004, and Clay Buchholz and Jacoby Ellsbury in 2005 — extraordinary production, and all of them were largely developed in Epstein’s system. By 2007 all six had reached the big leagues and, along with a few trade acquisitions and free-agent signings, helped the Red Sox win another World Series. As sweet as the first title was, it was the second that validated Epstein’s approach. The Red Sox won 95 games in both 2008 (resulting in an oh-so-close seven-game ALCS loss to the Rays) and 2009 (a first round sweep to the Angels). The latter playoff exit, coupled with the hated Yankees World Series triumph, made Epstein conclude that it was time to wait for the next team to develop. Although he believed the team could continue to compete with a few low-cost patches, “we all don’t want to sacrifice our competitiveness during the bridge just for the future. So we’re just trying to balance both those issues.” These comments were skewered in the press (“It’s nice that Theo has a passion for player development,” wrote Dan Shaughnessy in the Globe, “but asking fans to take a year off is outrageous. Henry is a billionaire and the Sox are making bundles of money.”) At least partly as a result of the backlash from fans and the media, Epstein’s bosses told him to double down and spend more money. Within a few weeks the Red Sox signed John Lackey, Adrian Beltre, Mike Cameron, and Marco Scutaro. After the Red Sox, with the second-highest payroll in baseball, failed to make the postseason in 2010, the team opened the vault even more, signing Carl Crawford (seven years, $142 million) and trading for Adrian Gonzalez and extending his contract (seven years, $154 million). Several of the signings cost the team draft choices, and the Gonzalez deal cost them three of the best players in their system. The Red Sox were hailed as a super-team heading into the 2011 season, and they played like it for five months. At the end of August they had an 83-52 record, the best record in the American League. Thanks mainly to dreadful pitching, they crashed to 7-20 in September, losing the division race and, on the final day of the season, the wild card as well. After this stunning collapse and multiple stories concerning turmoil in the clubhouse, Francona, sensing ownership had lost faith in him, resigned. A couple of weeks later Epstein followed suit, taking a job with the Cubs as President of Baseball Operations. “It was my fault,” Epstein lamented later. “I ****ed up by giving in to [the trades and signings]. I think [baseball ops] was really good at being true to our approach in the early and middle years, then toward the end—and I blame myself for this—we sort of gave in to it.” With the Cubs Epstein has a better title and more rope but essentially the same job. He hired Jed Hoyer as the GM, but in reality Hoyer fills a role much like a traditional assistant GM. A modern baseball ops group has a lot to do and requires much broader array of talent than it did a generation ago. If things go well a lot of people will deserve and receive credit for it. Importantly, Epstein resolved to build his machine and fight for it. Unlike in Boston, he took over a team with little talent so his patient approach offered little immediate relief for the faithful — the club finished 61-101, 66-96, and 73-89 his first three years. But there is hope. We hate to get ahead of the story here, but Epstein appears to have executed the first part of his plan wonderfully. There is a lot of young or mid-career talent and the farm system is loaded. Epstein signed Jon Lester, and traded for catcher Miguel Montero and outfielder Dexter Fowler, suggesting he feels the team is getting close. The team could contend for the post-season this year, and will be expected to do so starting in 2016. If Epstein pulls this off, if he wins in Chicago after winning in Boston, he will deserve a much higher ranking than this, well into the top ten and talk of Cooperstown. But for now we will leave him here, and follow along with the rest of you. To read more about the history of baseball operations and the GM, please buy our new book In Pursuit of Pennants–Baseball Operations from Deadball to Moneyball via the publisher or at your favorite on-line store.