Jamie Cameron

There’s no doubt that the Falvey/Levine regime in Minnesota has stamped the organization with its own unique culture and identity. Since their arrival in advance of the 2020 season, leadership has taken the holistic approach needed to bring an organization like the Twins up to speed, to become and remain a competitor.
Falvey and Levine have focused their systematic overhaul on a number of key areas - individual development plans for players, innovative and creative coaching hires, and building out an incredibly robust analytical department.
 
A maxim Falvey has used since his arrival in Minnesota is his desire to build a sustainable winner, an annually playoff bound team with enough organizational and prospect depth to remain a perennial challenger. In recent years, fans have seen this strategy play out through their approach to free agency, signing high floor, veteran adds on short term deals to accent the homegrown core, built upon by the gambit of signing Josh Donaldson last offseason. Another key trend of the front office has been taking advantage of market depth, something exemplified by their inking Andrelton Simmons to a 1 year, $10.5 million contract on Tuesday night.
To explore this, let’s examine the corner outfield situation in 2017, the year Falvey and Lavine arrived, to today. While Simmons and Donaldson would have been an all time left side of the infield 3-5 years ago, they still provide a telling contrast defensively between then and now.
 
In 2017, the Twins corner infield consisted of Miguel Sano and Eduardo Escobar at 3rd and Jorge Polanco and Ehire Adrianza at SS. This quarter combined in 2017 for an OAA -5 collectively. By contrast, in 2019, the last full season in which Donaldson and Simmons were relatively healthy, they combined for 25 OAA.
Looking at fielding range provides an even more stark contrast. In 2017, the Twins left side quarter combined for a UZR/150 of -26.2, while in 2019, Donaldson and Simmons combined for UZR/150 of 15.9. Clearly, these aren’t apples to apples comparisons, but the point remains, the 2021 Twins left side of the infield, if healthy, is elite, where it used to be a legitimate weakness.
 
The positive defensive outcomes Twins fans are hoping for will be dependent on many factors, not least of which, is the health (calves and ankles) of their infielders. What is interesting, is what the combination continues to prove about Falvey and Levine, that they will continue to prioritize organizational flexibility and market depth to improve the team. While this slow and late approach hasn’t always worked out for the team (see Logan Morrison and Lance Lynn), the Twins front office continues to build a case that they are adept and nimble in constructing and regenerating their roster, a recipe for sustained success.

There’s no doubt that the Falvey/Levine regime in Minnesota has stamped the organization with its own unique culture and identity. Since their arrival in advance of the 2020 season, leadership has taken the holistic approach needed to bring an organization like the Twins up to speed, to become and remain a competitor.
Falvey and Levine have focused their systematic overhaul on a number of key areas - individual development plans for players, innovative and creative coaching hires, and building out an incredibly robust analytical department.
 
A maxim Falvey has used since his arrival in Minnesota is his desire to build a sustainable winner, an annually playoff bound team with enough organizational and prospect depth to remain a perennial challenger. In recent years, fans have seen this strategy play out through their approach to free agency, signing high floor, veteran adds on short term deals to accent the homegrown core, built upon by the gambit of signing Josh Donaldson last offseason. Another key trend of the front office has been taking advantage of market depth, something exemplified by their inking Andrelton Simmons to a 1 year, $10.5 million contract on Tuesday night.
To explore this, let’s examine the corner outfield situation in 2017, the year Falvey and Lavine arrived, to today. While Simmons and Donaldson would have been an all time left side of the infield 3-5 years ago, they still provide a telling contrast defensively between then and now.
 
In 2017, the Twins corner infield consisted of Miguel Sano and Eduardo Escobar at 3rd and Jorge Polanco and Ehire Adrianza at SS. This quarter combined in 2017 for an OAA -5 collectively. By contrast, in 2019, the last full season in which Donaldson and Simmons were relatively healthy, they combined for 25 OAA.
Looking at fielding range provides an even more stark contrast. In 2017, the Twins left side quarter combined for a UZR/150 of -26.2, while in 2019, Donaldson and Simmons combined for UZR/150 of 15.9. Clearly, these aren’t apples to apples comparisons, but the point remains, the 2021 Twins left side of the infield, if healthy, is elite, where it used to be a legitimate weakness.
 
The positive defensive outcomes Twins fans are hoping for will be dependent on many factors, not least of which, is the health (calves and ankles) of their infielders. What is interesting, is what the combination continues to prove about Falvey and Levine, that they will continue to prioritize organizational flexibility and market depth to improve the team. While this slow and late approach hasn’t always worked out for the team (see Logan Morrison and Lance Lynn), the Twins front office continues to build a case that they are adept and nimble in constructing and regenerating their roster, a recipe for sustained success.

The day the Padres officially announced their status as contenders by officially landing Blake Snell and Yu Darvish, the Twins countered with their own power move for, *squints at notes*, Hansel Robles. Jokes aside, Twins fans should be encouraged that an initial move has been made to deepen a bullpen losing several key 2020 cornerstones. What should we make of Robles, his stuff, his profile, and his fit?
 
Robles had a dire 2020 that should be largely thrown out as his 317 recorded pitches amounted to less than one third of any of his other five MLB seasons besides his debut year.
 
Robles is a mostly 3 pitch righty, with a hard fastball with some decent ride that sits 95-97mph. Robles fastball was his undoing in 2020, with opposing hitters lighting it up to the tune of a .667 SLG, with a bloated BaBIP that should normalize with a 900ish pitch sample in 2021.
 
Robles' other two pitches are likely what the Twins hope to capitalize on. He throws a changeup around 35% of the time (often to lefties) and a slider around 12% of the time, mostly to righties. While the Twins are becoming known as a slider loving organization, it's Robles’ changeup which has been his most effective pitch, holding opposing hitters to a wRC+ of 11 on the pitch in 2019, by far his best year, and 86 in a very poor 2020. Expect the Twins to tinker with his pitch mix significantly, as they have with other bullpen additions in recent years.
 
While Robles isn’t someone to write to your momma about, he’s not a scrapheap guy either. He’s a solid MLB pitcher with a 5 year track record. He essentially offered a 1st percentile season in 2020 and a 99th percentile season in 2019. In 2021 he should be good for 50ish innings (season length dependent) of work in low to mid leverage spots. While perhaps underwhelming given some of the other moves made around MLB yesterday, Robles pitch mix gives him the versatility to throw to just about anyone, and he offers solid upside in a bullpen severely lacking in depth. Over to you Wes Johnson.

The day the Padres officially announced their status as contenders by officially landing Blake Snell and Yu Darvish, the Twins countered with their own power move for, *squints at notes*, Hansel Robles. Jokes aside, Twins fans should be encouraged that an initial move has been made to deepen a bullpen losing several key 2020 cornerstones. What should we make of Robles, his stuff, his profile, and his fit?
 
Robles had a dire 2020 that should be largely thrown out as his 317 recorded pitches amounted to less than one third of any of his other five MLB seasons besides his debut year.
 
Robles is a mostly 3 pitch righty, with a hard fastball with some decent ride that sits 95-97mph. Robles fastball was his undoing in 2020, with opposing hitters lighting it up to the tune of a .667 SLG, with a bloated BaBIP that should normalize with a 900ish pitch sample in 2021.
 
Robles' other two pitches are likely what the Twins hope to capitalize on. He throws a changeup around 35% of the time (often to lefties) and a slider around 12% of the time, mostly to righties. While the Twins are becoming known as a slider loving organization, it's Robles’ changeup which has been his most effective pitch, holding opposing hitters to a wRC+ of 11 on the pitch in 2019, by far his best year, and 86 in a very poor 2020. Expect the Twins to tinker with his pitch mix significantly, as they have with other bullpen additions in recent years.
 
While Robles isn’t someone to write to your momma about, he’s not a scrapheap guy either. He’s a solid MLB pitcher with a 5 year track record. He essentially offered a 1st percentile season in 2020 and a 99th percentile season in 2019. In 2021 he should be good for 50ish innings (season length dependent) of work in low to mid leverage spots. While perhaps underwhelming given some of the other moves made around MLB yesterday, Robles pitch mix gives him the versatility to throw to just about anyone, and he offers solid upside in a bullpen severely lacking in depth. Over to you Wes Johnson.

If there is one thing we can all agree on regarding the 2018 Minnesota Twins, it’s that they have a higher floor than their 2017 counterparts. With key additions in the rotation, bullpen, and at DH, Minnesota baseball fans are eagerly anticipating the start of a new season. With a higher floor, established pieces are going to have to maintain, or raise the level of their game in order to keep their jobs. Most notably; Taylor Rogers.
 
Rogers was drafted by the Twins in the 11th round in 2012 out of the University of Kentucky. Rogers exceeded rookie limits in the 2016 season and is not eligible for arbitration until 2020. With that amount of team control its important the Twins what they have, and what they don’t have in the 27 year old left-hander.
 
MLB Debut
Rogers made his MLB debut in 2016, pitching 61 innings and excelled. Rogers managed a 3.96 ERA on the back of a 9.39 K/9, 2.35 BB/9, and GB% of 51%, all really solid numbers. Rogers’ xFIP of 3.47 was indicative that he might be scratching the surface of being an excellent relief option for the Twins. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Rogers had pretty dramatic splits in 2016. Against lefties, he put together an excellent .202 BAA, .286 SLG, and .281 BAbip. Conversely, Rogers struggled against righties, to the tune of a .291 BAA, .462 SLG, and .348 BAbip. This led most to the conclusion that Rogers could be a viable long term option as a LOOGY. The first half of Rogers 2017 however, would call that conclusion into question.
 
2017: A Tale of two Halves
‘It was the best of times, it was the worst of times’. Words from Charles Dickens which are applicable to Rogers’ 2017, which oscillated between impressive, and desolate.
 
First Half: 1.87 BB/9, 0.80 HR/9, .333 SLG
Second Half: 5.73 BB/9, 1.23 HR/9, .434 SLG
 
In the first half of the 2017 season, the Twins bullpen was in flux. Not only did the big league club use a record 16 starting pitchers over the course of the season, a slew of quadruple A types saw time in the pen, long before an incredible second half surge propelled the team to the second wild card berth. With a stable bullpen, Rogers would likely faced predominantly LHH. The Twins however, were struggling, and Rogers began to see RHH with increasing frequency. Surprisingly, he delivered in a big way. Prior to the end of June, Rogers managed an incredible 1.35 ERA against RHH, with a stingy .257 SLG, and .227 BAA. For the Twins, this was a boon of Hildenbergian proportions. Overall, in the first half of 2017, Rogers threw to 33% more RHH than LHH, a statistic which evened in the second half of the season, but not significantly enough to prevent a major regression against righties, evidenced by his 5.79 ERA, .355 BAA, and .581 SLG the rest of the way against RHH.
 
It’s almost a certainty that Rogers’ first half numbers against RHH were an aberration. A return to dominance against LHH (he had been solid but unspectacular against them in the first half) helped mitigate the damage of an awful second half. All in all Rogers finished the season with number which would lead most to consider him a left-handed specialist. Rogers offers more than Buddy Boshers, but not a ton more.
 
Pitch Mix Overview
Rogers’ pitch mix is important to understanding why he suddenly fell off a cliff against RHH in the second half of 2017. Rogers relies on a sinker, four seam fastball, and a curveball. Additionally, he mixes in a changeup pretty infrequently (only 4% of the time in 2017). Rogers has above average velocity on most of his pitches, his fastball generating a ton of fly balls, and his changeup generating a decent number of groundballs.
 
Rogers threw his changeup minimally to begin with but decreasingly frequently as the 2017 season progressed, ditching the pitch altogether in July. Coincidentally, July was the worst month of the year for Rogers, who put together an ERA of 8.18 and gave up a .614 SLG that month. This makes sense. The changeup is an equalizing pitch to throw to opposite handed hitters (that’s why Johan Santana was so dominant). Despite not having a great changeup to begin with, Rogers was continually being put in tough situations against RHH without a weapon to neutralize them. This, in addition to an uncharacteristically high walk rate, led Rogers to an awful second half.
 
Waiting in the Wings
On one hand, there is reason for optimism for Rogers in 2018. Despite having a pretty rough spring training, it’s likely that his elevated walk rate from the second half of the season is a mechanical issue which is now resolved (2 walks in 11 IP in spring training would suggest as much). On the other hand, his splits are real, Rogers might not be a true LOOGY, but he isn’t a pitcher the Twins should be relying on to get out RHH on a consistent basis.
 
Additionally, the Twins have some interesting arms waiting in the wings. Gabriel Moya (owner of an excellent changeup) is a candidate much more likely to be successful against both LHH and RHH due to his pitch mix and deceptive mechanics. Tyler Jay is another candidate to be a backend bullpen option if he can stay healthy throughout the 2018 season. If either of those pitchers have strong seasons, they may challenge for Rogers’ spot. Zach Duke is already a better iteration of a LHP who can dominate LHH due to his ability to generate ground balls instead of fly-balls. With a minor league option remaining, don’t be surprised if Rogers ends up in Rochester if he doesn’t get off to a strong start.

*Note: This article has been updated. The previous image of Kershaw's release point was horizontal instead of vertical. This error has since been amended.
 
2018 is a pivotal year for Ryan Pressly. The Twins originally acquired Pressly from Boston in the 2012 Rule 5 draft. In five season in Minnesota, Pressly has oscillated between very good (2016 version), and so-so, (2017 version). With the front office adding significant major league talent this off-season, and a chunk of organizational relief talent in the high minors (Curtiss, Reed etc.), Pressly is entering a crucial season. He is out of minor league options. For a Twins team hoping to challenge for the AL Central, a poor April-June may mean the end of his tenure with the team.
 
On paper, Ryan Pressly is everything the Twins want to help anchor a bullpen which has lacked dominant arms in recent years. In January, Pressly agreed to a $1.6 million contract with the Twins for 2018, avoiding arbitration. Stuff-wise, Pressly is the kind of arm the Twins have needed to stick at the major league level. He can throw five pitches (fourseam fastball, cutter, slider, curve, and sinker) and has well-above average velocity (his fastball averaged 96mph in 2017). Pressly also generates a ton of swings and misses, with a 12.4% SwStr% (swinging strike %). For context, this was 38th in MLB for relievers who threw at least 60 innings, sandwiched right around Brad Hand and Bryan Shaw. So why hasn’t Pressly managed to produce more consistently excellent results, given his impressive arsenal?
 
Variable Release Points
I’m about to do something extremely unfair to Ryan Pressly; compare him to Clayton Kershaw. That’s not really reasonable. Kershaw is perhaps, the greatest pitcher of his generation, a starter, and left-handed. Pressly is none of those things. The comparison is useful however. In the table below, you’ll see Kershaw’s vertical release points for all his pitches charted throughout the 2017 season. Notice the consistency in release points for his pitches (how clustered together they are). The result of this is all his pitches are coming at hitters from an extremely similar height, increasing the likelihood of deceiving the hitter. Pitchers typically go through subtle variations in their release points throughout the season. When Kershaw’s vertical release dips or increases in one pitch, the rest follow suit.
 




 
By contrast, Pressly has wide fluctuations in his vertical release, both throughout the season, and in between his pitches. There are two months’ worth noting in his 2017 season, May, and August. In May, there was a much greater range in the vertical release points of Pressly’s fastball and slider (his primary two pitches). In August he brought those two release points (although lower) much closer together. Pressly managed an ERA of 11.00 in May with a .324 BAA, and a 1.13 ERA in August with a 0.96 BAA. When Pressly is able to release the ball from consistent vertical coordinates, regardless of the pitch, he has the velocity required to dominate opposing hitters.
 
Slider Command
Pressly employs both a curveball and slider as breaking pitches. 2017 saw a significant reduction in the amount Pressly used his slider (dropping from around 25% to around 18%). Both of Pressly’s breaking pitches have fairly minimal vertical break and are both above average in velocity. When throwing breaking pitches without a ton of break, command is everything. Below are two charts mapping Pressly’s slider and curveball location in 2017.
 




 
It’s immediately noticeable that Pressly leaves far too many sliders over the heart of the plate. By comparison, Pressly locates his curveball more consistently down and away to RHH (down and in to LHH). His slider command struggle is reflected in the effectiveness of both pitches in 2017. Pressly’s curveball had a .194 SLG against in 2017 (with around 21% whiffs), compared to .463 SLG for his slider (around 15% whiffs). In other words, when Pressly left his slider over the plate, the break he generates is not enough to save him, and excellent professional hitters tend to have their way with it. For one final comparison, the last chart here shows Pressly’s slider command in 2016, his best full season with the Twins. His ability to cluster slider location down in the zone is noticeable. In 2016, Pressly gave up a .375 SLG on his slider, and .089 ISO, compared with .256 ISO in 2017.
 


 
Upon looking into Pressly’s numbers more closely, there’s only one conclusion to draw, he’s never established great enough level of consistency in his mechanics throughout his tenure with the Twins. Variations in his release point and command struggles have diminished the impact of his incredible arm. If Pressly is going to stick in the Twins’ pen long term, mechanical consistency is the key lever that needs to improve to capitalize on his excellent arm

*Note: This article has been updated. The previous image of Kershaw's release point was horizontal instead of vertical. This error has since been amended.
 
2018 is a pivotal year for Ryan Pressly. The Twins originally acquired Pressly from Boston in the 2012 Rule 5 draft. In five season in Minnesota, Pressly has oscillated between very good (2016 version), and so-so, (2017 version). With the front office adding significant major league talent this off-season, and a chunk of organizational relief talent in the high minors (Curtiss, Reed etc.), Pressly is entering a crucial season. He is out of minor league options. For a Twins team hoping to challenge for the AL Central, a poor April-June may mean the end of his tenure with the team.
 
On paper, Ryan Pressly is everything the Twins want to help anchor a bullpen which has lacked dominant arms in recent years. In January, Pressly agreed to a $1.6 million contract with the Twins for 2018, avoiding arbitration. Stuff-wise, Pressly is the kind of arm the Twins have needed to stick at the major league level. He can throw five pitches (fourseam fastball, cutter, slider, curve, and sinker) and has well-above average velocity (his fastball averaged 96mph in 2017). Pressly also generates a ton of swings and misses, with a 12.4% SwStr% (swinging strike %). For context, this was 38th in MLB for relievers who threw at least 60 innings, sandwiched right around Brad Hand and Bryan Shaw. So why hasn’t Pressly managed to produce more consistently excellent results, given his impressive arsenal?
 
Variable Release Points
I’m about to do something extremely unfair to Ryan Pressly; compare him to Clayton Kershaw. That’s not really reasonable. Kershaw is perhaps, the greatest pitcher of his generation, a starter, and left-handed. Pressly is none of those things. The comparison is useful however. In the table below, you’ll see Kershaw’s vertical release points for all his pitches charted throughout the 2017 season. Notice the consistency in release points for his pitches (how clustered together they are). The result of this is all his pitches are coming at hitters from an extremely similar height, increasing the likelihood of deceiving the hitter. Pitchers typically go through subtle variations in their release points throughout the season. When Kershaw’s vertical release dips or increases in one pitch, the rest follow suit.
 




 
By contrast, Pressly has wide fluctuations in his vertical release, both throughout the season, and in between his pitches. There are two months’ worth noting in his 2017 season, May, and August. In May, there was a much greater range in the vertical release points of Pressly’s fastball and slider (his primary two pitches). In August he brought those two release points (although lower) much closer together. Pressly managed an ERA of 11.00 in May with a .324 BAA, and a 1.13 ERA in August with a 0.96 BAA. When Pressly is able to release the ball from consistent vertical coordinates, regardless of the pitch, he has the velocity required to dominate opposing hitters.
 
Slider Command
Pressly employs both a curveball and slider as breaking pitches. 2017 saw a significant reduction in the amount Pressly used his slider (dropping from around 25% to around 18%). Both of Pressly’s breaking pitches have fairly minimal vertical break and are both above average in velocity. When throwing breaking pitches without a ton of break, command is everything. Below are two charts mapping Pressly’s slider and curveball location in 2017.
 




 
It’s immediately noticeable that Pressly leaves far too many sliders over the heart of the plate. By comparison, Pressly locates his curveball more consistently down and away to RHH (down and in to LHH). His slider command struggle is reflected in the effectiveness of both pitches in 2017. Pressly’s curveball had a .194 SLG against in 2017 (with around 21% whiffs), compared to .463 SLG for his slider (around 15% whiffs). In other words, when Pressly left his slider over the plate, the break he generates is not enough to save him, and excellent professional hitters tend to have their way with it. For one final comparison, the last chart here shows Pressly’s slider command in 2016, his best full season with the Twins. His ability to cluster slider location down in the zone is noticeable. In 2016, Pressly gave up a .375 SLG on his slider, and .089 ISO, compared with .256 ISO in 2017.
 


 
Upon looking into Pressly’s numbers more closely, there’s only one conclusion to draw, he’s never established great enough level of consistency in his mechanics throughout his tenure with the Twins. Variations in his release point and command struggles have diminished the impact of his incredible arm. If Pressly is going to stick in the Twins’ pen long term, mechanical consistency is the key lever that needs to improve to capitalize on his excellent arm

Jamie Cameron here. If you haven’t been reading John Olson’s Four-Six-Three Blog at Twins Daily, get on it. He’s been churning out some really great content. John is also a great Twitter follow. Recently he posted a thread which caught my attention, essentially attempting to answer the question; does a given team need an ace in order to win the World Series? So I did what any Twitter secret admirer would do, and slid into John’s DMs.
 
‘John, you don’t know me, but this thread is super interesting, how would you feel about writing a collaborative piece for Twins Daily?’ was my smooth pickup line. John, ever the good sport, agreed, so we came up with a premise; let’s have a debate within an article. Let’s go toe to toe and try to answer the question; do the Twins need an ace to win the World Series? John will argue for, I will argue against. We’d love you to weigh in, and your thoughts on the format. Thanks in advance for reading!
 
Ace up your Sleeve: The necessity of a “true” number one
by John Olson
 
Throughout the past offseason, I have been adamant about the necessity of an ace. If the Twins truly want to take the next step, they need to have a front-line, no. 1, ace starter. Assembling a decent rotation, something stable enough to win you some games in a weak division, maybe secure the second Wild Card – well, that’s all fine and well, I suppose. If the goal is to win the last game, it may be a near impossible task to do it without having a true number one starter.
 
I think we need to get some semantics out of the way, first, before we can make any cogent arguments. There isn’t a good way to, non-subjectively, define what an ace pitcher “is”. If you simply define an ace as a teams’ number one pitcher in the rotation, their Opening Day starter, then well, every team in the league already has one – case closed. This isn’t true; I think we can all agree. Even with the incredible season Ervin Santana had last season, I don’t think he fits the mold, either. Like Justice Stewart said, in 1964 when asked to define the threshold of obscenity - “I know it when I see it.”
 
Alright – Get on with it, already
So, what’s the point, right? Laid out plainly, take a look at the last 10 World Series winners. What do all of them, invariably, have in common? They all either had, or acquired at some point during the season, at least one ace in their rotation. This seems like a very “cherry-picked” piece of evidence – not all teams are built the same. Some teams have had the league MVP, others had a league leading offense, some the best overall pitching staff, others were somewhere in between. What they all did have is the ability to hand the ball, every fifth day, to an established number 1 starter.
 
Admittedly, having an ace in the rotation doesn’t guarantee any Championships – just ask the LA Dodgers – but an ace does seem to be a prerequisite for any team that considers itself a true contender. Plenty of teams, for example the 2014 Oakland A's who added Jon Lester at the trade deadline that year, have anted up for the postseason when they felt their window was open.
 
Anything can happen in the MLB Postseason, but...
Bats get hot; bats get cold and the same goes for pitching. Clayton Kershaw, one of the greatest left-handed pitchers in MLB history, has had the label of pitching outstandingly in the regular season but falling flat come October. Some of that’s fair, some of its not – but push comes to shove, ideally, you’re giving the ball to Kershaw. He’s your Ace. He’s your Stopper. He’s” the guy” that will right the ship. Nine times out of ten, he’s giving you the best possible chance at winning that game. That’s why teams pay out the nose for them in trade, that’s why when they come on the free agent market, they’re a unicorn. If we take a look back in recent history, there isn’t a team who has won it all, without having at least one Ace pitcher.
 
The Astros, ’17 Champions, had Dallas Keuchel (who had a 1.67 ERA pre-All Star break), though hampered with injuries mid-season, felt the need to add another ace-quality pitcher, Justin Verlander, to the rotation. That seemed to work out. Verlander pitched to the tune of a 1.95 ERA in the second half, was the winning pitcher in games 1 and 4 in the ALDS, games 2 and 6 in the ALCS. Verlander was a force in the 2017 postseason, and one of the Astros most potent weapons.
 
The 2016 Chicago Cubs had a three-headed monster rotation of Jon Lester, Jake Arrieta and Kyle Hendricks. None of those pitchers had an ERA higher than 3.10 during the season, but Lester in particular lead that staff in xFIP, K/9, and IP. He pitched games 1, 5 AND appeared in 3 innings of relief in game 7 to break the curse in Chicago.
 
The 2015 Royals, perhaps the weakest case for 'necessity of an ace' in the last 10 years, wanted to add to their arsenal prior to heading into the playoffs. The Royals, at the deadline, traded for Johnny Cueto who had a 2.73 ERA and 113K’s with the Reds in the first half. Slotting him alongside rising star Yordano Ventura and Edinson Volquez, the Royals poised themselves for a World Series run. Although Cueto pitched poorly in the second half of the regular season, he started (and won) game 2 of the World Series, pitching 9 innings of 1 run baseball.
 
Giants ace Madison Bumgarner had the most impressive overall pitching performance, in my opinion, in World Series history in 2014. Jon Lester (again) led the Red Sox as their number one starter in 2013. Bumgarner (again) pitched the Giants to a World Series win a 0.00 ERA over 7 IP in their 2012 Series sweep. Chris Carpenter in 2011. Tim Lincecum in 2010. CC Sabathia in 2009. Cole Hamels in 2008.
 
All of these pitchers, all aces at that point in their careers. All of them World Series Champions. In fact, 2005 is the last year in recent memory where a group of pitchers – none of whom considered a true ace – were part of a World Series winner.
 
So, what does this have to do with the Twins, exactly?
In a one game play-in, who do you want to take the ball? Santana was excellent in 2017, but to call him an ace is overselling him. He has a career ERA of 4.02 and a career FIP of 4.24; he has been brilliant in short bursts and he is what he is – a decent number 2 or 3 starter on a good team. It's wholly unfair to pin last year’s Wild Card loss on Ervin; the entire roster lost that one. I would expect they would say the same. I like Santana; I just don't like him as my number 1.
 
The Twins are sorely in need of a pitcher who, when handed the ball, can pitch out of a jam reliably. Get the strikeout, when you really need it. A starter that knows he can depend on his defense, but can also generate those outs on his own.
 
As I mentioned previously, Santana had a great season, but his Fielding Independent Pitching (FIP) - out of 58 total qualifying pitchers per Fangraphs – was 43rd. That mark lodges him solidly between Ty Blach, Ivan Nova and Dan Straily. His 4.46 FIP, paired next to a 3.28 ERA, gives a 1.18 point discrepancy – or simply put, he depended heavily on the defense behind him.
 
This isn't meant to pick on Erv. He had a good season. He finished 7th in Cy Young voting. But don't be mistaken, he's not an ace.
 
Perhaps the Twins are where the Astros were in 2015. Maybe Jose Berrios will develop into that guy, or Romero or Gonsalves or someone else. Maybe our version of Keuchel and McCullers is staring us in the face. Whoever that pitcher is, if we expect to compete in October – not just “get there”, but actually be a threat to win it all – we’ll need an established front-line guy. Preferably, two.
 
Aces Low: Why You Don’t Need an Ace to be World Champions
By Jamie Cameron
 
Do you need an ace to win the World Series? Absolutely not. Sure, it helps, but it’s certainly no guarantee, ask the Dodgers (side bar – we both included this reference prior to comparing pieces, so I left it in). Can the Twins win the World Series without a true, legitimate number one starting pitcher? Yes they can. For this half of the debate we’re going to use a team as a case study – the 2015 Kansas City Royals.
 
Who needs an ace when you have a super-bullpen?
Let’s dig into what most folks remember about the 2015 Royals, their bullpen. The Royals actually didn’t have the best bullpen in MLB during the regular season. What they did have is 4 guys who could dominate 4 consecutive innings in Greg Holland, Wade Davis (remember when they were on the same team), Kelvin Herrera, and Ryan Madson. The Royals threw the fifth most innings in the majors during the regular season, trailing only the Dbacks, Rockies, Reds, and Phillies (who were all average to terrible teams). In other words, no other good team relied on their bullpen the way the 95 win Royals did. The Royals bullpen ranked 17th in K/9 (8.38), 10th in FIP (3.56), and 7th in WAR (4.8). If you isolate these stats just accounting for their top 4 guys, they tell a more dominant story. Madson, Herrera, Holland, and Davis combined for a 9.2 K/9, a 3.02 FIP, and 4.2 of the bullpen’s entire 4.8 WAR, over 243 regular season innings. There’s a recipe for post-season success if I’ve ever seen one.
 
What about their rotation?
OK, everyone remembers, the bullpen was good, but what about the rotation? KC’s rotation must have at least been solid to support an outstanding bullpen. Not really. Interestingly 2015 was a record breaking season. There were 2,006 occasions where starting pitchers did not make it through the sixth inning (Twins fans know all about that, amirite?) There are only 2,430 MLB games in the regular season, that’s just under 83% of games where starters are not making it through six innings (we are not alone, Twins fans). By 2015, the bullpen revolution was well and truly on with team like the Yankees stacking the backend of their bullpen. The Royals just did it better than anyone else. The Royals rotation in the regular season was pretty poor. They ranked 23rd in the league in WAR (7.9), 24th in inning pitched (912.2), 26th in K/9 at 6.49, and 29th in xFIP at 4.48. Hardly intimidating numbers going into the post-season. As a frame of reference, the Twins starters combined for an xFIP of 4.92 in 2017 (using 16 starting pitchers), and an absurd amount of sub-par arms.
 
The homegrown, high quality offense
The Royals did have a really strong offense in 2015 which was anchored by lots of good hitters and an excellent defense. Looking back, there are some pretty obvious similarities between the 2015 KC offense and the 2017 Twins offense. Both were constructed around a young core of talented layers who rose through their teams’ minor league ranks. In the case of KC this group was comprised of Hosmer, Moustakas, Salvador Perez, and Lorenzo Cain. KC was 7th in runs scored in 2015 with 724. They hit 139 HR, well below the MLB average of 164 for the 2015 season. The Royals did rank third in the league in doubles (300), sixth in triples (42), and 10th in OPS (.734). The Royals offense, similarly to the Twins, was built around a terrific outfield anchored by Alex Gordon and Lorenzo Cain (combined 10 WAR). So, the Royals had a solid offensive core anchored around an excellent outfield. Sounds familiar. For comparison, the Twins offense in 2017 was one of the best in baseball, finishing 7th in runs scored (815), 13th in doubles (286), 10th in triples (31), and 9th in OPS (.768).
 
An ace in the hole and the story of the 2015 post-season
Let’s address the elephant in the room. The Royals DID have an ace. On July 26th 2015, the Royals traded for Brandon Finnegan, John Lamb, and Cody Reed for Johnny Cueto. Royals’ fans must have been beside themselves at the time. In the first half of the season with the Cincinnati Reds, Cueto has been dominant. In 130 IP, he had a 2.62 ERA, 0.93 WHIP, 2.0 BB/9, and 8.3 K/9. After he was trades to KC he struggled mightily, amassing a 4.76 ERA the rest of the way, giving up a 1.45 WHIP, and giving up a ton more contact. My point here is simply that while the Royals may have ‘had an ace’, he certainly didn’t perform like one in the portion of the regular season he was with KC (as a sidebar, this is exactly the type of trade the Twins should be looking to make if they are in contention in July). While Cueto didn’t pitch well for the Royals in the regular season, they did have strong performers in their rotation, including Edinson Volquez, and the late Yordano Ventura, both of whom had strong seasons.
 
Conclusion
Cueto did ultimately play a big role in the Royals postseason. Yet, even in the highest leverage situations, his results were mixed. In the unbelievable ALDS VS Astros he had one excellent start and one awful start. He had one poor start in the ALCS VS Blue Jays, and one incredible start in the World Series against a flat New York Mets team. While Cueto was a bonus for Kansas City, he certainly wasn’t the reason they won the World Series.
 
For me, the similarity for me between the Royals 2015 team and the Twins in 2018 is strong offensive lineups, with pitching staffs which can keep them in most games. It remains to be seen whether the 2018 Twins have enough depth in their rotation and enough stability in their bullpen to hold as many leads as the 2015 Royals created for themselves. The Royals had an ace by name but not by performance. Their offense and their bullpen was good enough to ameliorate the limitations of their rotation, which was OK, but still better than the Twins rotation. If the Twins want to contend for a World Series, they don’t need an ace, but they absolutely need more depth in their starting rotation. In addition to using the 2015 Royals to argue the case against needing an ace pitcher, for me, they offer the Twins a blueprint. Not specifically by imitating their incredible bullpen, but rather, being on the front end of a trend such as bullpen stacking which can give a mid-market team the shove it needs into the post-season, where anything can happen.
 
The conclusion after the conclusion – from John
We’re in the middle of a paradigm shift in baseball. Teams are tanking, racing to the bottom trying to ensure a high draft spot. Young, controllable talent is the currency of a franchise. The Yankees, Dodgers and other high payroll/large media market teams are trimming the fat to get under Luxury Tax thresholds and the penalties associated with repeat offenders. Raise your hand, and be honest, if you knew about – let alone used in conversation – the terms exit velocity, launch angle and heat maps even 2 years ago.
 
The establishment of an ace pitcher as a staple of a rotation isn’t quite as “new age” as some of these things, but it’s there.
 
Who do you give the ball to in a must-win game? That’s a no-brainer in Dodgertown. Maybe it depends on the matchup with the teams that boast having two or more of these guys (looking at you, Chicago Cubs/Houston Astros). Any way you look at it, you've got to like your odds of winning when you have an ace up your sleeve.
 
What are your thoughts? Is having a true number one pitcher necessary or luxury when it comes to winning a World Series? Let us know!

Jamie Cameron here. If you haven’t been reading John Olson’s Four-Six-Three Blog at Twins Daily, get on it. He’s been churning out some really great content. John is also a great Twitter follow. Recently he posted a thread which caught my attention, essentially attempting to answer the question; does a given team need an ace in order to win the World Series? So I did what any Twitter secret admirer would do, and slid into John’s DMs.
 
‘John, you don’t know me, but this thread is super interesting, how would you feel about writing a collaborative piece for Twins Daily?’ was my smooth pickup line. John, ever the good sport, agreed, so we came up with a premise; let’s have a debate within an article. Let’s go toe to toe and try to answer the question; do the Twins need an ace to win the World Series? John will argue for, I will argue against. We’d love you to weigh in, and your thoughts on the format. Thanks in advance for reading!
 
Ace up your Sleeve: The necessity of a “true” number one
by John Olson
 
Throughout the past offseason, I have been adamant about the necessity of an ace. If the Twins truly want to take the next step, they need to have a front-line, no. 1, ace starter. Assembling a decent rotation, something stable enough to win you some games in a weak division, maybe secure the second Wild Card – well, that’s all fine and well, I suppose. If the goal is to win the last game, it may be a near impossible task to do it without having a true number one starter.
 
I think we need to get some semantics out of the way, first, before we can make any cogent arguments. There isn’t a good way to, non-subjectively, define what an ace pitcher “is”. If you simply define an ace as a teams’ number one pitcher in the rotation, their Opening Day starter, then well, every team in the league already has one – case closed. This isn’t true; I think we can all agree. Even with the incredible season Ervin Santana had last season, I don’t think he fits the mold, either. Like Justice Stewart said, in 1964 when asked to define the threshold of obscenity - “I know it when I see it.”
 
Alright – Get on with it, already
So, what’s the point, right? Laid out plainly, take a look at the last 10 World Series winners. What do all of them, invariably, have in common? They all either had, or acquired at some point during the season, at least one ace in their rotation. This seems like a very “cherry-picked” piece of evidence – not all teams are built the same. Some teams have had the league MVP, others had a league leading offense, some the best overall pitching staff, others were somewhere in between. What they all did have is the ability to hand the ball, every fifth day, to an established number 1 starter.
 
Admittedly, having an ace in the rotation doesn’t guarantee any Championships – just ask the LA Dodgers – but an ace does seem to be a prerequisite for any team that considers itself a true contender. Plenty of teams, for example the 2014 Oakland A's who added Jon Lester at the trade deadline that year, have anted up for the postseason when they felt their window was open.
 
Anything can happen in the MLB Postseason, but...
Bats get hot; bats get cold and the same goes for pitching. Clayton Kershaw, one of the greatest left-handed pitchers in MLB history, has had the label of pitching outstandingly in the regular season but falling flat come October. Some of that’s fair, some of its not – but push comes to shove, ideally, you’re giving the ball to Kershaw. He’s your Ace. He’s your Stopper. He’s” the guy” that will right the ship. Nine times out of ten, he’s giving you the best possible chance at winning that game. That’s why teams pay out the nose for them in trade, that’s why when they come on the free agent market, they’re a unicorn. If we take a look back in recent history, there isn’t a team who has won it all, without having at least one Ace pitcher.
 
The Astros, ’17 Champions, had Dallas Keuchel (who had a 1.67 ERA pre-All Star break), though hampered with injuries mid-season, felt the need to add another ace-quality pitcher, Justin Verlander, to the rotation. That seemed to work out. Verlander pitched to the tune of a 1.95 ERA in the second half, was the winning pitcher in games 1 and 4 in the ALDS, games 2 and 6 in the ALCS. Verlander was a force in the 2017 postseason, and one of the Astros most potent weapons.
 
The 2016 Chicago Cubs had a three-headed monster rotation of Jon Lester, Jake Arrieta and Kyle Hendricks. None of those pitchers had an ERA higher than 3.10 during the season, but Lester in particular lead that staff in xFIP, K/9, and IP. He pitched games 1, 5 AND appeared in 3 innings of relief in game 7 to break the curse in Chicago.
 
The 2015 Royals, perhaps the weakest case for 'necessity of an ace' in the last 10 years, wanted to add to their arsenal prior to heading into the playoffs. The Royals, at the deadline, traded for Johnny Cueto who had a 2.73 ERA and 113K’s with the Reds in the first half. Slotting him alongside rising star Yordano Ventura and Edinson Volquez, the Royals poised themselves for a World Series run. Although Cueto pitched poorly in the second half of the regular season, he started (and won) game 2 of the World Series, pitching 9 innings of 1 run baseball.
 
Giants ace Madison Bumgarner had the most impressive overall pitching performance, in my opinion, in World Series history in 2014. Jon Lester (again) led the Red Sox as their number one starter in 2013. Bumgarner (again) pitched the Giants to a World Series win a 0.00 ERA over 7 IP in their 2012 Series sweep. Chris Carpenter in 2011. Tim Lincecum in 2010. CC Sabathia in 2009. Cole Hamels in 2008.
 
All of these pitchers, all aces at that point in their careers. All of them World Series Champions. In fact, 2005 is the last year in recent memory where a group of pitchers – none of whom considered a true ace – were part of a World Series winner.
 
So, what does this have to do with the Twins, exactly?
In a one game play-in, who do you want to take the ball? Santana was excellent in 2017, but to call him an ace is overselling him. He has a career ERA of 4.02 and a career FIP of 4.24; he has been brilliant in short bursts and he is what he is – a decent number 2 or 3 starter on a good team. It's wholly unfair to pin last year’s Wild Card loss on Ervin; the entire roster lost that one. I would expect they would say the same. I like Santana; I just don't like him as my number 1.
 
The Twins are sorely in need of a pitcher who, when handed the ball, can pitch out of a jam reliably. Get the strikeout, when you really need it. A starter that knows he can depend on his defense, but can also generate those outs on his own.
 
As I mentioned previously, Santana had a great season, but his Fielding Independent Pitching (FIP) - out of 58 total qualifying pitchers per Fangraphs – was 43rd. That mark lodges him solidly between Ty Blach, Ivan Nova and Dan Straily. His 4.46 FIP, paired next to a 3.28 ERA, gives a 1.18 point discrepancy – or simply put, he depended heavily on the defense behind him.
 
This isn't meant to pick on Erv. He had a good season. He finished 7th in Cy Young voting. But don't be mistaken, he's not an ace.
 
Perhaps the Twins are where the Astros were in 2015. Maybe Jose Berrios will develop into that guy, or Romero or Gonsalves or someone else. Maybe our version of Keuchel and McCullers is staring us in the face. Whoever that pitcher is, if we expect to compete in October – not just “get there”, but actually be a threat to win it all – we’ll need an established front-line guy. Preferably, two.
 
Aces Low: Why You Don’t Need an Ace to be World Champions
By Jamie Cameron
 
Do you need an ace to win the World Series? Absolutely not. Sure, it helps, but it’s certainly no guarantee, ask the Dodgers (side bar – we both included this reference prior to comparing pieces, so I left it in). Can the Twins win the World Series without a true, legitimate number one starting pitcher? Yes they can. For this half of the debate we’re going to use a team as a case study – the 2015 Kansas City Royals.
 
Who needs an ace when you have a super-bullpen?
Let’s dig into what most folks remember about the 2015 Royals, their bullpen. The Royals actually didn’t have the best bullpen in MLB during the regular season. What they did have is 4 guys who could dominate 4 consecutive innings in Greg Holland, Wade Davis (remember when they were on the same team), Kelvin Herrera, and Ryan Madson. The Royals threw the fifth most innings in the majors during the regular season, trailing only the Dbacks, Rockies, Reds, and Phillies (who were all average to terrible teams). In other words, no other good team relied on their bullpen the way the 95 win Royals did. The Royals bullpen ranked 17th in K/9 (8.38), 10th in FIP (3.56), and 7th in WAR (4.8). If you isolate these stats just accounting for their top 4 guys, they tell a more dominant story. Madson, Herrera, Holland, and Davis combined for a 9.2 K/9, a 3.02 FIP, and 4.2 of the bullpen’s entire 4.8 WAR, over 243 regular season innings. There’s a recipe for post-season success if I’ve ever seen one.
 
What about their rotation?
OK, everyone remembers, the bullpen was good, but what about the rotation? KC’s rotation must have at least been solid to support an outstanding bullpen. Not really. Interestingly 2015 was a record breaking season. There were 2,006 occasions where starting pitchers did not make it through the sixth inning (Twins fans know all about that, amirite?) There are only 2,430 MLB games in the regular season, that’s just under 83% of games where starters are not making it through six innings (we are not alone, Twins fans). By 2015, the bullpen revolution was well and truly on with team like the Yankees stacking the backend of their bullpen. The Royals just did it better than anyone else. The Royals rotation in the regular season was pretty poor. They ranked 23rd in the league in WAR (7.9), 24th in inning pitched (912.2), 26th in K/9 at 6.49, and 29th in xFIP at 4.48. Hardly intimidating numbers going into the post-season. As a frame of reference, the Twins starters combined for an xFIP of 4.92 in 2017 (using 16 starting pitchers), and an absurd amount of sub-par arms.
 
The homegrown, high quality offense
The Royals did have a really strong offense in 2015 which was anchored by lots of good hitters and an excellent defense. Looking back, there are some pretty obvious similarities between the 2015 KC offense and the 2017 Twins offense. Both were constructed around a young core of talented layers who rose through their teams’ minor league ranks. In the case of KC this group was comprised of Hosmer, Moustakas, Salvador Perez, and Lorenzo Cain. KC was 7th in runs scored in 2015 with 724. They hit 139 HR, well below the MLB average of 164 for the 2015 season. The Royals did rank third in the league in doubles (300), sixth in triples (42), and 10th in OPS (.734). The Royals offense, similarly to the Twins, was built around a terrific outfield anchored by Alex Gordon and Lorenzo Cain (combined 10 WAR). So, the Royals had a solid offensive core anchored around an excellent outfield. Sounds familiar. For comparison, the Twins offense in 2017 was one of the best in baseball, finishing 7th in runs scored (815), 13th in doubles (286), 10th in triples (31), and 9th in OPS (.768).
 
An ace in the hole and the story of the 2015 post-season
Let’s address the elephant in the room. The Royals DID have an ace. On July 26th 2015, the Royals traded for Brandon Finnegan, John Lamb, and Cody Reed for Johnny Cueto. Royals’ fans must have been beside themselves at the time. In the first half of the season with the Cincinnati Reds, Cueto has been dominant. In 130 IP, he had a 2.62 ERA, 0.93 WHIP, 2.0 BB/9, and 8.3 K/9. After he was trades to KC he struggled mightily, amassing a 4.76 ERA the rest of the way, giving up a 1.45 WHIP, and giving up a ton more contact. My point here is simply that while the Royals may have ‘had an ace’, he certainly didn’t perform like one in the portion of the regular season he was with KC (as a sidebar, this is exactly the type of trade the Twins should be looking to make if they are in contention in July). While Cueto didn’t pitch well for the Royals in the regular season, they did have strong performers in their rotation, including Edinson Volquez, and the late Yordano Ventura, both of whom had strong seasons.
 
Conclusion
Cueto did ultimately play a big role in the Royals postseason. Yet, even in the highest leverage situations, his results were mixed. In the unbelievable ALDS VS Astros he had one excellent start and one awful start. He had one poor start in the ALCS VS Blue Jays, and one incredible start in the World Series against a flat New York Mets team. While Cueto was a bonus for Kansas City, he certainly wasn’t the reason they won the World Series.
 
For me, the similarity for me between the Royals 2015 team and the Twins in 2018 is strong offensive lineups, with pitching staffs which can keep them in most games. It remains to be seen whether the 2018 Twins have enough depth in their rotation and enough stability in their bullpen to hold as many leads as the 2015 Royals created for themselves. The Royals had an ace by name but not by performance. Their offense and their bullpen was good enough to ameliorate the limitations of their rotation, which was OK, but still better than the Twins rotation. If the Twins want to contend for a World Series, they don’t need an ace, but they absolutely need more depth in their starting rotation. In addition to using the 2015 Royals to argue the case against needing an ace pitcher, for me, they offer the Twins a blueprint. Not specifically by imitating their incredible bullpen, but rather, being on the front end of a trend such as bullpen stacking which can give a mid-market team the shove it needs into the post-season, where anything can happen.
 
The conclusion after the conclusion – from John
We’re in the middle of a paradigm shift in baseball. Teams are tanking, racing to the bottom trying to ensure a high draft spot. Young, controllable talent is the currency of a franchise. The Yankees, Dodgers and other high payroll/large media market teams are trimming the fat to get under Luxury Tax thresholds and the penalties associated with repeat offenders. Raise your hand, and be honest, if you knew about – let alone used in conversation – the terms exit velocity, launch angle and heat maps even 2 years ago.
 
The establishment of an ace pitcher as a staple of a rotation isn’t quite as “new age” as some of these things, but it’s there.
 
Who do you give the ball to in a must-win game? That’s a no-brainer in Dodgertown. Maybe it depends on the matchup with the teams that boast having two or more of these guys (looking at you, Chicago Cubs/Houston Astros). Any way you look at it, you've got to like your odds of winning when you have an ace up your sleeve.
 
What are your thoughts? Is having a true number one pitcher necessary or luxury when it comes to winning a World Series? Let us know!

The Twins made another exciting off-season move this weekend, signing ex-Rays and Marlins 1B/DH Logan Morrison to a 1 year deal worth $6.5 million. The Twins continued their strong push in free-agency this winter. Morrison’s deal has a team option which will vest at 600 plate appearances. With escalators, he can earn a maximum of $16.5 million over the next two seasons. It’s worth noting that the Twins have positioned themselves carefully and strategically this off-season, maintaining financial flexibility through inking their additions to one or two year deals. Minnesota remains poised with a deep pool of talent on the farm to make in-season acquisitions if and when necessary. Most projection systems have Morrison as around a 1-2 win player in 2018, which, if true, is another bargain for the cost-opportunistic Twins front office in a stagnant winter of free agency.
 
Morrison is a fascinating player. His power surge made him the Statcast poster boy for the 2017 season. Before 2017 Morrison’s career high for HR was 23, in his first full season with the Marlins in 2011. Adjustments in Morrison’s approach at the plate led to an increase in HR from 14 to 38 (albeit with considerably more plate appearances), an increase in OBP from .319 in 2016 to .353 in 2017, and a huge climb in BB%, from 9.3% in 2016, to 13.5% in 2017, (good for 14th in the league among hitters who made at least 500 PA). Per Statcast, Morrison increased his launch angle from 12.1 degrees to 17.4 degrees in 2017 in an attempt to hit more balls in the air. Boy, did that ever work. Along with his adjusted launch angle, how did Morrison’s approach at the plate differ in 2017? Is his 2017 season a sign of things to come, or a statistical anomaly?
 
David Laurila of Fangraphs captured some interesting comments from Morrison that get at the heart of his different approach as of 2017:
 
‘I’ve looked at the all-stars in the league, and what they believe. I’ve heard guys say if they fly out 3 or 4 times a night, that’s a good night. I was always taught to hit the ball on the ground and run, and I’m not even fast. Now my ‘back to basics' is hitting a fly ball up the middle (instead of a ground ball up the middle). Valuing that side of it – launch angle and stuff – has helped me a lot.’
 
Morrison’s shift in approach is obvious from the ground-out from a pitch up in the zone when he was still a member of the Marlins, versus the slobberknocker he deposits from Buck Farmer of the Tigers when with the Rays in 2017, where he is clearly sitting on a pitch up.
 




 
Morrison also shared some thoughts on pitch location:
 
‘As far as pitch location, I’m more of an up-and-middle, middle-away guy. I just think there’s a lot of stuff down and in that can get you out if you’re actually looking there.’
 
Morrison showed a tendency in 2017 to ere on the side of pulling the ball, while attempting to jump on pitches middle high. In 2017 Morrison put around 5% more pitches in play to center field than he did in 2016 and reduced his pitches in play to opposite field slightly to boot. This is born out in a heat map of portions of the strike zone Morrison swung at in 2017. This is interesting given the trend of pitchers working fastballs up in the zone which the Rays themselves pioneered. That is exactly what Morrison is looking for.
 


Morrison may well not replicate his incredible 2017. Even if Morrison is a 22-28 home run hitter in 2018, he provides valuable insurance with Miguel Sano expected to begin the season suspended, and adds another potent bat at DH to an already formidable lineup when Sano returns. If Morrison can stay with his approach of hitting fly-balls to center field, a good number of them should exit Target Field as souvenirs this summer.

With the Twins off-season moves seemingly drawing to a close, fans would be hard pressed not to be enthused by the clubs’ upgrades. At the beginning of the 2017 season, fans were frustrated with a lifeless offseason which involved adding Jason Castro, Matt Belisle, and newly reinvented Craig Breslow. Most cautioned that ‘Falvine’ (there’s my garage band name of the future) were assessing the organization and its infrastructure before making hasty free agent additions. This off-season, the front office has been aggressive, acquiring Jacob Pearson and David Banuelos from the Angels and Mariners for international slot money, adding Michael Pineda, Zach Duke, Fernando Rodney, Addison Reed, Annibal Sanchez, and trading for Jake Odorizzi.
 
Falvey and Lavine deserve credit for creatively adding to the Twins 2018 chances whilst maintaining strong organizational depth for 2019 and beyond. I would argue that the Twins punched a little above off-season expectations in their bullpen additions (with the addition of Reed) and a little below their expectations for the rotation given the earnestness of their interest in Yu Darvish. While the Twins have improved their starting five, the lack of a higher quality add like Darvish or Archer (although unsurprising) heightens the pressure on Kyle Gibson to build on his string second half performance in 2017. So who is the real Kyle Gibson? What can Twins fans expect in 2018?
 
One question I pondered before I dug into Gibson’s numbers; Did/do Twins fans have unreasonable expectations for Gibson? There has always been a contention that Gibson has not lived up to the hype. The Twins first round selection (22nd overall) in 2009, Gibson ascended to fairly lofty prospect status, reaching a peak of #34 overall (Baseball America). The Twins have struggled to draft and develop front line starting pitching for a significant period of time, making the pressure on Gibson to be ‘the answer’ immense when he made his big league debut in 2013. It should also be noted that in spite of Gibson falling a little in the draft due to his injury history, the Twins have had other late first round pick pitchers who couldn’t establish themselves in the majors at all (such as Alex Wimmers).
 
With Ervin Santana out and until May and rotation with a top end of 2/3 types (Berrios and Odorizzi), the Twins need Gibson to be at least solid. So who is Kyle Gibson? Is he the 2015 version who threw almost 200 innings and had an xFIP of 3.95? Is the second half of 2017 version who had a K/9 of almost 9.0 and help opposing hitters to a .379 SLG? Or is he the pitcher who struggled significantly throughout the first half of last season, to the tune of a .389 OBP against whilst surrendering 16 HR in 80 innings?
 
Matthew Trueblood wrote an excellent article for Baseball Prospectus when Gibson was picking up steam in the second half of 2017. He isolated four primary factors in Gibson’s breakthrough; a lower release point, moving to the middle of the rubber to combat control problems, using his legs more effectively, and an evolving pitch mix. Gibson’s velocity improved as a result, his average fastball increasing almost 1 mph from 2016.
 
New Twins pitching coach Garvin Alston is one of the most fascinating stories not to be talked about this offseason. Minnesota owe much of their 2017 success to then new hitting coach James Rowson. Throughout the season when the Twins young hitters made breakthroughs, Rowson continued to emphasize one central tenet of his coaching; the swing belongs to the hitter, they must own it and feel empowered to tweak it. When introduced to Twin Cities’ media, Alston emphasized his own central teaching:
 
‘First, one of the biggest things I teach is commanding the zone with the fastball’.
 
Consider then, Gibson’s fastball command from the first half of 2017 to the second half. Comparing Gibson’s fastball location from the first half of his season to the second, he clusters his strike throwing with greater consistency in the portion of the zone up and away from RHH. Additionally, he more intentionally uses the opposite corner of the zone, down and in from RHH or down and away for LHH.
 




 
Between April and the end of July 2017, Gibson gave up a .300 BAA with his fastball, a SLG of .640, and .340 ISO. Over the same period of time, he gave up .342 BAA on his sinker. After tweaking his pitch mix, Gibson’s results improved dramatically. Throughout the rest of the season, his gave up a .529 SLG, and .193 ISO on his fastball. It was still being hit, but much less hard. Similarly, he gave up a .267 BAA on his sinker. This makes a ton of sense. Gibson has always been a sinker ball pitcher, known for keeping the ball down in the zone. It doesn’t take a ton of research for good hitter to be able to pick up on his location tendencies when his mix was so predictable. By using more of the zone and varying his fastball and sinkerball usage, Gibson induced more groundballs, increased his strikeout rate, and most important for a pitcher without a real plus pitch, reduced hard contact.
 
Gibson’s fastball command and usage had a significant impact on hitters. Opposing hitters O-Swing % (the amount opposing hitters swing at a pitch outside the strike zone) increased from 18% to over 25%. Additionally, Gibson was able to generate more swings inside the zone with his fastball increasing that number 18% to 61%, a career high. In other words, if your stuff isn’t outstanding, you better to be able to keep hitters off balance by moving it around in the zone, or command the strike zone, as Alston would call it. It will be fascinating to see if Alston can further leverage this improvement Gibson made in the second half of 2017 for a successful 2018.
 
Gibson is likely going to continue to make adjustments to stay ahead of the curve in keeping hitters off-balance. Ultimately, the construction of the Twins’ off-season speaks to Falvine’s understanding of that they have on their roster, and what they don’t have. The Twins now have several intriguing back end bullpen options between Trevor Hildenberger, Zach Duke, Fernando Rodney, and Addison Reed. The pen is much more likely to be able to bail out a bad start than in 2017. If Gibson can continue to tweak his approach and forms and effective partnership with Alston, the Twins may find themselves with a fourth starting pitcher who gives them more consistent innings and can pitch deeper into games. How do you think Kyle Gibson will perform for the Twins in 2018? Do you think he will establish himself as a consistent middle of the rotation starter? Or will he continue to have varied and inconsistent results?

With the Twins off-season moves seemingly drawing to a close, fans would be hard pressed not to be enthused by the clubs’ upgrades. At the beginning of the 2017 season, fans were frustrated with a lifeless offseason which involved adding Jason Castro, Matt Belisle, and newly reinvented Craig Breslow. Most cautioned that ‘Falvine’ (there’s my garage band name of the future) were assessing the organization and its infrastructure before making hasty free agent additions. This off-season, the front office has been aggressive, acquiring Jacob Pearson and David Banuelos from the Angels and Mariners for international slot money, adding Michael Pineda, Zach Duke, Fernando Rodney, Addison Reed, Annibal Sanchez, and trading for Jake Odorizzi.
 
Falvey and Lavine deserve credit for creatively adding to the Twins 2018 chances whilst maintaining strong organizational depth for 2019 and beyond. I would argue that the Twins punched a little above off-season expectations in their bullpen additions (with the addition of Reed) and a little below their expectations for the rotation given the earnestness of their interest in Yu Darvish. While the Twins have improved their starting five, the lack of a higher quality add like Darvish or Archer (although unsurprising) heightens the pressure on Kyle Gibson to build on his string second half performance in 2017. So who is the real Kyle Gibson? What can Twins fans expect in 2018?
 
One question I pondered before I dug into Gibson’s numbers; Did/do Twins fans have unreasonable expectations for Gibson? There has always been a contention that Gibson has not lived up to the hype. The Twins first round selection (22nd overall) in 2009, Gibson ascended to fairly lofty prospect status, reaching a peak of #34 overall (Baseball America). The Twins have struggled to draft and develop front line starting pitching for a significant period of time, making the pressure on Gibson to be ‘the answer’ immense when he made his big league debut in 2013. It should also be noted that in spite of Gibson falling a little in the draft due to his injury history, the Twins have had other late first round pick pitchers who couldn’t establish themselves in the majors at all (such as Alex Wimmers).
 
With Ervin Santana out and until May and rotation with a top end of 2/3 types (Berrios and Odorizzi), the Twins need Gibson to be at least solid. So who is Kyle Gibson? Is he the 2015 version who threw almost 200 innings and had an xFIP of 3.95? Is the second half of 2017 version who had a K/9 of almost 9.0 and help opposing hitters to a .379 SLG? Or is he the pitcher who struggled significantly throughout the first half of last season, to the tune of a .389 OBP against whilst surrendering 16 HR in 80 innings?
 
Matthew Trueblood wrote an excellent article for Baseball Prospectus when Gibson was picking up steam in the second half of 2017. He isolated four primary factors in Gibson’s breakthrough; a lower release point, moving to the middle of the rubber to combat control problems, using his legs more effectively, and an evolving pitch mix. Gibson’s velocity improved as a result, his average fastball increasing almost 1 mph from 2016.
 
New Twins pitching coach Garvin Alston is one of the most fascinating stories not to be talked about this offseason. Minnesota owe much of their 2017 success to then new hitting coach James Rowson. Throughout the season when the Twins young hitters made breakthroughs, Rowson continued to emphasize one central tenet of his coaching; the swing belongs to the hitter, they must own it and feel empowered to tweak it. When introduced to Twin Cities’ media, Alston emphasized his own central teaching:
 
‘First, one of the biggest things I teach is commanding the zone with the fastball’.
 
Consider then, Gibson’s fastball command from the first half of 2017 to the second half. Comparing Gibson’s fastball location from the first half of his season to the second, he clusters his strike throwing with greater consistency in the portion of the zone up and away from RHH. Additionally, he more intentionally uses the opposite corner of the zone, down and in from RHH or down and away for LHH.
 




 
Between April and the end of July 2017, Gibson gave up a .300 BAA with his fastball, a SLG of .640, and .340 ISO. Over the same period of time, he gave up .342 BAA on his sinker. After tweaking his pitch mix, Gibson’s results improved dramatically. Throughout the rest of the season, his gave up a .529 SLG, and .193 ISO on his fastball. It was still being hit, but much less hard. Similarly, he gave up a .267 BAA on his sinker. This makes a ton of sense. Gibson has always been a sinker ball pitcher, known for keeping the ball down in the zone. It doesn’t take a ton of research for good hitter to be able to pick up on his location tendencies when his mix was so predictable. By using more of the zone and varying his fastball and sinkerball usage, Gibson induced more groundballs, increased his strikeout rate, and most important for a pitcher without a real plus pitch, reduced hard contact.
 
Gibson’s fastball command and usage had a significant impact on hitters. Opposing hitters O-Swing % (the amount opposing hitters swing at a pitch outside the strike zone) increased from 18% to over 25%. Additionally, Gibson was able to generate more swings inside the zone with his fastball increasing that number 18% to 61%, a career high. In other words, if your stuff isn’t outstanding, you better to be able to keep hitters off balance by moving it around in the zone, or command the strike zone, as Alston would call it. It will be fascinating to see if Alston can further leverage this improvement Gibson made in the second half of 2017 for a successful 2018.
 
Gibson is likely going to continue to make adjustments to stay ahead of the curve in keeping hitters off-balance. Ultimately, the construction of the Twins’ off-season speaks to Falvine’s understanding of that they have on their roster, and what they don’t have. The Twins now have several intriguing back end bullpen options between Trevor Hildenberger, Zach Duke, Fernando Rodney, and Addison Reed. The pen is much more likely to be able to bail out a bad start than in 2017. If Gibson can continue to tweak his approach and forms and effective partnership with Alston, the Twins may find themselves with a fourth starting pitcher who gives them more consistent innings and can pitch deeper into games. How do you think Kyle Gibson will perform for the Twins in 2018? Do you think he will establish himself as a consistent middle of the rotation starter? Or will he continue to have varied and inconsistent results?

With the Twins off-season moves seemingly drawing to a close, fans would be hard pressed not to be enthused by the clubs’ upgrades. At the beginning of the 2017 season, fans were frustrated with a lifeless offseason which involved adding Jason Castro, Matt Belisle, and newly reinvented Craig Breslow. Most cautioned that ‘Falvine’ (there’s my garage band name of the future) were assessing the organization and its infrastructure before making hasty free agent additions. This off-season, the front office has been aggressive, acquiring Jacob Pearson and David Banuelos from the Angels and Mariners for international slot money, adding Michael Pineda, Zach Duke, Fernando Rodney, Addison Reed, Annibal Sanchez, and trading for Jake Odorizzi.
 
Falvey and Lavine deserve credit for creatively adding to the Twins 2018 chances whilst maintaining strong organizational depth for 2019 and beyond. I would argue that the Twins punched a little above off-season expectations in their bullpen additions (with the addition of Reed) and a little below their expectations for the rotation given the earnestness of their interest in Yu Darvish. While the Twins have improved their starting five, the lack of a higher quality add like Darvish or Archer (although unsurprising) heightens the pressure on Kyle Gibson to build on his string second half performance in 2017. So who is the real Kyle Gibson? What can Twins fans expect in 2018?
 
One question I pondered before I dug into Gibson’s numbers; Did/do Twins fans have unreasonable expectations for Gibson? There has always been a contention that Gibson has not lived up to the hype. The Twins first round selection (22nd overall) in 2009, Gibson ascended to fairly lofty prospect status, reaching a peak of #34 overall (Baseball America). The Twins have struggled to draft and develop front line starting pitching for a significant period of time, making the pressure on Gibson to be ‘the answer’ immense when he made his big league debut in 2013. It should also be noted that in spite of Gibson falling a little in the draft due to his injury history, the Twins have had other late first round pick pitchers who couldn’t establish themselves in the majors at all (such as Alex Wimmers).
 
With Ervin Santana out and until May and rotation with a top end of 2/3 types (Berrios and Odorizzi), the Twins need Gibson to be at least solid. So who is Kyle Gibson? Is he the 2015 version who threw almost 200 innings and had an xFIP of 3.95? Is the second half of 2017 version who had a K/9 of almost 9.0 and help opposing hitters to a .379 SLG? Or is he the pitcher who struggled significantly throughout the first half of last season, to the tune of a .389 OBP against whilst surrendering 16 HR in 80 innings?
 
Matthew Trueblood wrote an excellent article for Baseball Prospectus when Gibson was picking up steam in the second half of 2017. He isolated four primary factors in Gibson’s breakthrough; a lower release point, moving to the middle of the rubber to combat control problems, using his legs more effectively, and an evolving pitch mix. Gibson’s velocity improved as a result, his average fastball increasing almost 1 mph from 2016.
 
New Twins pitching coach Garvin Alston is one of the most fascinating stories not to be talked about this offseason. Minnesota owe much of their 2017 success to then new hitting coach James Rowson. Throughout the season when the Twins young hitters made breakthroughs, Rowson continued to emphasize one central tenet of his coaching; the swing belongs to the hitter, they must own it and feel empowered to tweak it. When introduced to Twin Cities’ media, Alston emphasized his own central teaching:
 
‘First, one of the biggest things I teach is commanding the zone with the fastball’.
 
Consider then, Gibson’s fastball command from the first half of 2017 to the second half. Comparing Gibson’s fastball location from the first half of his season to the second, he clusters his strike throwing with greater consistency in the portion of the zone up and away from RHH. Additionally, he more intentionally uses the opposite corner of the zone, down and in from RHH or down and away for LHH.
 




 
Between April and the end of July 2017, Gibson gave up a .300 BAA with his fastball, a SLG of .640, and .340 ISO. Over the same period of time, he gave up .342 BAA on his sinker. After tweaking his pitch mix, Gibson’s results improved dramatically. Throughout the rest of the season, his gave up a .529 SLG, and .193 ISO on his fastball. It was still being hit, but much less hard. Similarly, he gave up a .267 BAA on his sinker. This makes a ton of sense. Gibson has always been a sinker ball pitcher, known for keeping the ball down in the zone. It doesn’t take a ton of research for good hitter to be able to pick up on his location tendencies when his mix was so predictable. By using more of the zone and varying his fastball and sinkerball usage, Gibson induced more groundballs, increased his strikeout rate, and most important for a pitcher without a real plus pitch, reduced hard contact.
 
Gibson’s fastball command and usage had a significant impact on hitters. Opposing hitters O-Swing % (the amount opposing hitters swing at a pitch outside the strike zone) increased from 18% to over 25%. Additionally, Gibson was able to generate more swings inside the zone with his fastball increasing that number 18% to 61%, a career high. In other words, if your stuff isn’t outstanding, you better to be able to keep hitters off balance by moving it around in the zone, or command the strike zone, as Alston would call it. It will be fascinating to see if Alston can further leverage this improvement Gibson made in the second half of 2017 for a successful 2018.
 
Gibson is likely going to continue to make adjustments to stay ahead of the curve in keeping hitters off-balance. Ultimately, the construction of the Twins’ off-season speaks to Falvine’s understanding of that they have on their roster, and what they don’t have. The Twins now have several intriguing back end bullpen options between Trevor Hildenberger, Zach Duke, Fernando Rodney, and Addison Reed. The pen is much more likely to be able to bail out a bad start than in 2017. If Gibson can continue to tweak his approach and forms and effective partnership with Alston, the Twins may find themselves with a fourth starting pitcher who gives them more consistent innings and can pitch deeper into games. How do you think Kyle Gibson will perform for the Twins in 2018? Do you think he will establish himself as a consistent middle of the rotation starter? Or will he continue to have varied and inconsistent results?

With the Twins off-season moves seemingly drawing to a close, fans would be hard pressed not to be enthused by the clubs’ upgrades. At the beginning of the 2017 season, fans were frustrated with a lifeless offseason which involved adding Jason Castro, Matt Belisle, and newly reinvented Craig Breslow. Most cautioned that ‘Falvine’ (there’s my garage band name of the future) were assessing the organization and its infrastructure before making hasty free agent additions. This off-season, the front office has been aggressive, acquiring Jacob Pearson and David Banuelos from the Angels and Mariners for international slot money, adding Michael Pineda, Zach Duke, Fernando Rodney, Addison Reed, Annibal Sanchez, and trading for Jake Odorizzi.
 
Falvey and Lavine deserve credit for creatively adding to the Twins 2018 chances whilst maintaining strong organizational depth for 2019 and beyond. I would argue that the Twins punched a little above off-season expectations in their bullpen additions (with the addition of Reed) and a little below their expectations for the rotation given the earnestness of their interest in Yu Darvish. While the Twins have improved their starting five, the lack of a higher quality add like Darvish or Archer (although unsurprising) heightens the pressure on Kyle Gibson to build on his string second half performance in 2017. So who is the real Kyle Gibson? What can Twins fans expect in 2018?
 
One question I pondered before I dug into Gibson’s numbers; Did/do Twins fans have unreasonable expectations for Gibson? There has always been a contention that Gibson has not lived up to the hype. The Twins first round selection (22nd overall) in 2009, Gibson ascended to fairly lofty prospect status, reaching a peak of #34 overall (Baseball America). The Twins have struggled to draft and develop front line starting pitching for a significant period of time, making the pressure on Gibson to be ‘the answer’ immense when he made his big league debut in 2013. It should also be noted that in spite of Gibson falling a little in the draft due to his injury history, the Twins have had other late first round pick pitchers who couldn’t establish themselves in the majors at all (such as Alex Wimmers).
 
With Ervin Santana out and until May and rotation with a top end of 2/3 types (Berrios and Odorizzi), the Twins need Gibson to be at least solid. So who is Kyle Gibson? Is he the 2015 version who threw almost 200 innings and had an xFIP of 3.95? Is the second half of 2017 version who had a K/9 of almost 9.0 and help opposing hitters to a .379 SLG? Or is he the pitcher who struggled significantly throughout the first half of last season, to the tune of a .389 OBP against whilst surrendering 16 HR in 80 innings?
 
Matthew Trueblood wrote an excellent article for Baseball Prospectus when Gibson was picking up steam in the second half of 2017. He isolated four primary factors in Gibson’s breakthrough; a lower release point, moving to the middle of the rubber to combat control problems, using his legs more effectively, and an evolving pitch mix. Gibson’s velocity improved as a result, his average fastball increasing almost 1 mph from 2016.
 
New Twins pitching coach Garvin Alston is one of the most fascinating stories not to be talked about this offseason. Minnesota owe much of their 2017 success to then new hitting coach James Rowson. Throughout the season when the Twins young hitters made breakthroughs, Rowson continued to emphasize one central tenet of his coaching; the swing belongs to the hitter, they must own it and feel empowered to tweak it. When introduced to Twin Cities’ media, Alston emphasized his own central teaching:
 
‘First, one of the biggest things I teach is commanding the zone with the fastball’.
 
Consider then, Gibson’s fastball command from the first half of 2017 to the second half. Comparing Gibson’s fastball location from the first half of his season to the second, he clusters his strike throwing with greater consistency in the portion of the zone up and away from RHH. Additionally, he more intentionally uses the opposite corner of the zone, down and in from RHH or down and away for LHH.
 




 
Between April and the end of July 2017, Gibson gave up a .300 BAA with his fastball, a SLG of .640, and .340 ISO. Over the same period of time, he gave up .342 BAA on his sinker. After tweaking his pitch mix, Gibson’s results improved dramatically. Throughout the rest of the season, his gave up a .529 SLG, and .193 ISO on his fastball. It was still being hit, but much less hard. Similarly, he gave up a .267 BAA on his sinker. This makes a ton of sense. Gibson has always been a sinker ball pitcher, known for keeping the ball down in the zone. It doesn’t take a ton of research for good hitter to be able to pick up on his location tendencies when his mix was so predictable. By using more of the zone and varying his fastball and sinkerball usage, Gibson induced more groundballs, increased his strikeout rate, and most important for a pitcher without a real plus pitch, reduced hard contact.
 
Gibson’s fastball command and usage had a significant impact on hitters. Opposing hitters O-Swing % (the amount opposing hitters swing at a pitch outside the strike zone) increased from 18% to over 25%. Additionally, Gibson was able to generate more swings inside the zone with his fastball increasing that number 18% to 61%, a career high. In other words, if your stuff isn’t outstanding, you better to be able to keep hitters off balance by moving it around in the zone, or command the strike zone, as Alston would call it. It will be fascinating to see if Alston can further leverage this improvement Gibson made in the second half of 2017 for a successful 2018.
 
Gibson is likely going to continue to make adjustments to stay ahead of the curve in keeping hitters off-balance. Ultimately, the construction of the Twins’ off-season speaks to Falvine’s understanding of that they have on their roster, and what they don’t have. The Twins now have several intriguing back end bullpen options between Trevor Hildenberger, Zach Duke, Fernando Rodney, and Addison Reed. The pen is much more likely to be able to bail out a bad start than in 2017. If Gibson can continue to tweak his approach and forms and effective partnership with Alston, the Twins may find themselves with a fourth starting pitcher who gives them more consistent innings and can pitch deeper into games. How do you think Kyle Gibson will perform for the Twins in 2018? Do you think he will establish himself as a consistent middle of the rotation starter? Or will he continue to have varied and inconsistent results?

Few moments in life result in genuine anticipation. For me, they are predictable. My wedding day, the birth of my daughter, and waiting for a starting pitcher to sign this off-season. In an effort to fill this continually vacuous, and harrowingly stagnant alternate reality in which starting pitchers are no longer required to complete baseball games, I’m taking a stand. I’m going to forget about all the upside that could improve the Twins rotation, and focus on what we already have. Namely, Adalberto Mejia.
 
Mejia ‘hasn’t gotten a ton of ink’ at Twins Daily this off-season. Those are Tom Froemming’s words, I can’t pull that sentence off. The point remains, Mejia can be an afterthought in a Twins rotation resplendent with uncertain back end options. He’s most likely the leading candidate for the fifth start role in 2018, but should he be?
 
The Twins acquired Mejia in a sell high trade for Eduardo Nunez, traded on the back of an outstanding(ly lucky) first half for Minnesota in 2016. Mejia was one of the Giants’ better thought of prospects (No 10 according to Baseball Prospectus) in a weaker system. At the time he was thought of more as high floor than high ceiling. After an up and down 2017 season, what does Mejia offer the Twins? And what does he need to do to take a step forward and cement his position as a more consistent back of the rotation starter?
 
Let’s start with what Mejia has. He’s a 6’3 lefty, who checks in at 195 lbs. according to Fangraphs (lies!). He relies in a pretty typical four pitch mix. Mejia throws a four seam fastball (avg. 93mph), a slider (avg. 84 mph), a changeup (avg. 84 mpg), and a sinker (avg. 92 mph). All four of his pitches have slightly above average velocity, but none of them are going to blow you away.
 
Mejia’s mechanics went through some adjustments over the course of the 2017 season. In April (a month in which Mejia struggled significantly) his release point was significantly lower on all four of his pitches than it was by the season’s end. His average fastball, started the season with a release point of 6ft and finished with a release point of 6.31 ft. a significant difference. This ‘straightening up’ allowed Mejia to generate a little more vertical movement on all of his off-speed pitches as the season progressed. The graphs below track Mejia's vertical release point and vertical movement for his four primary pitches throughout the 2017 season.
 
 




 
In spite of this increase in movement, Mejia struggled to generate a consistently strong secondary pitch throughout the 2017 season. Mejia left a few of his sliders over the plate, which, with minimal break on the pitch led to said few being crushed for home runs. His lack of a strong secondary pitch however, most impacted his fastball, allowing hitters to wait on it and tee off on the pitch to the tune of a .921 OPS. Mejia did split his breaking pitch mix between his slider and a curveball (which he threw around 10% of the time). Mejia’s curveball showed promise, registering at season’s end as his only plus pitch.
 
If there is one factor in determining whether Mejia can solidify himself as a solid back end option for the Twins, it is his fastball control. Overall, Mejia had an ugly walk rate of 4.04 BB/9 in 2017. Mejia was only able to generate 34% ground balls on his fastball. Looking at his heat map for first pitch fastballs, it’s easy to see why. The heat map below shows the location of Mejia’s fastball, when it was the first pitch he threw to right handed hitters. It’s notable that Mejia 1) struggles to find the zone and establish his fastball against RHH and 2) Mejia leaves a considerable number of the fastballs which do find the strike zone over the middle of the plate.
 


 
One of the limitations of Mejia’s fastball in 2018 is how eminently hittable it is. This is noticeable in a comparison between Mejia’s fastball and that of Jose Berrios. O-Contact% measures the amount of contact hitters make with a particular pitch when it is thrown outside the strike zone. In 2017 opposing hitters made contact with around 60% of Berrios’ fastballs located outside the strike zone. For Mejia the figure was just under 80%. Over the course of the season, this equates to around 150 extra fastballs which weren’t in the strike zone getting contacted when comparing Berrios and Mejia. When your fastball isn’t a plus pitch, that’s a big deal. Mejia doesn’t have the movement or velocity to blow people away or create much deception in his pitches. In order to be successful, he needs to develop his ability to control his fastball and command it using the strike zone more deliberately.
 
Lastly, it’s interesting to note exactly when Mejia got himself into his biggest messes on the mound. You might think that a pitcher struggling with control would walk more hitters with men on base, these situations were actually where Mejia clamped down. His greatest struggles came in low leverage situations in which he had a BB/9 of 5.34, as opposed to 1.29 in high leverage situations. To put this another way, Mejia had a BB/9 of 5.73 when the bases where empty, as opposed to just 2.67 with men on base.
 
Mejia remains an interesting option for the Twins going into the 2018 season. He will remain a bargain, given the price Minnesota paid for him. His 2018 impact is really dependent on two key factors moving forwards; getting, and staying ahead of hitters, and improving one of his breaking pitches to offset his fastball more effectively. If Mejia can take steps forward in these areas, the Twins should have a solid number five. Who do you think is the favorite for the Twins fifth starting pitching roster spot ahead of spring training?

Kintzler, Duffey, Pressly, Belisle, Rogers, Hughes, Hildenberger, Gee, Boshers, Busenitz, Breslow, Tonkin, Haley, Turley, Slegers, Wilk, Curtiss, Wimmers, Moya, Perkins, Rucinski, Enns, Melville, Wheeler, Rosario, Tepesch, Heston, and Chris Gimenez. These are the 27 pitchers and one intrepid catcher who made up the Twins relief pitching corps in 2017. By sheer volume alone, the Twins bullpen left a lot to be desired in 2017. There were some bright spots. Brandon Kintzler, who departed to the Nationals via trade, was excellent. Trevor Hildenberger, whose unique approach should make him a staple of the Twins bullpen for the foreseeable future, emerged as a potential bullpen star. The rest of the pen was about as effective as a Matt Asiata run up in middle from inside the five yard line. So where did the Twins stack up against other bullpens when the 2017 season was all said and done?
 
2017 Bullpen Performance
Just for the sake of comparison, the Yankees, whose relievers threw an arsenal of sonic-boom inducing fastballs that blew the Twins straight out of the wild card game, used 19 relief pitchers last season. The Dodgers, who had an exceptional bullpen, also used 19. While the number of relievers used is hardly an important metric, it is indicative of a contrast in stability in some of MLB’s top bullpens, and that of the Twins.
 
Minnesota’s bullpen pen logged the tenth most innings of any bullpen in 2017 (looking at you Kyle Gibson and Adalberto Mejia), struck out the fifth fewest hitters (482), and walked the seventh fewest number of hitters (187). Tale as old as time, right? So far, we’ve established that the pen was overworked, didn’t walk many guys, and didn’t strike a lot out either. What about when opposing hitters made contact? The Twins had a significant issue here, giving up the fourth worst Hard% (hard contact percentage) and generating the second worst Soft% (soft contact percentage, significant because there’s a medium contact %) in the league. Essentially, when the Twins gave up contact to opposing hitters, they made a lot of good contact. The Twins bullpen performance in 2017 was actually similar to 2016 (a difference of 0.1 in bullpen WAR), accomplished in a very different way. In short, the pen needed a significant overhaul before the 2018 season. In an organization with a strong offensive lineup and in a market where high level starting pitching is difficult to attract via free agency, the bullpen was the lowest hanging fruit for the Twins front office to attack during free agency.
 
What was Missing?
So what was the Twins bullpen lacking? One area the Twins pen did improve in 2017 was generating groundballs, improving from 23rd in MLB in 2016, to 12th in 2017. This is an area of strength the Twins chose to build upon in 2018, adding Zach Duke and Fernando Rodney to one year deals. In Duke’s last full season before injury, he logged a GB% of 58%, which is elite. Rodney wasn’t too shabby himself, generating GB% of 52% in 2017.
 
Looking at the most effective bullpens of 2017, an even more integral stat is K/9. This makes a ton of sense, not much can go wrong if you’re striking hitters out on a consistent basis. In 2017, there were 9 teams with a bullpen K/9 of at least 9.5. Between them, these clubs averaged a WAR of 6.5 for their bullpen. The Twins bullpen WAR in 2017 was 2.2, not a disaster, good for 22nd in MLB. By K/9, the Twins ranked 29th, with just 7.66 strikeouts per nine innings. Hardly surprising, when you are cycling through nearly 30 relievers over the course of the season. So how do the Twins new additions stack up in generating more strikeouts?
 
In short, pretty darn well. If you average out the K/9 for Duke, Rodney, and Reed over their last two full seasons of pitching (excluding years significantly impacted by injury), they sit at an average K/9 of 10.00. That’s the kind of strikeout power you want sitting at the back end of your bullpen, particularly if you throw Hildenberger’s 2017 K/9 of 9.43 into the mix too. While past performance isn’t necessarily a good indicator of future results, this is certainly an encouraging trend in remedying a weakness Twins fans have bemoaned, and has impeded the team for years.
 
Apples and Oranges?
The Twins additions are even more interesting if considered in comparison to another team attempting to ramp up the quality of their bullpen, the Rockies. Colorado spent a Ron Swanson-esque ‘all of the money’ on adding Wade Davis, Jake McGee, and Bryan Shaw this offseason. The Rockies added their relief upgrades for a cost of $30.5 million in 2018. The Twins, by contrast, added Duke, Rodney, and Reed for around $14.65 million in 2018, or around $1.5 million less than it took the Rockies to sign Davis alone for a single year. The average of the Rockies additions K/9 over their last two full seasons pitched is 9.39. While they offer more consistency than a back end containing an ageing Fernando Rodney and Zach Duke returning from Tommy John surgery, the comparison is striking.
 
There are two more avenues which make this comparison interesting. When looking at the cumulative WAR of the three new relief pitching options for each team over the last two seasons, the Twins trio contributed 6.3 WAR, to the Rockies triumvirates 5.2. While WAR has been put through the ringer in the baseball writing community recently, it is, if nothing else, a useful starting point for a comparison.
 
Perhaps the Rockies new additions were so much more highly paid because they pitched in higher leverage situations, earning the moniker of ‘super-reliever’ for their respective 2017 teams? WPA (Win Probability Added) examines changes in win probability and reflects how much a player impacted their team’s chances of winning a game. Duke, Rodney and Reed combined for a WPA of 6.08 in their last full season pitched (using 2016 for Duke as 2017 was lost to injury), compared to Davis, McGee, and Shaw’s combined 5.52 in 2017. While the majority of WPA and WAR added for each team was bound up in Reed for the Twins and Davis for the Rockies, comparing the additions in groups of three offers a glimpse at what their cumulative impact on their new teams might be in 2018 in the highest leverage situations each team will face.
 
This is not to say the Twins signed three better guys than the Rockies, but for a team with their bottom line, they added a significant amount of upside for excellent value, in an area that badly needed to be addressed. As a smaller market team, the Twins don’t have the luxury not to consider short and long term viability when balancing the upside of their free agent signings with the cost it takes to sign them. While the Twins likely won’t have one of the top bullpens in MLB next year, consider the floor significantly raised. If Rodney, Duke, and Reed can maintain a similar level of performance, the Twins will have a much improved pen, cemented by a particularly strong back end that closes the gap between Minnesota and Cleveland.

Kintzler, Duffey, Pressly, Belisle, Rogers, Hughes, Hildenberger, Gee, Boshers, Busenitz, Breslow, Tonkin, Haley, Turley, Slegers, Wilk, Curtiss, Wimmers, Moya, Perkins, Rucinski, Enns, Melville, Wheeler, Rosario, Tepesch, Heston, and Chris Gimenez. These are the 27 pitchers and one intrepid catcher who made up the Twins relief pitching corps in 2017. By sheer volume alone, the Twins bullpen left a lot to be desired in 2017. There were some bright spots. Brandon Kintzler, who departed to the Nationals via trade, was excellent. Trevor Hildenberger, whose unique approach should make him a staple of the Twins bullpen for the foreseeable future, emerged as a potential bullpen star. The rest of the pen was about as effective as a Matt Asiata run up in middle from inside the five yard line. So where did the Twins stack up against other bullpens when the 2017 season was all said and done?
 
2017 Bullpen Performance
Just for the sake of comparison, the Yankees, whose relievers threw an arsenal of sonic-boom inducing fastballs that blew the Twins straight out of the wild card game, used 19 relief pitchers last season. The Dodgers, who had an exceptional bullpen, also used 19. While the number of relievers used is hardly an important metric, it is indicative of a contrast in stability in some of MLB’s top bullpens, and that of the Twins.
 
Minnesota’s bullpen pen logged the tenth most innings of any bullpen in 2017 (looking at you Kyle Gibson and Adalberto Mejia), struck out the fifth fewest hitters (482), and walked the seventh fewest number of hitters (187). Tale as old as time, right? So far, we’ve established that the pen was overworked, didn’t walk many guys, and didn’t strike a lot out either. What about when opposing hitters made contact? The Twins had a significant issue here, giving up the fourth worst Hard% (hard contact percentage) and generating the second worst Soft% (soft contact percentage, significant because there’s a medium contact %) in the league. Essentially, when the Twins gave up contact to opposing hitters, they made a lot of good contact. The Twins bullpen performance in 2017 was actually similar to 2016 (a difference of 0.1 in bullpen WAR), accomplished in a very different way. In short, the pen needed a significant overhaul before the 2018 season. In an organization with a strong offensive lineup and in a market where high level starting pitching is difficult to attract via free agency, the bullpen was the lowest hanging fruit for the Twins front office to attack during free agency.
 
What was Missing?
So what was the Twins bullpen lacking? One area the Twins pen did improve in 2017 was generating groundballs, improving from 23rd in MLB in 2016, to 12th in 2017. This is an area of strength the Twins chose to build upon in 2018, adding Zach Duke and Fernando Rodney to one year deals. In Duke’s last full season before injury, he logged a GB% of 58%, which is elite. Rodney wasn’t too shabby himself, generating GB% of 52% in 2017.
 
Looking at the most effective bullpens of 2017, an even more integral stat is K/9. This makes a ton of sense, not much can go wrong if you’re striking hitters out on a consistent basis. In 2017, there were 9 teams with a bullpen K/9 of at least 9.5. Between them, these clubs averaged a WAR of 6.5 for their bullpen. The Twins bullpen WAR in 2017 was 2.2, not a disaster, good for 22nd in MLB. By K/9, the Twins ranked 29th, with just 7.66 strikeouts per nine innings. Hardly surprising, when you are cycling through nearly 30 relievers over the course of the season. So how do the Twins new additions stack up in generating more strikeouts?
 
In short, pretty darn well. If you average out the K/9 for Duke, Rodney, and Reed over their last two full seasons of pitching (excluding years significantly impacted by injury), they sit at an average K/9 of 10.00. That’s the kind of strikeout power you want sitting at the back end of your bullpen, particularly if you throw Hildenberger’s 2017 K/9 of 9.43 into the mix too. While past performance isn’t necessarily a good indicator of future results, this is certainly an encouraging trend in remedying a weakness Twins fans have bemoaned, and has impeded the team for years.
 
Apples and Oranges?
The Twins additions are even more interesting if considered in comparison to another team attempting to ramp up the quality of their bullpen, the Rockies. Colorado spent a Ron Swanson-esque ‘all of the money’ on adding Wade Davis, Jake McGee, and Bryan Shaw this offseason. The Rockies added their relief upgrades for a cost of $30.5 million in 2018. The Twins, by contrast, added Duke, Rodney, and Reed for around $14.65 million in 2018, or around $1.5 million less than it took the Rockies to sign Davis alone for a single year. The average of the Rockies additions K/9 over their last two full seasons pitched is 9.39. While they offer more consistency than a back end containing an ageing Fernando Rodney and Zach Duke returning from Tommy John surgery, the comparison is striking.
 
There are two more avenues which make this comparison interesting. When looking at the cumulative WAR of the three new relief pitching options for each team over the last two seasons, the Twins trio contributed 6.3 WAR, to the Rockies triumvirates 5.2. While WAR has been put through the ringer in the baseball writing community recently, it is, if nothing else, a useful starting point for a comparison.
 
Perhaps the Rockies new additions were so much more highly paid because they pitched in higher leverage situations, earning the moniker of ‘super-reliever’ for their respective 2017 teams? WPA (Win Probability Added) examines changes in win probability and reflects how much a player impacted their team’s chances of winning a game. Duke, Rodney and Reed combined for a WPA of 6.08 in their last full season pitched (using 2016 for Duke as 2017 was lost to injury), compared to Davis, McGee, and Shaw’s combined 5.52 in 2017. While the majority of WPA and WAR added for each team was bound up in Reed for the Twins and Davis for the Rockies, comparing the additions in groups of three offers a glimpse at what their cumulative impact on their new teams might be in 2018 in the highest leverage situations each team will face.
 
This is not to say the Twins signed three better guys than the Rockies, but for a team with their bottom line, they added a significant amount of upside for excellent value, in an area that badly needed to be addressed. As a smaller market team, the Twins don’t have the luxury not to consider short and long term viability when balancing the upside of their free agent signings with the cost it takes to sign them. While the Twins likely won’t have one of the top bullpens in MLB next year, consider the floor significantly raised. If Rodney, Duke, and Reed can maintain a similar level of performance, the Twins will have a much improved pen, cemented by a particularly strong back end that closes the gap between Minnesota and Cleveland.

Kintzler, Duffey, Pressly, Belisle, Rogers, Hughes, Hildenberger, Gee, Boshers, Busenitz, Breslow, Tonkin, Haley, Turley, Slegers, Wilk, Curtiss, Wimmers, Moya, Perkins, Rucinski, Enns, Melville, Wheeler, Rosario, Tepesch, Heston, and Chris Gimenez. These are the 27 pitchers and one intrepid catcher who made up the Twins relief pitching corps in 2017. By sheer volume alone, the Twins bullpen left a lot to be desired in 2017. There were some bright spots. Brandon Kintzler, who departed to the Nationals via trade, was excellent. Trevor Hildenberger, whose unique approach should make him a staple of the Twins bullpen for the foreseeable future, emerged as a potential bullpen star. The rest of the pen was about as effective as a Matt Asiata run up in middle from inside the five yard line. So where did the Twins stack up against other bullpens when the 2017 season was all said and done?
 
2017 Bullpen Performance
Just for the sake of comparison, the Yankees, whose relievers threw an arsenal of sonic-boom inducing fastballs that blew the Twins straight out of the wild card game, used 19 relief pitchers last season. The Dodgers, who had an exceptional bullpen, also used 19. While the number of relievers used is hardly an important metric, it is indicative of a contrast in stability in some of MLB’s top bullpens, and that of the Twins.
 
Minnesota’s bullpen pen logged the tenth most innings of any bullpen in 2017 (looking at you Kyle Gibson and Adalberto Mejia), struck out the fifth fewest hitters (482), and walked the seventh fewest number of hitters (187). Tale as old as time, right? So far, we’ve established that the pen was overworked, didn’t walk many guys, and didn’t strike a lot out either. What about when opposing hitters made contact? The Twins had a significant issue here, giving up the fourth worst Hard% (hard contact percentage) and generating the second worst Soft% (soft contact percentage, significant because there’s a medium contact %) in the league. Essentially, when the Twins gave up contact to opposing hitters, they made a lot of good contact. The Twins bullpen performance in 2017 was actually similar to 2016 (a difference of 0.1 in bullpen WAR), accomplished in a very different way. In short, the pen needed a significant overhaul before the 2018 season. In an organization with a strong offensive lineup and in a market where high level starting pitching is difficult to attract via free agency, the bullpen was the lowest hanging fruit for the Twins front office to attack during free agency.
 
What was Missing?
So what was the Twins bullpen lacking? One area the Twins pen did improve in 2017 was generating groundballs, improving from 23rd in MLB in 2016, to 12th in 2017. This is an area of strength the Twins chose to build upon in 2018, adding Zach Duke and Fernando Rodney to one year deals. In Duke’s last full season before injury, he logged a GB% of 58%, which is elite. Rodney wasn’t too shabby himself, generating GB% of 52% in 2017.
 
Looking at the most effective bullpens of 2017, an even more integral stat is K/9. This makes a ton of sense, not much can go wrong if you’re striking hitters out on a consistent basis. In 2017, there were 9 teams with a bullpen K/9 of at least 9.5. Between them, these clubs averaged a WAR of 6.5 for their bullpen. The Twins bullpen WAR in 2017 was 2.2, not a disaster, good for 22nd in MLB. By K/9, the Twins ranked 29th, with just 7.66 strikeouts per nine innings. Hardly surprising, when you are cycling through nearly 30 relievers over the course of the season. So how do the Twins new additions stack up in generating more strikeouts?
 
In short, pretty darn well. If you average out the K/9 for Duke, Rodney, and Reed over their last two full seasons of pitching (excluding years significantly impacted by injury), they sit at an average K/9 of 10.00. That’s the kind of strikeout power you want sitting at the back end of your bullpen, particularly if you throw Hildenberger’s 2017 K/9 of 9.43 into the mix too. While past performance isn’t necessarily a good indicator of future results, this is certainly an encouraging trend in remedying a weakness Twins fans have bemoaned, and has impeded the team for years.
 
Apples and Oranges?
The Twins additions are even more interesting if considered in comparison to another team attempting to ramp up the quality of their bullpen, the Rockies. Colorado spent a Ron Swanson-esque ‘all of the money’ on adding Wade Davis, Jake McGee, and Bryan Shaw this offseason. The Rockies added their relief upgrades for a cost of $30.5 million in 2018. The Twins, by contrast, added Duke, Rodney, and Reed for around $14.65 million in 2018, or around $1.5 million less than it took the Rockies to sign Davis alone for a single year. The average of the Rockies additions K/9 over their last two full seasons pitched is 9.39. While they offer more consistency than a back end containing an ageing Fernando Rodney and Zach Duke returning from Tommy John surgery, the comparison is striking.
 
There are two more avenues which make this comparison interesting. When looking at the cumulative WAR of the three new relief pitching options for each team over the last two seasons, the Twins trio contributed 6.3 WAR, to the Rockies triumvirates 5.2. While WAR has been put through the ringer in the baseball writing community recently, it is, if nothing else, a useful starting point for a comparison.
 
Perhaps the Rockies new additions were so much more highly paid because they pitched in higher leverage situations, earning the moniker of ‘super-reliever’ for their respective 2017 teams? WPA (Win Probability Added) examines changes in win probability and reflects how much a player impacted their team’s chances of winning a game. Duke, Rodney and Reed combined for a WPA of 6.08 in their last full season pitched (using 2016 for Duke as 2017 was lost to injury), compared to Davis, McGee, and Shaw’s combined 5.52 in 2017. While the majority of WPA and WAR added for each team was bound up in Reed for the Twins and Davis for the Rockies, comparing the additions in groups of three offers a glimpse at what their cumulative impact on their new teams might be in 2018 in the highest leverage situations each team will face.
 
This is not to say the Twins signed three better guys than the Rockies, but for a team with their bottom line, they added a significant amount of upside for excellent value, in an area that badly needed to be addressed. As a smaller market team, the Twins don’t have the luxury not to consider short and long term viability when balancing the upside of their free agent signings with the cost it takes to sign them. While the Twins likely won’t have one of the top bullpens in MLB next year, consider the floor significantly raised. If Rodney, Duke, and Reed can maintain a similar level of performance, the Twins will have a much improved pen, cemented by a particularly strong back end that closes the gap between Minnesota and Cleveland.

The Twins made an unexpected addition to their burgeoning bullpen over the weekend, adding former Mets and Red Sox reliever Addison Reed on a two-year pact worth $16.75 million. The deal profiles well for the Twins on a number of fronts. At 29, Reed is at the younger end of a relief pitching market deep in high quality back end bullpen arms. Reed represents the first multi-year deal the Twins have ever signed with an outside reliever in free agency. In spite of this, the Twins locked Reed up on a short contract, at a price which they undoubtedly would have had to surpass had they signed him earlier in free agency.
 
Reed joins a Twins bullpen shaping up to be vastly different, and potentially much improved over its 2017 iteration. In addition to returning standout Trevor Hildenberger, the Twins have added Fernando Rodney, presumably filling the vacant ninth inning role, and Zach Duke, returning from an injury-plagued 2017 season. In the former trio, the Twins seemed to have established a penchant for the traits they are pursuing in improving their bullpen; inducing ground balls and a lot of strikeouts, hardly a pioneering recipe for success. In Reed however, they have added a pitcher who generates more fly balls, so what about Reed has made him such a consistent a reliable late inning reliever?
 
There’s no real intricacy in Reed’s pitch mix. He throws a four seem fastball around 66% of the time, a slider 33% of the time, and a changeup about as often as Byron Buxton gets caught stealing a base. Reed has excellent control, posting a walk rate of 1.51 BB/9 in 2016 and 1.78 BB/9 in 2017. Reed’s 2017 BB/9 was good for 11th among relievers who pitched at least 50 innings. This level of control was not always a staple of Reed’s pitching. In his first 3 seasons in MLB his BB/9 oscillated between 2.90 and 3.05. While this may seem like a trivial difference, this is a difference of around 10-11 walks over a 75 inning sample, a big deal when you’re constantly pitching in high leverage situations. So what is at the root of Reed’s improved control since the beginning of the 2016 season?
 
In 2016, Reed produced a dramatic improvement in his overall numbers. In addition to refining his control, Reed stranded around 5% more baserunners, increased his K/9 from 8.2 to 10.55 and dropped his xFIP from 4.04 to 2.09. Reed has never had elite velocity. While some have commented on a dip in velocity throughout the past two seasons, his average four seam fastball velocity has remained fairly consistent, dropping from 93.66 mph in April of 2015 to 92.72 mph in October of 2017. So if Reed isn’t blowing hitters away, how did his K/9 improve and stick above 9.0 in his last two seasons?
 
The number that jumps out in Reed’s improvement from 2015 to 2016 is his F-Strike% (percentage of the time Reed is throwing a first pitch strike). In 2015 Reed’s F-Strike% was around 56%. In 2016, it jumped to 70%. For the sake of comparison, old friend Pat Neshek had an F-Strike% of 71.1% in 2017 and had an incredible BB/9 of 0.87. This is a dramatic improvement from Reed which is even more impressive when visualized.
 
Here’s a look at Reed’s heat map from 2015. This charts the percentage a pitch falls within a sub-location of the strike zone. For all three of these searches I looked at heat maps representing the first pitch of a plate appearance, exclusively when Reed threw his four seem fastball. You’ll immediately notice a stark contrast between 2015 and 2016. Reed improved in two notable areas, pounding the strike zone with a greater level of consistency, and using a greater portion of the strike zone when throwing first pitch strikes. We see a similar performance in 2017 (although not quite as impressive). Interestingly, Reed’s obvious trend in locating his first pitch strikes higher in the zone in resulted in opposing batters OPS increasing from .587 in 2016, to .862 in 2017.
 






 
So where does Reed fit in the back end of a Twins bullpen which has been dramatically upgraded from a year ago? Initially, there was contention that adding Reed might create a closer controversy in Minnesota. The Twins had recently added Fernando Rodney to the pen on a one year deal. It seems as if the Twins will stick with Rodney as their primary ninth inning option. Since taking on his role with the Twins, Paul Molitor has been criticized in his bullpen management for traditionalism, a tendency to use each of his relievers in a pre-determined role. Intractably funneling Rodney into save situations may allow Molitor the luxury of using both Reed and Trevor Hildenberger as more flexible relievers, whose appearances are dictated by the leverage of a given situation, rather than the inning they are pitching in. In addition to providing Molitor with another quality arm, Reed may provide the impetus for Molitor to get more creative in facilitating the evolution of the Twins bullpen, maximizing the potential of a vastly upgraded group.

The Twins made an unexpected addition to their burgeoning bullpen over the weekend, adding former Mets and Red Sox reliever Addison Reed on a two-year pact worth $16.75 million. The deal profiles well for the Twins on a number of fronts. At 29, Reed is at the younger end of a relief pitching market deep in high quality back end bullpen arms. Reed represents the first multi-year deal the Twins have ever signed with an outside reliever in free agency. In spite of this, the Twins locked Reed up on a short contract, at a price which they undoubtedly would have had to surpass had they signed him earlier in free agency.
 
Reed joins a Twins bullpen shaping up to be vastly different, and potentially much improved over its 2017 iteration. In addition to returning standout Trevor Hildenberger, the Twins have added Fernando Rodney, presumably filling the vacant ninth inning role, and Zach Duke, returning from an injury-plagued 2017 season. In the former trio, the Twins seemed to have established a penchant for the traits they are pursuing in improving their bullpen; inducing ground balls and a lot of strikeouts, hardly a pioneering recipe for success. In Reed however, they have added a pitcher who generates more fly balls, so what about Reed has made him such a consistent a reliable late inning reliever?
 
There’s no real intricacy in Reed’s pitch mix. He throws a four seem fastball around 66% of the time, a slider 33% of the time, and a changeup about as often as Byron Buxton gets caught stealing a base. Reed has excellent control, posting a walk rate of 1.51 BB/9 in 2016 and 1.78 BB/9 in 2017. Reed’s 2017 BB/9 was good for 11th among relievers who pitched at least 50 innings. This level of control was not always a staple of Reed’s pitching. In his first 3 seasons in MLB his BB/9 oscillated between 2.90 and 3.05. While this may seem like a trivial difference, this is a difference of around 10-11 walks over a 75 inning sample, a big deal when you’re constantly pitching in high leverage situations. So what is at the root of Reed’s improved control since the beginning of the 2016 season?
 
In 2016, Reed produced a dramatic improvement in his overall numbers. In addition to refining his control, Reed stranded around 5% more baserunners, increased his K/9 from 8.2 to 10.55 and dropped his xFIP from 4.04 to 2.09. Reed has never had elite velocity. While some have commented on a dip in velocity throughout the past two seasons, his average four seam fastball velocity has remained fairly consistent, dropping from 93.66 mph in April of 2015 to 92.72 mph in October of 2017. So if Reed isn’t blowing hitters away, how did his K/9 improve and stick above 9.0 in his last two seasons?
 
The number that jumps out in Reed’s improvement from 2015 to 2016 is his F-Strike% (percentage of the time Reed is throwing a first pitch strike). In 2015 Reed’s F-Strike% was around 56%. In 2016, it jumped to 70%. For the sake of comparison, old friend Pat Neshek had an F-Strike% of 71.1% in 2017 and had an incredible BB/9 of 0.87. This is a dramatic improvement from Reed which is even more impressive when visualized.
 
Here’s a look at Reed’s heat map from 2015. This charts the percentage a pitch falls within a sub-location of the strike zone. For all three of these searches I looked at heat maps representing the first pitch of a plate appearance, exclusively when Reed threw his four seem fastball. You’ll immediately notice a stark contrast between 2015 and 2016. Reed improved in two notable areas, pounding the strike zone with a greater level of consistency, and using a greater portion of the strike zone when throwing first pitch strikes. We see a similar performance in 2017 (although not quite as impressive). Interestingly, Reed’s obvious trend in locating his first pitch strikes higher in the zone in resulted in opposing batters OPS increasing from .587 in 2016, to .862 in 2017.
 






 
So where does Reed fit in the back end of a Twins bullpen which has been dramatically upgraded from a year ago? Initially, there was contention that adding Reed might create a closer controversy in Minnesota. The Twins had recently added Fernando Rodney to the pen on a one year deal. It seems as if the Twins will stick with Rodney as their primary ninth inning option. Since taking on his role with the Twins, Paul Molitor has been criticized in his bullpen management for traditionalism, a tendency to use each of his relievers in a pre-determined role. Intractably funneling Rodney into save situations may allow Molitor the luxury of using both Reed and Trevor Hildenberger as more flexible relievers, whose appearances are dictated by the leverage of a given situation, rather than the inning they are pitching in. In addition to providing Molitor with another quality arm, Reed may provide the impetus for Molitor to get more creative in facilitating the evolution of the Twins bullpen, maximizing the potential of a vastly upgraded group.

The Twins made an unexpected addition to their burgeoning bullpen over the weekend, adding former Mets and Red Sox reliever Addison Reed on a two-year pact worth $16.75 million. The deal profiles well for the Twins on a number of fronts. At 29, Reed is at the younger end of a relief pitching market deep in high quality back end bullpen arms. Reed represents the first multi-year deal the Twins have ever signed with an outside reliever in free agency. In spite of this, the Twins locked Reed up on a short contract, at a price which they undoubtedly would have had to surpass had they signed him earlier in free agency.
 
Reed joins a Twins bullpen shaping up to be vastly different, and potentially much improved over its 2017 iteration. In addition to returning standout Trevor Hildenberger, the Twins have added Fernando Rodney, presumably filling the vacant ninth inning role, and Zach Duke, returning from an injury-plagued 2017 season. In the former trio, the Twins seemed to have established a penchant for the traits they are pursuing in improving their bullpen; inducing ground balls and a lot of strikeouts, hardly a pioneering recipe for success. In Reed however, they have added a pitcher who generates more fly balls, so what about Reed has made him such a consistent a reliable late inning reliever?
 
There’s no real intricacy in Reed’s pitch mix. He throws a four seem fastball around 66% of the time, a slider 33% of the time, and a changeup about as often as Byron Buxton gets caught stealing a base. Reed has excellent control, posting a walk rate of 1.51 BB/9 in 2016 and 1.78 BB/9 in 2017. Reed’s 2017 BB/9 was good for 11th among relievers who pitched at least 50 innings. This level of control was not always a staple of Reed’s pitching. In his first 3 seasons in MLB his BB/9 oscillated between 2.90 and 3.05. While this may seem like a trivial difference, this is a difference of around 10-11 walks over a 75 inning sample, a big deal when you’re constantly pitching in high leverage situations. So what is at the root of Reed’s improved control since the beginning of the 2016 season?
 
In 2016, Reed produced a dramatic improvement in his overall numbers. In addition to refining his control, Reed stranded around 5% more baserunners, increased his K/9 from 8.2 to 10.55 and dropped his xFIP from 4.04 to 2.09. Reed has never had elite velocity. While some have commented on a dip in velocity throughout the past two seasons, his average four seam fastball velocity has remained fairly consistent, dropping from 93.66 mph in April of 2015 to 92.72 mph in October of 2017. So if Reed isn’t blowing hitters away, how did his K/9 improve and stick above 9.0 in his last two seasons?
 
The number that jumps out in Reed’s improvement from 2015 to 2016 is his F-Strike% (percentage of the time Reed is throwing a first pitch strike). In 2015 Reed’s F-Strike% was around 56%. In 2016, it jumped to 70%. For the sake of comparison, old friend Pat Neshek had an F-Strike% of 71.1% in 2017 and had an incredible BB/9 of 0.87. This is a dramatic improvement from Reed which is even more impressive when visualized.
 
Here’s a look at Reed’s heat map from 2015. This charts the percentage a pitch falls within a sub-location of the strike zone. For all three of these searches I looked at heat maps representing the first pitch of a plate appearance, exclusively when Reed threw his four seem fastball. You’ll immediately notice a stark contrast between 2015 and 2016. Reed improved in two notable areas, pounding the strike zone with a greater level of consistency, and using a greater portion of the strike zone when throwing first pitch strikes. We see a similar performance in 2017 (although not quite as impressive). Interestingly, Reed’s obvious trend in locating his first pitch strikes higher in the zone in resulted in opposing batters OPS increasing from .587 in 2016, to .862 in 2017.
 






 
So where does Reed fit in the back end of a Twins bullpen which has been dramatically upgraded from a year ago? Initially, there was contention that adding Reed might create a closer controversy in Minnesota. The Twins had recently added Fernando Rodney to the pen on a one year deal. It seems as if the Twins will stick with Rodney as their primary ninth inning option. Since taking on his role with the Twins, Paul Molitor has been criticized in his bullpen management for traditionalism, a tendency to use each of his relievers in a pre-determined role. Intractably funneling Rodney into save situations may allow Molitor the luxury of using both Reed and Trevor Hildenberger as more flexible relievers, whose appearances are dictated by the leverage of a given situation, rather than the inning they are pitching in. In addition to providing Molitor with another quality arm, Reed may provide the impetus for Molitor to get more creative in facilitating the evolution of the Twins bullpen, maximizing the potential of a vastly upgraded group.

The Twins made an unexpected addition to their burgeoning bullpen over the weekend, adding former Mets and Red Sox reliever Addison Reed on a two-year pact worth $16.75 million. The deal profiles well for the Twins on a number of fronts. At 29, Reed is at the younger end of a relief pitching market deep in high quality back end bullpen arms. Reed represents the first multi-year deal the Twins have ever signed with an outside reliever in free agency. In spite of this, the Twins locked Reed up on a short contract, at a price which they undoubtedly would have had to surpass had they signed him earlier in free agency.
 
Reed joins a Twins bullpen shaping up to be vastly different, and potentially much improved over its 2017 iteration. In addition to returning standout Trevor Hildenberger, the Twins have added Fernando Rodney, presumably filling the vacant ninth inning role, and Zach Duke, returning from an injury-plagued 2017 season. In the former trio, the Twins seemed to have established a penchant for the traits they are pursuing in improving their bullpen; inducing ground balls and a lot of strikeouts, hardly a pioneering recipe for success. In Reed however, they have added a pitcher who generates more fly balls, so what about Reed has made him such a consistent a reliable late inning reliever?
 
There’s no real intricacy in Reed’s pitch mix. He throws a four seem fastball around 66% of the time, a slider 33% of the time, and a changeup about as often as Byron Buxton gets caught stealing a base. Reed has excellent control, posting a walk rate of 1.51 BB/9 in 2016 and 1.78 BB/9 in 2017. Reed’s 2017 BB/9 was good for 11th among relievers who pitched at least 50 innings. This level of control was not always a staple of Reed’s pitching. In his first 3 seasons in MLB his BB/9 oscillated between 2.90 and 3.05. While this may seem like a trivial difference, this is a difference of around 10-11 walks over a 75 inning sample, a big deal when you’re constantly pitching in high leverage situations. So what is at the root of Reed’s improved control since the beginning of the 2016 season?
 
In 2016, Reed produced a dramatic improvement in his overall numbers. In addition to refining his control, Reed stranded around 5% more baserunners, increased his K/9 from 8.2 to 10.55 and dropped his xFIP from 4.04 to 2.09. Reed has never had elite velocity. While some have commented on a dip in velocity throughout the past two seasons, his average four seam fastball velocity has remained fairly consistent, dropping from 93.66 mph in April of 2015 to 92.72 mph in October of 2017. So if Reed isn’t blowing hitters away, how did his K/9 improve and stick above 9.0 in his last two seasons?
 
The number that jumps out in Reed’s improvement from 2015 to 2016 is his F-Strike% (percentage of the time Reed is throwing a first pitch strike). In 2015 Reed’s F-Strike% was around 56%. In 2016, it jumped to 70%. For the sake of comparison, old friend Pat Neshek had an F-Strike% of 71.1% in 2017 and had an incredible BB/9 of 0.87. This is a dramatic improvement from Reed which is even more impressive when visualized.
 
Here’s a look at Reed’s heat map from 2015. This charts the percentage a pitch falls within a sub-location of the strike zone. For all three of these searches I looked at heat maps representing the first pitch of a plate appearance, exclusively when Reed threw his four seem fastball. You’ll immediately notice a stark contrast between 2015 and 2016. Reed improved in two notable areas, pounding the strike zone with a greater level of consistency, and using a greater portion of the strike zone when throwing first pitch strikes. We see a similar performance in 2017 (although not quite as impressive). Interestingly, Reed’s obvious trend in locating his first pitch strikes higher in the zone in resulted in opposing batters OPS increasing from .587 in 2016, to .862 in 2017.
 






 
So where does Reed fit in the back end of a Twins bullpen which has been dramatically upgraded from a year ago? Initially, there was contention that adding Reed might create a closer controversy in Minnesota. The Twins had recently added Fernando Rodney to the pen on a one year deal. It seems as if the Twins will stick with Rodney as their primary ninth inning option. Since taking on his role with the Twins, Paul Molitor has been criticized in his bullpen management for traditionalism, a tendency to use each of his relievers in a pre-determined role. Intractably funneling Rodney into save situations may allow Molitor the luxury of using both Reed and Trevor Hildenberger as more flexible relievers, whose appearances are dictated by the leverage of a given situation, rather than the inning they are pitching in. In addition to providing Molitor with another quality arm, Reed may provide the impetus for Molitor to get more creative in facilitating the evolution of the Twins bullpen, maximizing the potential of a vastly upgraded group.

The Twins made an unexpected addition to their burgeoning bullpen over the weekend, adding former Mets and Red Sox reliever Addison Reed on a two-year pact worth $16.75 million. The deal profiles well for the Twins on a number of fronts. At 29, Reed is at the younger end of a relief pitching market deep in high quality back end bullpen arms. Reed represents the first multi-year deal the Twins have ever signed with an outside reliever in free agency. In spite of this, the Twins locked Reed up on a short contract, at a price which they undoubtedly would have had to surpass had they signed him earlier in free agency.
 
Reed joins a Twins bullpen shaping up to be vastly different, and potentially much improved over its 2017 iteration. In addition to returning standout Trevor Hildenberger, the Twins have added Fernando Rodney, presumably filling the vacant ninth inning role, and Zach Duke, returning from an injury-plagued 2017 season. In the former trio, the Twins seemed to have established a penchant for the traits they are pursuing in improving their bullpen; inducing ground balls and a lot of strikeouts, hardly a pioneering recipe for success. In Reed however, they have added a pitcher who generates more fly balls, so what about Reed has made him such a consistent a reliable late inning reliever?
 
There’s no real intricacy in Reed’s pitch mix. He throws a four seem fastball around 66% of the time, a slider 33% of the time, and a changeup about as often as Byron Buxton gets caught stealing a base. Reed has excellent control, posting a walk rate of 1.51 BB/9 in 2016 and 1.78 BB/9 in 2017. Reed’s 2017 BB/9 was good for 11th among relievers who pitched at least 50 innings. This level of control was not always a staple of Reed’s pitching. In his first 3 seasons in MLB his BB/9 oscillated between 2.90 and 3.05. While this may seem like a trivial difference, this is a difference of around 10-11 walks over a 75 inning sample, a big deal when you’re constantly pitching in high leverage situations. So what is at the root of Reed’s improved control since the beginning of the 2016 season?
 
In 2016, Reed produced a dramatic improvement in his overall numbers. In addition to refining his control, Reed stranded around 5% more baserunners, increased his K/9 from 8.2 to 10.55 and dropped his xFIP from 4.04 to 2.09. Reed has never had elite velocity. While some have commented on a dip in velocity throughout the past two seasons, his average four seam fastball velocity has remained fairly consistent, dropping from 93.66 mph in April of 2015 to 92.72 mph in October of 2017. So if Reed isn’t blowing hitters away, how did his K/9 improve and stick above 9.0 in his last two seasons?
 
The number that jumps out in Reed’s improvement from 2015 to 2016 is his F-Strike% (percentage of the time Reed is throwing a first pitch strike). In 2015 Reed’s F-Strike% was around 56%. In 2016, it jumped to 70%. For the sake of comparison, old friend Pat Neshek had an F-Strike% of 71.1% in 2017 and had an incredible BB/9 of 0.87. This is a dramatic improvement from Reed which is even more impressive when visualized.
 
Here’s a look at Reed’s heat map from 2015. This charts the percentage a pitch falls within a sub-location of the strike zone. For all three of these searches I looked at heat maps representing the first pitch of a plate appearance, exclusively when Reed threw his four seem fastball. You’ll immediately notice a stark contrast between 2015 and 2016. Reed improved in two notable areas, pounding the strike zone with a greater level of consistency, and using a greater portion of the strike zone when throwing first pitch strikes. We see a similar performance in 2017 (although not quite as impressive). Interestingly, Reed’s obvious trend in locating his first pitch strikes higher in the zone in resulted in opposing batters OPS increasing from .587 in 2016, to .862 in 2017.
 






 
So where does Reed fit in the back end of a Twins bullpen which has been dramatically upgraded from a year ago? Initially, there was contention that adding Reed might create a closer controversy in Minnesota. The Twins had recently added Fernando Rodney to the pen on a one year deal. It seems as if the Twins will stick with Rodney as their primary ninth inning option. Since taking on his role with the Twins, Paul Molitor has been criticized in his bullpen management for traditionalism, a tendency to use each of his relievers in a pre-determined role. Intractably funneling Rodney into save situations may allow Molitor the luxury of using both Reed and Trevor Hildenberger as more flexible relievers, whose appearances are dictated by the leverage of a given situation, rather than the inning they are pitching in. In addition to providing Molitor with another quality arm, Reed may provide the impetus for Molitor to get more creative in facilitating the evolution of the Twins bullpen, maximizing the potential of a vastly upgraded group.

The Twins made an unexpected addition to their burgeoning bullpen over the weekend, adding former Mets and Red Sox reliever Addison Reed on a two-year pact worth $16.75 million. The deal profiles well for the Twins on a number of fronts. At 29, Reed is at the younger end of a relief pitching market deep in high quality back end bullpen arms. Reed represents the first multi-year deal the Twins have ever signed with an outside reliever in free agency. In spite of this, the Twins locked Reed up on a short contract, at a price which they undoubtedly would have had to surpass had they signed him earlier in free agency.
 
Reed joins a Twins bullpen shaping up to be vastly different, and potentially much improved over its 2017 iteration. In addition to returning standout Trevor Hildenberger, the Twins have added Fernando Rodney, presumably filling the vacant ninth inning role, and Zach Duke, returning from an injury-plagued 2017 season. In the former trio, the Twins seemed to have established a penchant for the traits they are pursuing in improving their bullpen; inducing ground balls and a lot of strikeouts, hardly a pioneering recipe for success. In Reed however, they have added a pitcher who generates more fly balls, so what about Reed has made him such a consistent a reliable late inning reliever?
 
There’s no real intricacy in Reed’s pitch mix. He throws a four seem fastball around 66% of the time, a slider 33% of the time, and a changeup about as often as Byron Buxton gets caught stealing a base. Reed has excellent control, posting a walk rate of 1.51 BB/9 in 2016 and 1.78 BB/9 in 2017. Reed’s 2017 BB/9 was good for 11th among relievers who pitched at least 50 innings. This level of control was not always a staple of Reed’s pitching. In his first 3 seasons in MLB his BB/9 oscillated between 2.90 and 3.05. While this may seem like a trivial difference, this is a difference of around 10-11 walks over a 75 inning sample, a big deal when you’re constantly pitching in high leverage situations. So what is at the root of Reed’s improved control since the beginning of the 2016 season?
 
In 2016, Reed produced a dramatic improvement in his overall numbers. In addition to refining his control, Reed stranded around 5% more baserunners, increased his K/9 from 8.2 to 10.55 and dropped his xFIP from 4.04 to 2.09. Reed has never had elite velocity. While some have commented on a dip in velocity throughout the past two seasons, his average four seam fastball velocity has remained fairly consistent, dropping from 93.66 mph in April of 2015 to 92.72 mph in October of 2017. So if Reed isn’t blowing hitters away, how did his K/9 improve and stick above 9.0 in his last two seasons?
 
The number that jumps out in Reed’s improvement from 2015 to 2016 is his F-Strike% (percentage of the time Reed is throwing a first pitch strike). In 2015 Reed’s F-Strike% was around 56%. In 2016, it jumped to 70%. For the sake of comparison, old friend Pat Neshek had an F-Strike% of 71.1% in 2017 and had an incredible BB/9 of 0.87. This is a dramatic improvement from Reed which is even more impressive when visualized.
 
Here’s a look at Reed’s heat map from 2015. This charts the percentage a pitch falls within a sub-location of the strike zone. For all three of these searches I looked at heat maps representing the first pitch of a plate appearance, exclusively when Reed threw his four seem fastball. You’ll immediately notice a stark contrast between 2015 and 2016. Reed improved in two notable areas, pounding the strike zone with a greater level of consistency, and using a greater portion of the strike zone when throwing first pitch strikes. We see a similar performance in 2017 (although not quite as impressive). Interestingly, Reed’s obvious trend in locating his first pitch strikes higher in the zone in resulted in opposing batters OPS increasing from .587 in 2016, to .862 in 2017.
 






 
So where does Reed fit in the back end of a Twins bullpen which has been dramatically upgraded from a year ago? Initially, there was contention that adding Reed might create a closer controversy in Minnesota. The Twins had recently added Fernando Rodney to the pen on a one year deal. It seems as if the Twins will stick with Rodney as their primary ninth inning option. Since taking on his role with the Twins, Paul Molitor has been criticized in his bullpen management for traditionalism, a tendency to use each of his relievers in a pre-determined role. Intractably funneling Rodney into save situations may allow Molitor the luxury of using both Reed and Trevor Hildenberger as more flexible relievers, whose appearances are dictated by the leverage of a given situation, rather than the inning they are pitching in. In addition to providing Molitor with another quality arm, Reed may provide the impetus for Molitor to get more creative in facilitating the evolution of the Twins bullpen, maximizing the potential of a vastly upgraded group.

Hildenwho? Was my thought when I first saw Trevor Hildenberger pitch for the Minnesota Twins. I hadn’t heard much about him aside from rumblings he was performing consistently well at AAA Rochester. The then 26 year old was drafted in 22nd round of the 2014 amateur player draft out of UC Berkley. He was pick 650 overall, but who’s counting? This was all news to me. The Twins had been through a dearth of ho-hum relievers on their way to a typically mediocre bullpen. I didn’t pay much attention to Hildenberger, thinking he might not last long in the majors. What a considerable miscalculation that was.
 
Hildenberger had good MiLB numbers, but I had no idea how dominant he was. In any MiLB stint in which Hildenberger pitched at least 20 innings, he never had a K/9 of under 9.6, and never had a GB% lower than 53%. He topped out at 11.8 K/9 at low A. His GB% peaked at 67%. To put that into some major league perspective, only 4 guys who threw at least 40 innings in 2017 had a GB% higher than 67% (one of whom, Scott Alexander, the Dodgers saw fit to trade for as a replacement for Tony Watson in their bullpen). Granted, Hildenberger was at high A, but the signs were promising. Hildenberger had consistently shown an ability to do two things which in combination can make a reliever elite; get lots of strikeouts and induce a ton of ground balls.
 
Fastforward to June of 2017 and Hildenberger makes his MLB debut. Before continuing, it’s worth pointing out that Hildenberger has a pretty small MLB sample size to date. This is therefore more of a commentary on what has been, rather than a prediction of what will be. In 2017, Hildenberger finished his rookie season with a GB% of 58.8%. This was good for 13th among relievers who threw at least 40 innings. If you add the criterion of relief pitchers who had K/9 greater than 9, Hildenberger is one of 23 relievers across major league baseball to combine these rather useful traits (he ranks 10th by K/9 from the qualified list). Hildenberger ranked right above Bryan Shaw, who just signed a 3 year pact with the Rockies for $27 million, (Hildenberger will make almost nothing by comparison in 2018). The top two names on this list are Nationals Ryan Madson, and Pirates Felipe Rivero. Both Madson and Rivero were elite relief pitchers last year, combining for a WAR of 4 and averaging an xFIP of 2.72 between them. Madson and Rivero are a fascinating duo of names in part are so entirely different from Hildenberger, both rely heavily on their velocity. So what makes Hildenberger so good? And what makes him able to generate such a high level of ground balls and strikeouts?
 
Velocity
On a surface level, Hildenberger is unusual when you take a closer look at his velocity as a pitcher. At first glance, Hildenberger seems like a soft tossing side-armer. This is not the case. Despite not using it much, Hildenberger’s fastball showed a steady increase in velocity from June to October in his first big league season, from just under 91 mph in July, up to a season high of 94.78 mph in October.
 
The aforementioned Felipe Rivero and Hildenberger share a fascinating skill, an excellent changeup. Rivero threw his changeup around 20% of the time in 2017, to Hildenberger’s 35%. Both however, are a significant value add for each pitcher. Hildenberger and Rivero have a similar velocity differential between their highest and lowest velocity pitch (between 15-16 mph on average). Hildenberger’s approach differs because he throws his fastball just 13% of the time. Contrarily to the majority of pitchers who use their fastball to set up their off-speed pitches, Hildenberger is constantly working off-speed (35% changeups) and uses a surprisingly competent fastball to keep hitters honest. While Hildenberger’s sinker and changeup are vastly superior pitches, his use of velocity is an example of how his unconventional means keep hitters off balance.
 
Release Point
The next aspect of Hildenberger’s unusual approach that merits some thought is his release point, or rather, points. Simply put, a release point is the combination of horizontal and vertical coordinates from which a pitchers releases the ball. Higher release points tend to produce more sink, more extreme horizontal release points tend to create more horizontal action throughout the plane of the pitch.
 
The chart below shows Felipe Rivero’s vertical release point (in feet) throughout the 2017 season for his four pitches. Many pitchers, like Rivero have pretty consistent release points, born of mechanics which have been tuned and honed over many years. Rivero’s fastball has an average release point of 5.69 feet, while his slider has an average release point of 5.43, a differential of .26 feet between his highest and lowest release points. By contrast, the average vertical release point of Hildenberger’s fastball is 5.6 feet, while his average release of his changeup is 4.13 feet, good for a differential of 1.47 feet. Hildenberger has an incredibly low and difficult to pick up release point for pitches he throws 70% of the time (his sinker and changeup), simply because hitters rarely see baseballs coming towards the strike zone from such a height, or lack thereof. Additionally, Hildenberger has a huge differential between his different arm slots. In essence, facing Hildenberger throwing a fastball versus Hildenberger throwing a changeup is like facing two completely different pitchers in the same sequence of pitches.
 


 


 
While the horizontal point of release does not make for quite such an impressive contrast, a similar disparity exists, both comparing Hildenberger to other pitchers and within his own pitch mix. In short, Hildenberger’s inconsistency in his vertical and horizontal release points go a long way to overcoming the limitations of his lack of velocity.
 
The Twins seem likely to let Fernando Rodney handle ninth inning duties as closer in 2018. Hildenberger made an incredibly impressive debut in 2017 using extraordinary means to pile up extraordinary results. He will likely assume the mantle of the relief pitcher used most frequently in high leverage situations moving forwards. This is a spot Twins fans should feel comfortable with ‘Hildy’ occupying. After all, he’s already proved he can. Minnesota, get to know your real bullpen MVP.