Jump to content
Twins Daily
  • Create Account

Hosken Bombo Disco

Community Leader
  • Posts

    14,795
  • Joined

  • Last visited

  • Days Won

    8

 Content Type 

Profiles

News

Tutorials & Help

Videos

2023 Twins Top Prospects Ranking

2022 Minnesota Twins Draft Picks

Free Agent & Trade Rumors

Guides & Resources

Minnesota Twins Players Project

Forums

Blogs

Events

Store

Downloads

Gallery

Blog Entries posted by Hosken Bombo Disco

  1. Hosken Bombo Disco
    On Monday, Rhett Bollinger of MLB wrote that the Minnesota Twins are still more likely to upgrade their pitching rotation for 2018 through free agency than by trade.
     
    And on Tuesday, MLB Trade Rumors reported off of a 1500 ESPN tweet that pitchers’ agents were getting the sense that the Twins (i.e., Derek Falvey and Thad Levine) were putting off talks until Yu Darvish announces his decision to sign.
     
    Reading between the lines, one can interpret these reports to mean that the Twins have not been in much communication with free agent pitchers waiting to sign contracts this offseason.
     
    But does an absence of communication mean that the Twins are failing to communicate?
     
    A story Thursday in the New York Times (h/t dougd) suggests that Levine is one of the more skilled baseball executives in using alternative means to communicate (such as text messaging) with players, agents, or other major league personnel.

    "...today, we negotiate hundreds of millions of dollars of contracts and make massive trades without ever picking up the phone and speaking directly with one another, let alone meeting face to face,” Levine said. “You kind of learn the personalities of guys—who needs a phone call, who can do it on text, who prefers emails, who likes to be lighthearted.
     
    "The art of the negotiation has almost been trumped by the art of communication."  
    This makes the news that the Twins have not met in person with Darvish much easier to take.
     
    Meanwhile, back in December, the Twins were reportedly offered Gerrit Cole in exchange for prospects Nick Gordon, Zack Granite, and Tyler Jay, according to the news site Pirates Breakdown.
     
    https://twitter.com/pbcbreakdown/status/940390540998250497
     
    Many Twins fans, including myself, liked this trade idea. (See here, here, here, or here —and the proposals offered by Twins fans in these threads were actually not far off the mark in terms of value.)
     
    The stat we know as WAR is not how we evaluate pitchers during the season, but it can be a good, broad gauge of general value.
     
    In terms of fWAR, the two sides of a Cole/Gordon/Granite trade match up well. Fangraphs projects Cole to provide 3.8 fWAR in 2018; let's add 3.8 fWAR more for 2019. That makes 7.6 fWAR for the final two team-controlled seasons of Cole coming from Pittsburgh. How much fWAR will the Twins prospects provide? The 2017 midseason KATOH+ projections estimate that Granite will contribute 6.8 fWAR through his six team-controlled MLB seasons, while Gordon will accumulate 6.3 worth of fWAR across his six seasons. Throw in a generous 2.0 fWAR for Jay as a relief pitcher, and the total contribution of the prospects coming from the Twins is 15.1 fWAR.
     
    In such a Gerrit Cole trade as proposed above, the Twins would trade away a future 15.1 fWAR in exchange for Cole’s 7.6 fWAR as a starter for the next two seasons.
     
    That looks unequal, but posters on the Dozier trade discussion threads last winter found that MLB-for-prospect trades often lean heavily to one side in this way. A risk premium on the speculative nature of unpredictable prospects, perhaps.
     
    In any case, the barstool argument in favor of the trade may be more effective than the mathematical or financial analysis. Gordon and Granite are good players, but their production can be replaced. The Twins have Jermaine Palacios and Royce Lewis playing shortstop in the minors behind Nick Gordon, and have Jorge Polanco and other capable shortstops on the Major League team already. As for Granite, I would not count on him getting enough playing time to contribute much fWAR anyway, the maturing young Twins outfield being what it is. And the bottom line is the Twins badly need starting pitching in 2018.
     
    Now compare Cole to Darvish. Fangraphs projects Cole for 3.8 fWAR in 2018, while Darvish is projected only for 3.6 fWAR in 2018. Consider that Darvish’s contract will fetch more than $20 million per season for each of the next five or six seasons; Cole will not earn $20 million over the next two seasons together. Moreover, Cole might be motivated to pitch his best in order to increase his value in free agency following 2019.
     
    Through the quiet offseason to this point, and assuming Pittsburgh is still interested in a trade, Cole has looked like a solid alternative to Yu Darvish, maybe even better. Cole is younger and will not tie up salary beyond 2019, and might even present a July trade opportunity for the Twins if the 2019 season goes sideways.
     
    Beyond 2018 and 2019, the success of the Twins will depend on their ability to develop their own starting pitching. Darvish might help win some games in future seasons, but those wins will cost a lot of money, and possibly at the expense of extending one or two of the Twins young outfielders.
     
    Levine’s "negotiation" with Darvish this winter has put me at ease somewhat. Levine's knowledge of Darvish from their days in Texas suggests to me that the Twins are not concerned about Darvish’s health, nor his motivation to pitch after he signs this nine-figure deal. And a dollar today is worth more than a dollar tomorrow; figure on that annual salary at the end of Darvish’s contract to not look so bad as it does now, once those latter years finally arrive.
     
    I still prefer a trade for Cole, combined perhaps with a signing of Alex Cobb. But if the Twins really do sign Darvish — and my gut gives them a better than 50/50 chance at it — I imagine I will be amazed, thrilled, and fired up for the 2018 season. Such a signing will instantly put Minnesota almost on par with most other teams in the American League, and will give them a dependable arm for the next several seasons.
     
    But it's Darvish’s decision to make. If Levine has misjudged Darvish and Darvish chooses to sign with another team, and other subsequent options fail to break for the Twins, the Twins would find themselves going into 2018 without the addition of a single starting pitcher. For a young, talented team that made a strong run in 2017, this would be quite a blow. To borrow a great metaphor from another TwinsDaily poster in another thread, the Twins are playing a game of musical chairs, and if Darvish signs with another team, the Twins might find themselves without a chair when the music stops.
     
    Let's hope the personal relationship and commitment Thad Levine and Yu Darvish have together is real. My gut tells me it is.
  2. Hosken Bombo Disco
    I posted this idea in a discussion thread, but I do think it fits better in the blog section or in its own thread, but chose blog. I will leave the scenario as I posted it in the other thread.
     
    Anyway, in light of a recent debate on the value of defense, I came up with a problem. It would be interesting to run a simulation on this or hear what inputs others might have on it.
     
    Anyway, here it goes:
     
    There are two teams.
     
    One team is full of great hitters, 1 through 9, these are .950 OPS, 40 HR types of guys, don't strike out much, can draw a walk, but they are sloppy with the defense, all of them, and some in fact are downright terrible (the worst one is trying to hide in left or right field). Also, let's say they don't run much and are station to station baserunners.
     
    The other team is full of defensive whizzes, who make all the plays, throw to the right bases, great range, great gloves, rarely make an error, but are sub-.200 hitters.
     
    The great offense hits against the great fielders, and the poor hitters hit into the poor defense.
     
    All pitching is equal.
     
    They play a game.
     
    What happens?
     
    Now, the two teams play a 162-game season against each other. How does that turn out? Or say these two teams existed within MLB as it is now, 2 teams among the 30. Again, all pitching normalized. Where does each team finish in the standings?
     
    Have at it, blog readers!!
  3. Hosken Bombo Disco
    Ervin Santana is on top of his game.
     
    Earlier this evening, Santana blanked the Baltimore Orioles in a complete game win. It's his second complete game shutout on the season. Santana allowed just two hits, two walks, no runs, and no baserunners after the fifth inning.
     
    Santana owns a 7-2 record with a 1.80 ERA in ten starts. In 70.0 innings, he has allowed a mere 31 hits.
     
    After tonight, Santana has now won all four of his road starts, allowing just one run in 29.0 innings in those starts.
     
    The bottom of the ninth inning in tonight's game was a thing of beauty. Leading off and trailing by two runs, Adam Jones took a fastball and then a slider out of the zone, working Santana to a favorable 2-0 hitter's count. Then, like a true poker player, Santana stared down Jones and threw a thigh-high fastball, which Jones took for a strike. That ran the count to 2-1 and back in Santana's favor. Jones grounded out the next pitch. Then Manny Machado came up, fell behind 0-1, and couldn't lay off pitches out of the zone after that, striking out on a slider in the dirt. Mark Trumbo then came to bat and grounded out on the first pitch to end the game.
     
    Great pitch-calling, great execution of those pitches, great approach to batters the third and fourth times through the order, no doubt also some great scouting reports and comparing of notes when necessary as the game went on. Santana was in complete control. Great pitching is truly an art. Now excuse me while I go fetch a handkerchief.
  4. Hosken Bombo Disco
    The Twins sit at 8-10 through their first 18 games.
     
    The Twins are in a much better spot than last season, but considering that opening series sweep against Kansas City, the Twins have been heading in the wrong direction recently.
     
    The Twins begin a six game road trip in Texas tonight. I want to get my hasty thoughts down for the upcoming week.
     
    There's not a lot the Twins can do about the starting pitching right now (yes there is, but anyway), so I will set that aside. There is also specific information we do not have access to, as fans. However, in my opinion, there are four general things I would like to see the manager do this week to improve the team's present and future outlook.
     
    Here they are, as addressed to Molitor, in no particular order (except for the number one thing, which is unquestionably the number one thing, in my mind):
     
     
    # 4 : Hold the outfield together.
     
    Rosario-Buxton-Kepler should start all six games. They will not need rest, as there is a day off after each series. If you feel compelled to make a starting lineup substitution, then it needs to be Grossman, and probably as a right fielder. Kepler can move to left field or DH.
     
     
    # 3 : Move Mauer down the order.
     
    These are the players that should be batting ahead of him: Dozier, Polanco, Grossman, Sano, Kepler. Against a lefty, Mauer can sit (Hamels pitches Wednesday) and Vargas can slip into that sixth slot as a RHB first baseman.
     
    I liked the early lineup experimentation, but things are coming into a little more focus. Polanco and Grossman are OBP machines. Take advantage.
     
     
    # 2 : Manage pitching changes as if it's August.
     
    Manage them as if the Twins are in a pennant race, too. I understand it's pretty slim pickins out there, but there's no need to bring in a guy like Breslow to face a guy like Castellanos, as you did on Saturday. Granted neither of those two has a strong platoon split, but mind the splits anyway. Also, I like how you used the mop up guy for three inning stretches when necessary. Tepesch is that guy this week.
     
     
    # 1 : Let Buxton bat.
     
    This might be the week Buxton gets on track.
     
    Do not pinch hit for him, do not pinch run for him, do not ask him to bunt. In fact, tell him not to bunt. Just let him hit.
     
    The Twins have played mostly afternoon games to this point. Oddly, the Twins have played one night game on the road so far. It is April, and it has been the cold weather schedule. Beginning tonight, they will start their normal schedule. They will play three consecutive night games, followed by a day off, followed by two more night games this week, and then the Sunday day game before heading home for an evening series beginning Tuesday.
     
    These are good conditions for establishing a routine.
     
    Often, teams do not take batting practice ahead of day games. I'm sure Buxton is being coached well and doing tee work and getting swings off the machine. It's the real stuff out on the field where he needs to be this week, standing tall (DeRosa), and keeping his eyes on the ball (Reynolds). Lots of repetitions. Minimum distractions. Sound mechanics, same approach, swing after swing. Then into the clubhouse to think about it, grab a bite, get dressed, and get ready. Let him carry his batting practice work into the games.
     
    Buxton was slotted third in the batting order to start the season, a show of confidence. Removing him from a game for a pinch hitter is probably a contradictory message. Imagine if Buxton is allowed to bat in those late innings and comes up with a big hit, instead of being pinch hit for. That might be the biggest affirmation of his work and confidence boost of all.
     
    Tell Buxton he has 12 plate appearances in Texas, and 12 more in Kansas City, and as long as he's doing things correctly, there's no pressure to change or make it all up in that first at bat. He's got 4 at bats tonight, 4 tomorrow, and just go out there and do it. Unless of course the Twins clobber the starting pitcher tonight, in which case he might get 5 at bats. Or 6, if it really goes off the rails.
     
    Go Twins!
  5. Hosken Bombo Disco
    On Saturday, the Twins announced that young pitcher Jose Berrios would be demoted to Rochester to start the season. The reason, according to manager Paul Molitor, was "that the lack of work and consistency of work ... to try and rush the buildup here in the last ten days to try and get him ready to try and be in that spot didn’t make a lot of sense to me.”
     
    Does this explanation pass muster?
     
    Consider Phil Hughes is a given for the rotation, and that Berrios and Hughes have been on roughly the same pitching schedule this spring:
     
    Feb 25, Hughes: 2.0 innings
    Feb 26, Berrios: 2.0 innings
     
    March 2, Hughes: 2.0 innings
    March 3, Berrios: 2.0 innings
     
    It was at this point that Berrios went to play for Puerto Rico in the World Baseball Classic. Meanwhile, Hughes pitched in an intra-squad game on March 7. I will assume Berrios stayed loose or played some catch during that same time.
     
    Berrios and Hughes then made starts on the same day:
     
    March 12, Hughes: 5.0 innings
    March 12, Berrios: 5.0 innings
     
    After this, Berrios did not pitch again until the final, while Hughes made a start on March 17 for 5.0 more innings. However, Hector Santiago, teammate of Berrios on Puerto Rico, did say that Berrios threw a 55-pitch session of live batting practice during this time.
     
    Interestingly, both pitchers pitched again on the 22nd:
     
    March 22, Hughes: 2.0 innings
    March 22, Berrios: 1.2 innings
     
    This was the game Berrios struck out Giancarlo Stanton and Jonathan Lucroy with the nasty slurve-curve he throws:
     

     
    And here we sit, heading into Monday March 27. Both Berrios and Hughes would figure to pitch again in a day or two. In my opinion, if anyone needs to be stretched out, it's Hughes, who reported tingling in his fingers between innings last season, then had shoulder surgery.
     
    Obviously we are not privy to some of the things that goes on within the clubhouse and in private. I am also no pitching coach and do not know how pitchers prepare except for what I read on the Internets. However, the explanation that Berrios can't get "stretched out" does not hold up, in my opinion. Will Molitor and the Twins name a date for Berrios's return or the number of starts they plan to give him, or when the expect him to finally be stretched out?
     
    Berrios threw 40 pitches in his last outing the 22nd. How much more stretching out would Berrios need?
     
    How about something like this:
    March 22, 40 pitches (already complete)
    Tues. March 28, starting pitcher vs. Tampa Bay (50 or so pitches)
    Sun. April 2, no game, but a vigorous bullpen session (50-75 pitches - continue scaling upwards)
    Regular season: Sat. April 8, makes start against the White Sox, with a limit of 5 innings or 75 pitches

    That April 8 start is the turn of the fifth starter in the rotation. After that point, wouldn't Berrios be stretched out and ready to take his regular turn in the rotation? Yes? No? Thoughts?
  6. Hosken Bombo Disco
    In the spirit of putting stream-of-conscious rants in the blogs section, where nobody will ever see them or have to look at them, I submit this frustrated piece of work in response to the insanity thread poster Shane Wahl started. You have been warned!
     
    Another angle I come at this insanity from is the public messaging; in other words, the people who cover this team for the public.
     
    Let's start with the television guys, the guys with the most reach.
     
    I didn't see any of the broadcasts Jack Morris worked this spring when Dozier was slumping, but reading through the game threads you get the impression Morris's criticism of Dozier was bordering on abuse. Not sure what the purpose of it was. Then you have Dick in the other chair praising whatever the front office does. Yes, Dick, Robbie Grossman was a nice waiver wire find. But Fangraphs also has him ranked 87 out of 88 in UZR150 for outfielders with 550 innings, so maybe Cleveland isn't pulling hair and gnashing teeth about losing him, after all.
     
    Another example. On the radio, after each game, the producers and broadcasters (usually Kris Atteberry and Dan Gladden) rehash the biggest moments of the game, conversation style. It's entertaining and smart.
     
    Last night, however, the big play was Polanco's sac fly in the fifth, when Buxton scored but Dozier was thrown out trying to advance to third base. Hey wait a minute: Dozier didn't even make the first or third out of the inning! But according to Atteberry, that was the turning point of the game somehow.
     
    I like Atteberry and it's obvious he's an extremely hard worker and good at his job but he is way off base much of the time. There were two other plays last night--occuring later in the game-- that had a higher impact on the win expectancy than Dozier being thrown out at third. The liner Schafer misjudged in the sixth (didn't see it) that would have been the third out was the difference maker by far, and the low throw behind the runner by Wimmers after the sac bunt that Plouffe should have caught but didn't. That was in the eight and it was a one run game. It was a tough play but very makeable and I feel like Mauer with his experience, stretches forward to make that catch. (I could be wrong and welcome input from experienced first baseman who have read this far.) However, the camera did show Molitor glaring out to first base at the conclusion of the play. Atteberry didn't even mention that play in the post game.
     
    I also detect a very strong pro-Plouffe bias in Atteberry, which I don't really care for, and practically all the broadcasters and journalists on all broadcast outlets pin as much blame to Rosario whenever possible, which I also don't care for. I'd go to war with Rosario. There's a lot of energy there that will contribute to a championship if harnessed correctly. Of course, I also said that about Arcia once.
     
    Then there's LaVelle. Enough said. One of the first things I would do as a GM/POBO is suspend his press privileges. I am also worried about Phil Miller slipping to the dark side. Please don't!
     
    The last thing this front office needs is for their broadcasters and journalists to keep telling them how smart and right they are about everything. I assume that's what's happening. That's how it looks from the outside. I assume it began as a benign effort to keep everyone cheered up, but has evolved, or devolved, into a performance art. "How well can we spin this poor turn of events" has become the name of the game. Fun for a while, and anyone who has worked politically will recognize it, but it's no way to go through life, year after year.
     
    And you never hear anything in the media, from anyone, ever, about how or why Danny Santana plays full time, or about all the base running blunders he regularly makes.
     
    Think about how the fans turn against this team's best players. At least that's what I'm seeing. Think about "bilateral leg weakness" and how many people in this market genuinely dislike Mauer. Think about the dislike for Gardy (I plead guilty). It would have been better for everyone and a really obvious, non-controversial move to part ways with Gardenhire after 2013, but they let him linger on. Then you had Morris attacking Dozier earlier in the season, causing many fans to become enraged by Dozier's long slumps. And now, the weight jokes about Sano are of course great sport for the LaVelle and Reusse types--black pots and kettles if there ever were any. The work ethic and weight gain whispering campaign against Sano in the media has taken the desired effect, and many fans have now taken the sport up themselves. Or maybe this is how the media and the fans are. I just don't know.
     
    I don't get it. I don't get any of it.
     
    Rant over.
     
    I agree completely--it's insanity!
  7. Hosken Bombo Disco
    Back on June 11, the Minnesota Twins were defeated by the Boston Red Sox 15-4, giving up 10 runs over the final two innings to let an otherwise close game get out of reach.
     
    It wasn’t just another loss in another losing season. It was noteworthy because it gave fans their first look at J. T. Chargois, a highly-touted, hard-throwing pitching prospect from the 2012 draft. Chargois is one of many collegiate relief pitchers the Twins have been stockpiling with high picks in the amateur draft over the past several years, and became the first of these picks to make his major league debut.
     
    Twins manager Paul Molitor said before the game that he would look for a low-pressure situation in which to ease Chargois into his role. It made sense. Chargois was coming off of two lost seasons to elbow surgery and had pitched on back to back days only once in 2016 to that point. The late innings of a lopsided game seemed like a good spot to give him his first appearance. Any runs Chargois might surrender would have little impact on the final result. And surrender them he did—he faced eight batters, six reached base, and he was charged with 5 runs in 2/3 of an inning.
     
    And just as quickly as he had been called up to the majors, Chargois was immediately optioned back to AAA after the game.
     
    Introduction
     
    Chargois was drafted in 2012 out of Rice University with the 72nd overall pick, one of five college relievers selected among the Twins’ first eight picks that year. The Twins then drafted heavily again in this way in 2014. Obtaining more college relievers with high velocity and expectations of much quicker promotions was welcome news for many Twins fans, who were enduring a string of losing seasons in which their team would finish near the bottom in many pitching categories. The 2014 season was one in which division rival Kansas City was building a pennant winner around its overpowering, upper-90s-throwing bullpen arms. Twins used the 42nd overall pick in June 2014 on Nick Burdi, a relief pitcher from Louisville who could reach 100 mph on the radar gun.
     
    But the 2014 draft was two years ago, and the 2012 draft was four years ago already. The Twins bullpen in 2016 is still relying on softer-throwing minor league signings made during the offseason. Where have all the college relievers gone?
     
    From reading the discussion boards at Twins Daily this season, I noticed others asking this same question. TwinsDaily writer Seth Stohs had an article back in December on the long list of college relief pitchers the Twins have drafted over the past decade. Other than that, references were scarce; I couldn’t find much (or didn't conduct the right searches) about how college relief pitchers became major league relief pitchers. Are the Twins promoting their relief prospects too slowly? That was my main question, but I had some other questions too. I decided to frame the questions as an academic type of study. I wanted answers with Chargois and Burdi in mind, two guys who were selected with second round picks and have been indisputably developed for the purpose of becoming major league relief pitchers.
     
    The natural response to the question of whether the Twins are promoting these pitchers too slowly is: They are promoted when they are promoted. Hard to argue with that explanation, but for many people, it’s not good enough.
     
    I wanted to compare how other organizations promote pitchers with profiles similar to Chargois and Burdi through their minor league systems. My intent was not to perform any sophisticated statistical analyses or conclusively answer any big philosophical questions, nor do I consider roster issues, or a pitcher’s velocity or pitch repertoire, or any qualitative information that might affect a player’s progress or a team’s evaluation of it. I just wanted to dig up some data, present it, and see if it was saying anything.
     
    I settled on three hypotheses or questions I wanted to test. First, that the Twins have drafted more of these types of pitchers than most other organizations; second, that the Twins promote these pitchers more slowly than other organizations; and third, that it makes no difference to their careers when these pitchers make their first major league appearance, whether it be a critical situation or low leverage.
     
    Also, I believed that there are more efficient ways to obtain strong bullpen arms than targeting them in the amateur draft, but I chose not to address this last question. A good rundown of the best relievers the Twins have developed over the years is here, and they are not primarily relief pitchers drafted from college.
     
    On the initial three hypotheses, I found the answers mixed. But I did discover a couple of things that surprised me.
     
    Methods
     
    In order to arrive objectively at a set of pitchers to examine, I established some rules. First, I would define what a college relief pitcher is. Then I would set some conditions for which pitchers from the draft were eligible for inclusion into the sample, and finally, I would need to decide on how to measure the promotions of these pitchers once they were in a team's minor league system.
     
    Above all, I was interested in success stories. Again, I was targeting players who were drafted as college relievers, who pitched in relief in the minors, and who eventually reached the major leagues as relievers for the team that drafted them. I wanted to know what characteristics these ballplayers had in common, and if Chargois, Burdi and other Twins relief pitchers shared those characteristics.
     
    Defining a college relief pitcher. I didn’t want starting pitchers in the group. During his college career, J.T. Chargois appeared in 47 games as a pitcher and started only 2 of them. (Note: I would use the Baseball Cube for retrieving college stats, and then verify these stats against other sources when possible.) I was comfortable calling Chargois a college relief pitcher. Other times it was less clear. Logan Darnell appeared in 43 games—strictly in relief—in his first two seasons at Kentucky. In his third and final season, he made 11 starts. Was Darnell a college reliever? Did the Twins consider him one? I wasn’t sure.
     
    After browsing through the records of many former college pitchers who were selected in the draft, I settled on the following rules. A college relief pitcher would be someone who:
    pitched in relief in a majority of games his final college season; or, pitched in relief in a majority of all college pitching appearances; and
    pitched fewer than 200 innings total as a college pitcher.
    There is nothing special about these rules; I thought they simply made sense for what I wanted to look at. Unfortunately those rules created a couple of odd exclusions, including Chance Ruffin, who was the closer for the Texas Longhorns during the 2010 NCAA season but who made 28 starts in his two prior seasons at Texas, exceeding the innings limit. Also disqualified as a relief pitcher here was Madison Boer, who the Twins drafted at the end of the 2nd round in 2011 but who also barely exceeded the innings limit (according to Baseball Cube). It's also not impossible that a pitcher or two in this study might have been unintentionally mis-categorized, but if so, it was without bias.
     
    Eligibility for sample. Having defined a college reliever, I then decided I would only look at picks in the first and second rounds, including compensation picks. This would include Chargois and Burdi in my set (but not Darnell, who in 2010 was a sixth round pick).
     
    I settled on the drafts from the years 2004-2012, however. This meant I would have Chargois, but not Burdi, who was drafted in 2014. I decided that for any players drafted 2013 or later, their teams wouldn’t have the benefit of development time. Though this endpoint excludes Burdi, I will bring him into the discussion later. I had also supposed that Chargois, a mid-second round pick in 2012, might be the final pitcher in the set chronologically, but my first surprise was that there was a college relief pitcher drafted later than Chargois in the second round who has been in the major leagues for several seasons now.
     
    The 2004 draft was my other endpoint, or beginning point, because in my initial browsing, I discovered that Huston Street was part of that draft, and he is an example of the successful type of college pitcher I imagine the Twins are hoping to develop with these picks. I also liked the 2004 draft for the irrational reasons that it was the first draft held following the publication of Michael Lewis's Moneyball, it was the draft of Glen Perkins, and also the draft of Matt Bush, the first overall pick that year, selected as a shortstop but now pitching effectively in relief with the Texas Rangers. (Perkins and Bush are not otherwise part of this study.)
     
    As I was finishing this project, I became aware that in 2002 the Twins drafted Jesse Crain in the 2nd round with the 61st overall pick. Crain then debuted for the Twins two seasons later. Crain would have qualified for this list had I broadened the year range back to 2002. But by that time, I did not want to expand the set of pitchers based on this selected piece of information. However, like Burdi, I will bring Crain into the discussion at various points of interest.
     
    How to measure the speed of promotions? I thought it would be reasonable and convenient to use innings pitched to measure a pitcher’s time spent at each minor league level. Innings pitched has the advantage of familiarity over other measures like batters faced, game appearances, or even calendar days spent at a level. I would track the number of innings pitched up until the pitcher's major league debut.
     
    I also began with the intention of tracking minor league performance, such as strikeout and walk rates, but as I went on, I felt less of a need for this. Sample sizes are too small for this exercise, and my own judgment about performance would be too uninformed and subjective. Here is an example. An argument could be made that Nick Burdi, compared with his stats in college, struggled with control (a higher BB/9) at his first minor league assignment in A ball at Cedar Rapids. Indeed, I believe the Twins even stated this. However, Huston Street, with the Oakland organization, also struggled with control in this same way (with a higher BB/9) at his first minor league assignment. I began the study wanting to measure performance, but when I considered things like park bias, and sample size, I decided it was not significant. Huston Street pitched only 2 innings in AAA, after all. Whatever his walk or strikeout rate in AAA, it wouldn't be as significant to me as the number of innings he pitched. I reasoned that Oakland would not have promoted Street after a mere 2 innings in AAA if they did not feel he was ready.
     
    In the end, I was comfortable bypassing statistics altogether and using the promotion itself as the main indicator for satisfactory performance.
     
    I did not account for innings pitched in exhibitions, minor league postseasons, or independent leagues. Only innings pitched in the affiliated minor leagues were part of this study; in other words, the innings pitched total you would see if you checked MiLB.com.
     
    Likewise, other than Chargois, I had very little information on injuries for these pitchers, and I simply used their presence in games as an indicator of health.
     
    The College Reliever Search
     
    Using the criteria above, I found a total of 50 college relief pitchers drafted in the first or second round from the years 2004 to 2012.
     
    Have the Twins drafted more college relief pitchers than other organizations? This was my first hypothesis, and from this pool of relievers, I would conclude yes. From this set of 50, the Twins drafted five college relief pitchers within the first two rounds between 2004 and 2012. The Dodgers also drafted five. The Diamondbacks and the Cardinals each drafted four, and no other team accounts for more than three such pitchers.
     
    However, I determined that 27 of these 50 relief pitchers were converted to starters early in their minor league careers, or were given enough starts to cast doubt on whether they were drafted with the strict intent of becoming major league relief pitchers. For example, Mason Melotakis, drafted in the 2nd round of 2012, met the conditions of a college relief pitcher, but he made 18 starts in A ball to begin the 2013 season. Carlos Gutierrez, drafted in 2008, had a similar profile as a potential starter. Starting games in the minor leagues made Melotakis, Gutierrez and the others distinct enough from Chargois and Burdi that I excluded them from my set.
     
    Removing those 27 converted starters from the original set of 50, and removing four others who did not sign a contract (including Josh Fields, who is actually counted twice in the set of 50 as he was drafted in consecutive years), I arrived at a set of 19 college relievers who were drafted in the first two rounds and then used almost exclusively as relief pitchers in the minors.
     
    The Twins drafted 3 of these 19 players to become relievers exclusively, while no other team drafted more than two. Setting aside Melotakis and Gutierrez, here are the three Twins pitchers who would make up part of this group of 19 (Table 1):
     
    Table 1: College relief pitchers drafted by the Twins between 2004-2012 in the first or second round, who were developed exclusively as relief pitchers in the minor leagues


     
    Because I was only interested in college relievers who have reached the majors with their original teams, I sorted these 19 relief pitchers into even smaller sets: three who were traded to another organization while still in the minors, including Bullock (and also Josh Fields again, who I will mention later); three who retired or were released by their original clubs before making it to the majors; and two who are still in the minors with their original clubs, including Luke Bard. That left 11 left over. The remaining 11 pitchers were the ones I was looking for—college relief pitchers who made it to the major leagues as relievers with the club that originally drafted them.
     
    These were the guys who again, like Chargois and Burdi, were selected with high draft picks, developed through the minors almost exclusively as relief pitchers, and made their debuts with the teams that drafted them.
     
    Table 2 introduces these 11 pitchers, listed chronologically by year drafted and draft position: Bill Bray (drafted as a Montreal Expo), Huston Street, Craig Hansen, Joey Devine, Chris Perez, Eddie Kunz, Ryan Perry, Daniel Schlereth, Drew Storen, J. T. Chargois, and Paco Rodriguez.
     
    Table 2: College relief pitchers drafted between 2004-2012 in the first or second round, who were developed exclusively as relief pitchers in the minor leagues, and who debuted in the major leagues as relief pitchers for the teams that drafted them


     
    By collecting data from this set of 11 relief pitchers, I could now look at innings pitched to test my second and main hypothesis, about whether the Twins are promoting college relief prospects more slowly than other organizations. I got my answer, but found that the question was a little more complicated than that.
     
    Before collecting this data, however, I wanted to get a sense of how well these pitchers have performed in MLB. A couple of these pitchers are well known, while a few of them I had not heard of or had forgotten about. Table 3 lists these same pitchers, tracking the pitcher by age and the fWAR accumulated in the majors at that age, through the end of the 2015 season:
     
    Table 3: Age of relief pitchers per season, and accumulated fWAR for that season


     
    There are some problems with using fWAR and dividing by seasons played to put a value on a player, but I was only looking for approximations. Additionally, when evaluated this way, I found these pitchers could be put into three natural groupings: a very good group, an above average group, and a below average group.
     
    The following data re-sorted and displayed in a bar graph (Figure 1) will illustrate these three groupings better. The top and bottom of each grey bar represent the highest and lowest season fWAR for each pitcher. The black line near the middle of each bar represents the pitcher’s career average fWAR. The league average fWAR for a relief pitcher is 0.16, indicated by a dashed line.
     
    Figure 1: Relief pitcher high and low season fWAR, represented as a bar graph, relievers sorted by general effectiveness


     
    The first three bars in order are Huston Street, Drew Storen, and Chris Perez. These three make up what I considered the very good group. The next three bars are the above average group of Paco Rodriguez, Joey Devine, and Bill Bray. The last group of bars includes Ryan Perry, Daniel Schlereth, Eddie Kunz, Craig Hansen, and J. T. Chargois.
     
    The pitchers will be sorted in this order in all of the bar graphs to follow.
     
    I put Chris Perez with the first group based on his career saves total, and because Perez’s fWAR was hurt by his final two seasons. bWAR treats Perez much better than fWAR. Perhaps Perez would fit better in the middle group, but I chose to include him in the top group. Perez also was named to two All Star games.
     
    You can also see Jesse Crain’s performance in this graph. The first bar represents his seasons with the Twins, which would fit neatly with the above average group of relievers. Crain’s second, taller bar represents his full career, including his final three seasons with the White Sox.
     
    Results and Discussion
     
    My second hypothesis was that college relief pitchers in the Twins system were promoted more slowly, as measured by innings pitched, than the pitchers in the other organizations. Note that this innings pitched data is not intended to differentiate across seasons, only minor league levels.
     
    For each of the 11 relief pitchers in the final set, Table 4 lists the number of innings each pitched at each minor league level prior to their major league debuts:
     
    Table 4: Relief pitchers, innings pitched per minor league level


     
    Below is the same information presented in bar graph format (Figure 2). Already, one or two things start to stand out.
     
    Figure 2: Relief pitchers, innings pitched per minor league level, represented as bar graphs


     
    The first thing that stood out to me is the tallness of the bar representing Chargois. Chargois pitched more minor league innings prior to his debut than all but Perez.
     
    Another clear bit of data that stood out is the number of innings Chargois pitched in rookie league, which I generally thought to be for players coming out of high school. All six of the very good and above average relief pitchers skipped the rookie level. At first, I thought that the Twins not having a short season A- team might have narrowed a choice of assignment to either rookie level or A level, but each of the top three relievers pitched in organizations with a short season A- level team, yet were assigned directly to A level.
     
    However, looking at Chargois and the top three relievers, what also stands out is a pattern of promotions those pitchers were given through the minors. Each of the top three of Street, Storen and Perez began their careers at A ball, pitched at AA, and then at AAA. Storen also made a stop at the high A+ level. Each of the top three spent their longest minor league assignment, measured by innings pitched, at AA. On its face, it looks significant to me that this progression of promotions is shared among the top three relievers, and I find it encouraging that Chargois also followed this progression. What’s more, none of the other seven relievers in the set shows this progression in just this way. On the contrary, the promotion patterns of the others seem haphazard in comparison.
     
    The most common characteristic shared among all the pitchers is pitching at the AA level. Ten of the eleven pitchers in this set pitched in AA prior to their major league debuts. The top three were then promoted to AAA and promoted to the majors from there. However, six of the other seven were promoted to the majors from AA.
     
    Nine of the 11 pitchers prior to their debuts, including Chargois, pitched their highest number of innings in AA. Perhaps these organizations see AA as the most important level for these pitching prospects.
     
    But for how long did these other pitchers stay in MLB after their debuts? Here is a chart with an additional bar to represent major league innings pitched following each pitcher’s debut:
     
    Figure 3: Relief pitchers, length of first stay in major leagues, represented as a bar graph


     
    Again, Chargois stands apart from this group in a few respects. His initial stay in the majors was very brief and fits more with the bottom of the group or relievers than the top group.
     
    The table below shows the number of major league game appearances and innings pitched for each pitcher following their initial call up (Table 5):
     
    Table 5: Relief pitchers, number of game appearances and innings pitched following MLB debut


     
    The best three pitchers had three of the four longest stints in the major leagues. Street was with the team from Opening Day, and Storen and Perez were each called up in the middle of May. Bill Bray was called up in June and then traded in July. Paco Rodriguez was a September call up, then broke camp with the Dodgers the following spring. Only Joey Devine was demoted shortly after his first call up.
     
    Leverage of First Appearances
     
    Does the leverage index of a debut appearance make a difference?
     
    I decided to look at the leverage index of the first three major league appearances of each reliever (Table 6). Approximately, low leverage is a number under 0.85, medium leverage is between 0.85 and 2.00, and high leverage is anything higher than 2.00:
     
    Table 6: Relief pitchers, leverage index (LI) of first three major league appearances following first call up


     
    Most of the relievers did indeed debut in low leverage situations, if not quite blowout losses as Chargois did. In fact, Huston Street’s first three appearances were also fairly late in blowout games (one win, two losses).
     
    The big difference between Street and Chargois is that Street eventually took over the closer role later in his rookie season, something Chargois seems unlikely to do.
     
    The highest leverage debut appearance came from Joey Devine, who entered a game in the top of the 12th inning for the Braves. Devine’s appearance was rated a leverage of 2.31. Devine was one of Bobby Cox’s last options from a bullpen that appears to have been depleted from the previous couple of games. Devine pitched a scoreless top of the 12th, struck out trying to lay down a bunt with two strikes in the bottom of the 12th, then got into trouble in the top of the 13th before surrendering a grand slam and taking the loss.
     
    Meanwhile, Bill Bray was credited with a win in his debut appearance—without facing a batter. Pitching for the Nationals and manager Frank Robinson, Bray entered a game in Milwaukee in the bottom of the 8th inning with a runner on first and two outs, his team trailing by a run. He was brought in to face the rookie Prince Fielder, but the baserunner was caught stealing after the first pitch, ending the inning. The Nationals scored two runs in the top of the 9th and another pitcher replaced Bray to record a save. Bray got the win. The baserunner who was thrown out? Corey Koskie, in his final major league season.
     
    Jesse Crain's MLB debut in August 2004 was in a 0.51 leverage situation, trailing by five runs in the 4th inning versus the Angels. Gardy pulled no punches with Crain’s next two appearances, however, with leverage indexes of 2.85 and 3.41 each, one of those being an extra-inning appearance.
     
    As far as leverage is concerned, I am not sure there is enough information—here or anywhere, perhaps—to determine whether a debut appearance in a high leverage situation will impact a career negatively. Introducing a relief pitcher into a low leverage situation wouldn’t seem to hurt, however.
     
    Other Pitchers
     
    In the following bar graph are the innings pitched of some additional pitchers, including Twins, who were not part of the original set of 11. Each of these pitchers were also relief pitchers in college and developed as relief pitchers in the minors:
     
    Figure 4: Relief pitchers, innings pitched in minor leagues, represented as a bar graph


     
    The first three remain Street, Storen, and Perez. The next two pitchers, separated by extra space in the middle, are Chargois and Nick Burdi. Chargois’s stats are through his debut in June, while Burdi’s stats are through the end of 2015, before his 2016 season began.
     
    The next group of six pitchers is made up of Twins. In order, from left: Billy Bullock, Luke Bard, Zack Jones, Jake Reed, Trevor Hildenberger, and Jesse Crain. The stats for Crain are up through his major league debut in 2004. The stats for the other five Twins pitchers run through the end of the 2015 season and do not include 2016.
     
    The final bar at the far right is Josh Fields, who was just traded from Houston to the Los Angeles Dodgers, which is now his fourth professional organization. Briefly on Josh Fields: Fields was among the 19 relievers in the sample above who were college relievers and pitched almost exclusively in relief in the minors. Seattle drafted Fields with the 20th overall pick in 2008, and notice how they assigned him directly to AA, skipping the lower levels completely. After seeing the progression of promotions from the top three relievers, it’s not hard to imagine how Fields might have struggled in that first long minor league assignment, facing a quality of competition he was not yet suited for, and then having trouble catching up and meeting expectations from that point forward.
     
    The second tallest bar, next to Fields, is Jesse Crain. You can see how the Twins promoted Crain comparatively slowly, but also according to the progression of minor league levels, without skipping a level. Crain spent the longest time in AAA, rather than AA.
     
    Notes on other Twins college relief pitchers here include:
    Billy Bullock, drafted in 2009, in the 2nd round with the 70th pick. Bullock was traded to Atlanta during spring training of 2011 after 107.2 minor league innings with the Twins. Bullock pitched in AAA for a couple of seasons and then was suspended in December 2012, effectively ending his career;
    Luke Bard (2012), 1st round with the 42nd pick. Bard has been hit with significant injuries which perhaps prolonged his stay in A ball, but is currently healthy and pitching in high A;
    Zack Jones (2012), 4th round, 130th overall. Looking at his stat line, Jones seemed to pitch well and even improve on his college numbers in 3 ½ seasons in the Twins system. Jones was then taken in the Rule 5 draft by Milwaukee in December 2015, but returned to the Twins in June. He is pitching in AA;
    Jake Reed (2014), 5th round, 140th overall. Reed would not have made my original set, for pitching too many innings in college. Reed sputtered when promoted to AA in 2015, but is performing very close to his college numbers in AA now in 2016;
    Trevor Hildenberger, 2014 draft, 22nd round, 650th overall. Successful late round picks are fun stories, and Hildenberger is finally getting some attention this season. Like the others in this study, he was a college reliever who was developed as a reliever in the minors. Like the other Twins, he has progressed through every level, and was promoted comparatively slowly to Street, Storen and Perez, which I attribute partly to his low draft selection and lower expectations. Hildenberger has dominated at AA this season;
    Mason Melotakis. I did not include Melotakis in the bar graph above, because the games he pitched as a starter in 2013 would distort his innings compared with the others. He was drafted in 2012, 2nd round, 63rd overall. He has been promoted on the same schedule as the others, with stops at every minor league level, including rookie. Melotakis is also currently pitching in AA;
    Pat Light. Light was drafted 37th overall in the 2012 draft. He was a starter in college and in the low minors, but has pitched exclusively as a reliever since being assigned to AA to begin 2015. At AA he has pitched 29.2 innings in 21 appearances, and at AAA he has pitched 64 innings in 51 appearances. He debuted with Boston on April 26 of this season and had two appearances before being demoted back to AAA;
    Alan Busenitz. Busenitz was college relief pitcher drafted in the 25th round of the 2013 draft. He has pitched 254 innings in the minor leagues, mostly in relief.
    All of which leads us to Nick Burdi.
     
    On the surface, it looks as though Burdi and Chargois are being promoted on the same schedule as the other Twins college relief prospects. Here is the comparison of Burdi’s minor league innings through 2015 with the innings pitched by Street, Storen, Perez, Chargois, and Crain prior to their major league debuts:
     
    Figure 5: Relief pitchers, comparison


     
    Again, Street and Storen were promoted fairly quickly, while Perez and the three Twins were promoted less quickly, or even slowly, in comparison. Chargois and Crain pitched 75.2 and 85.2 innings apiece through the AA level prior to their debuts. Similarly, Burdi reached 84 innings through AA through the end of 2015 (not counting Burdi’s innings during Chattanooga’s 2015 postseason run).
     
    Notice how Burdi skipped rookie ball and was assigned directly to A ball in 2014. As we’ve seen, for the Twins this is unusual. Remember too that Burdi struggled in the first half of 2015. After 30.1 innings in AA he was demoted back to A+ for a short time. Burdi then pitched 20 more innings in A+ before his promotion back to AA.
     
    Now suppose that Burdi, instead of struggling in those first AA appearances, had pitched very well. Suppose he pitched well enough that instead of being demoted at the end of June, the Twins instead promoted him to AAA, and he pitched in AAA until the end of the Rochester season. Here’s how the graph might look under these new innings totals (FIG 6):
     
    Figure 6: Relief pitchers, comparison alternative


     
    This alternative promotion schedule is similar to Storen’s, especially through the end of AA. If the 33.1 innings pitched by Burdi after his demotion had all been credited to AAA instead of the lower levels, the AA to AAA innings ratio would have resembled Crain’s prior to Crain’s debut. It is not a stretch of the imagination to think that Burdi would have been considered for a September call-up last season had his season gone differently.
     
    Wrapping up
     
    Looking only at this small set of 11 pitchers, one can conclude that what is most important to the major league success of these pitchers is not the speed of their promotions, but instead is the logical progression of promotions the pitcher takes through the minor leagues. The pitching prospect is drafted and assigned to a minor league team, after which point the pitcher advances level by level, without skipping more than one level at a time, until AA is reached. A college relief pitcher on a successful development plan can skip the rookie level, but will not skip the AA level. At AA, the pitcher may be asked to pitch more innings than at any previous level. AA is then followed by a stop in AAA, which is followed by the pitcher’s MLB debut. The soundness of this progression is even more evident when looking at the major league careers of the college relief pitchers in this study who did not follow the progression (Figure 2). It’s true that better data and a larger sample of pitchers might alter how this conclusion currently looks, but for now I am standing behind it.
     
    Unfortunately for this study, the relative slowness with which the Twins promote their relief prospects means that their success will not be apparent for a while. The quick promotion of Paco Rodriguez, selected 10 picks later than Chargois in 2012, does suggest that a late second round pick would not need to be promoted slowly out of fear of hurting the pitcher’s career. The Dodgers had already gotten more than three seasons and 1.2 fWAR from Rodriguez before trading him away during his age 24 season. With the slower timelines the Twins prefer, the Twins figure to miss out on the early value a college relief pitcher might present.
     
    Only after I finished with the above data did I hunt for pitchers with similar profiles who fell outside of my set. This is when I discovered Jesse Crain, drafted in 2002. There are pitchers such as Jake Barrett in Arizona (2012, 3rd round) and Tony Zych in Seattle (2011, 4th round) who were taken a bit later in the draft and spent a great deal more time in the minors than Chargois, but there are also pitchers like Joe Smith (2006, 3rd round), who was promoted rapidly by the Mets and debuted in MLB with only 32.2 minor league innings behind him.
     
    A similar, better study of minor league promotions would widen the sample of pitchers, and would also improve on the definition of college reliever as used here.
     
    For now, it's reasonable to think that the Twins still expect a few of these relievers in their system to become valuable major league contributors. I would also conclude that most of these relievers have been promoted responsibly, if a little slowly. But again, too slowly? It's hard to know for sure. Chargois could probably have been called up by now. Once Burdi becomes healthy, the Twins will probably ask him to pitch more minor league innings than he really needs. And aside from Chargois and Burdi, there is still an abundance of young pitching prospects in the Twins system waiting for their chance. Perhaps half of the AA Chattanooga bullpen is made up of former college relief pitchers who could stand to use a promotion, but not to the majors yet—to AAA.
  8. Hosken Bombo Disco
    A successful stolen base back on May 18 ignited a minor controversy recently in Twins territory. Holding a four run lead in the top of the 7th, the Detroit Tigers were playing it safe against the left handed batter, Joe Mauer. There were two outs, and the Tigers infielders were favoring the right side of the diamond, where any ground ball off Mauer's bat was likely to be hit. Tigers third baseman Nick Castellanos was playing well off third. Twins outfielder Eddie Rosario, who was the runner on second, saw an opportunity.
     
    Here's how Twins announcer Dick Bremer described what happened next:
     
    "And now running to third, with Rosario doing what Trevor Plouffe did the other day, taking advantage of Castellanos playing off the bag, and Rosario ends up at third base anyway with a stolen base before the pitch was thrown."
     
    Justin Verlander, the Detroit pitcher, was still in the set position when he noticed Rosario breaking for third base. Verlander quickly stepped off and threw accurately to Castellanos (who himself was running to third to take the throw), but the speedy Rosario, sliding head first into the bag, easily beat them both.
     
    Yet Rosario's stolen base was Twins manager Paul Molitor's last straw. After the inning ended, reserve outfielder Darin Mastroianni trotted out to left field instead of Rosario. Molitor had taken Rosario out of the game.
     
    "The risk — 100 fold — is greater than the reward," Molitor told reporters afterwards. "Being safe doesn't make it right for me." Interestingly, two days earlier, Trevor Plouffe had attempted almost the same steal of third base under similar conditions — in a middle inning, down several runs. According to Bremer's call of the earlier play, Plouffe should have been out by five feet had the throw from the catcher not skipped wildly into left field. But baseball is a funny game. Plouffe was not only credited with the stolen base, but scored on the error, and perhaps sparked a rally, as the Twins would score three more runs in the inning.
     
    How much risk did Rosario's steal entail? Were the Plouffe and Rosario situations all that different? Perhaps the manager was thinking primarily of that old baseball rule of thumb: Never make the final out at third. Here are three more ways to evaluate those steal attempts of third base: Run Expectancy, Win Probability, and Leverage.
     
    Run Expectancy
     
    The statistic RE24 shows the number of runs a team can expect to score in an inning, given the number of outs, and placement of base runners. A more in depth explanation of this metric can be found here.
     
    As Plouffe stood on second base with one out in the May 16 game, the Twins could expect to score 0.644 additional runs before that inning ended. In Rosario's situation two days later, with two outs and a trailing runner on first, 0.343 more runs could be expected.


    Obviously, no one scores a decimal or fraction of a run. This is generalized data that gives approximates what to expect over the course of a season.
     
    What were the run expectancies after Plouffe and Rosario each stole third? Also, what if they had been thrown out? The following chart shows the run expectancy after those situations:
     


    If Rosario had been thrown out, the inning would have ended with no runs scored. But if Plouffe had been thrown out, that also would have left the Twins without much expectation of scoring — a negative expectation of -.549, or half a run.
     
    This change in run expectancy is essential to finding a break even percentage for evaluating the risk of stealing a base. More on that here. Finding that break-even point can provide valuable insight — for a player, manager, or fan — to determine for themselves if a steal attempt is worth the trouble. It would be important to weigh this break even point with other variables, such as the throwing ability of the catcher in Plouffe's case, or the speed and guile of the runner himself (as well as the same throwing ability of the same catcher) in Rosario's case. Indeed, the runners themselves are making these calculations intuitively throughout a game.
     
    In Plouffe's base-out situation, a steal attempt should have a success rate of 71.3%. In Rosario's situation, a 72.8% success rate is needed. Taking into account other variables, an observer can then form an opinion on any given steal attempt — an imperfect science, to be sure.
     
    While RE24 might tell you how advancing an extra base impacts an inning, it doesn't tell you anything about what's happening outside of the inning, or how the steal attempt will affect the score of the game.
     
    Win Probability
     
    An explanation of win probability can be found here. The Twins were trailing by several runs when both Plouffe and Rosario each stole their base. The chances of winning those games were not high; four- and five-run deficits are hard to overcome.
     
    At the moment of Plouffe's steal attempt, the Twins were trailing 8-3 in the 4th inning and had an 8.4% chance of winning the game. At the moment of Rosario's attempt, they were trailing 5-1 in the top of the 7th and their win chances were 5.4%. Here is how those win probabilities changed with their steals, and how they would have changed had they been thrown out.
     


    In this case, Molitor's intuition was correct. In terms of win expectancy, having Rosario on third base instead of second increases the win probability only from 5.4% to 5.5%. It does virtually nothing to improve the Twins chances of winning the game.
     
    By the way, when the Detroit catcher committed the throwing error allowing Plouffe to score, the Twins win percentage increased, to 10.3%. (Again, these are benchmark numbers which may vary slightly when examining specific game logs on sites like Fangraphs.)
     
    For another comparison, here are some other recent base running plays that impacted their games much more than the Plouffe or Rosario steals.
     



    *Torii Hunter attempted a straight steal of home versus Oakland in 2015; was tagged out by catcher with time to spare. 

    *Miguel attempted to stretch a double into a triple with two outs in the bottom of the 9th in a game against the Tigers. When Sano came to bat, the Twins had a 4.5% chance of winning, and stopping at second base with a double would have raised that chance to 14.6%. Reaching third base on a triple would have increased the win chance to 16.5% 

    *Danny Santana was attempting to steal third base on a pitch which hit Dozier and stopped the play. Looking at the video gives no indication if Santana would have made it safely. He ran at the delivery of the pitch without the head start of Rosario. 

    Also note that, even though Sano's attempt to stretch a triple ended the game, it did not have the impact on the game that Santana's caught stealing attempt had on the game on May 19.  
    What this chart shows is that there are much higher leveraged base running situations which will impact a ballgame than the stolen bases of Plouffe and Rosario.
     
    Leverage
     
    The Leverage Index (LI) attempts to quantify the importance of a given game situation. More information here.
     
    Fangraphs presently recognizes three types of leverage: low, medium, high. Any leverage index number lower than 0.85 is considered low, and above 2.00 is considered high. As a benchmark, the leadoff hitter in the top of the first comes to bat in a leverage situation of .87 but again, these numbers can change slightly and are regularly updated.
     
    Here are the baserunning plays from the previous example, as measured by Leverage Index, with a dotted line to indicate low, medium, and high leverage situations:


    You see how the stolen bases of Plouffe and Rosario are fairly insignificant when it comes to other moments in a ballgame that can swing the result.
     
    The Twins have done a good job of stealing third base during Molitor’s tenure. From the start of 2015 through the end of May 2016, the Twins have stolen third base in 14 out of 17 tries, for an 82.4% success rate, where the American League average is roughly 16 steals in 20 tries.
     
    Here is a list of all attempted steals of third base, for both the Twins and their opponents, since the start of 2015. The dashed lines indicate markers between low, medium, and high leverage situations.


    Plotting these leverage numbers onto a graph shows that, consistent with Molitor’s statements above, the Twins have a greater sensitivity to risk when it comes to stealing third, at least since Molitor has been manager. Granted, there is not enough data here for a firm conclusion to be made, nor is there a strong enough correlation to support the regression lines drawn in. Nevertheless, I do feel a story starts to emerge.


    As close ballgames advance into the later innings, the leverage of each play naturally increases. While opponents continue to steal third against the Twins in the late innings, more of the Twins attempts seem to come in the earlier innings. With more data, the risk aversion Molitor hinted at might become clearer.
     
    There are four dots almost off the chart in the upper right corner that skew the data a bit.
     
    Two of the three red dots come from the exciting game versus Kansas City back on September 9th, when Jarrod Dyson and Terrance Gore both stole third in the late innings, but did not score. The Twins eventually won that game in the 12th inning on a Miguel Sano home run. The other red dot is Oakland’s Billy Burns stealing third base and scoring the winning run in the 10th inning in a game last July.
     
    The black dot up in the corner? That’s Eddie Rosario again, stealing third base with two outs in the bottom of the 9th in a tie game against the Seattle Mariners last August. He stole the base without a throw, and then scored the winning run on a walk-off single to left from Suzuki.
     
    There might be some interesting information hiding in all this scattered data, or there might not. So far, the jury is still out. Neither the performances of Rosario or Molitor this season give us enough information to take hard sides on the contentious stolen base back on May 18.
     
    One thing that does seem apparent, however, is a difference in game philosophy with the manager and playing style with at least one of the young prospects the Twins are counting upon. In order to get the best performance from their players and return to the successes they have known in the past, the Twins will probably need to reconcile these differences — not only between Molitor and Rosario, but also between others on the field and in the organization.
  9. Hosken Bombo Disco
    Some random, small sample thoughts on the Twins performance, based mostly on what the box scores are telling us, as we approach the halfway point of spring training. All the normal caveats about small sample, quality of opponents, and then some. I feel putting it in writing here will let me see how they hold up as spring training ends and we get going into the regular season.
     
    _______
     
    The bullpen. The three back end guys are Perkins, Jepsen and May. Good on Molly to give May a start today, though. I’d like to see May be a starter again in future seasons, but for this year, he looks ticketed for the 'pen. Add to those three Fien and Abad. That makes five relievers who look to start the season, and of those five, only Fien has allowed an earned run in relief. That’s not bad. Spring training is not necessarily a meaning-making exercise, but you'd rather be doing good than bad.
     
    Additionally, Nick Burdi and J. T. Chargois, our future bullpen anchors, have each thrown 3 scoreless innings. The future might be here early, let's hope. A lot of people were critical of the inaction this winter (not me) but either way, we need guys who can get outs.
     
    Forcing the Twins hand is the fact that guys like Aaron Thompson and Michael Tonkin are struggling to pitch any scoreless innings. Disappointing. (Granted Thompson is no longer on the 40-man.) And throw Meyer in with them. Meyer has faced 8 batters, struck out 3, walked 3, and the other batters 2 had line drive base hits. No batter he has faced has been retired in the field. Two of those other batters were thrown out stealing. Go figure. Nor have other guys like Dean, Reed and Melotakis haven’t put their names in the headlines yet. It’s still early, however.
     
    Then shift to J. R. Graham and Ryan Pressly. Combined, they have pitched 7 scoreless innings. Both are guys that Ryan picked up in the Rule 5 draft and right now, from 35,000 feet, I’d give Pressly a strong chance to make the Opening Day roster. Zack Jones, who Ryan lost to the Brewers in the Rule 5 draft this winter, blew out his shoulder prior to training camp, hasn't resumed throwing yet. Longshots O’Rourke and Kintzler have also pitched 3 scoreless innings apiece. Of those two, give the edge to O’Rourke because he’s awesome on the 40 man.
     
    Prediction: either Burdi or Chargois forces the Twins hand on a promotion right away in April, or even breaking from camp. I’d prefer the latter.
     
    Now let me talk about our new designated hitter. I’m not exactly sure how his name is styled, if it should read Park Byung-ho, or Byung Ho Park, or even Byung-ho Pak, without the R. I’d like to get it right, because he’s going to be good. After a forgetful first game (three strikeouts), he has batted 8-19 with 3 homers. Let’s roll the dice; he is ready.
     
    Arcia, Vargas and Santana have not hit yet, but that could change. Arcia is playing out of position in left field, Santana is playing several positions that he will struggle at in the majors, and Vargas in my opinion plays first base at least as well as Mauer does, but I’d much rather have Mauer for another year than Vargas. Vargas just hasn’t hit consistently since his first call up. Despite Mauer’s struggles, I still usually feel confident when he comes to the plate. I can’t say that about Vargas. Fortunately Vargas still has an option year and can play in Rochester again until needed.
     
    As has also been pointed out, Carlos Quentin is receiving the most playing time of the non roster invitees, by far. He’s also playing all over the field. He hasn’t been a full time player in years—he was even retired last season. The Twins wouldn’t ask him to play full time, but with Park showing he’s ready to DH there’s just no spot for Quentin, unless the Twins want to cut Santana or Arcia, which in my mind would be shortsighted for the limited value Quentin might provide. No doubt Quentin has shown in the past that he can mash, and hopefully he will accept some time in AAA and let the Twins see how things play out.
     
    Buxton figures to make the team, but is striking out a lot. I’m not too worried so long as the Twins can keep him in good spirits and let the development happen as it's meant to for him.
     
    And finally, Miguel Sano. Have you ever seen him hit? When people in sports bars hold up their phones to film Sano at bats on the television, that’s pretty special. Most of us expect him to struggle some in right field, and he will. But he got an outfield assist recently; expect him to get even more outfield assists after the season starts, as opposing base runners test his instincts out there.
     
    Speaking of outfield assists, don’t try to run on Rosario out in left. Or rather, please do try to run on Rosario.
  10. Hosken Bombo Disco
    A short blurb from 1909 that ran on page 4 of the Princeton Union of Princeton Minn:
     

    ________________________


     

    ."To show that Japan is making rapid



    progress. in. the. American. game. of



    baseball. it is only necessary to state



    that. in. Tokio. alone. seven.. umpires



    have. already. been. trampled. in. the



    dust for alleged crooked decisions." .


     

    ________________________


     
    Source: The Princeton Union. Princeton, Minn. October 7, 1909, p. 4.
    Link: http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83016758/1909-10-07/ed-1/seq-4/#date1=10%2F06%2F1909&sort=state&date2=10%2F07%2F1909&searchType=advanced&language=&sequence=0&index=46&words=baseball&proxdistance=5&rows=50&ortext=baseball&proxtext=&phrasetext=&andtext=&dateFilterType=range&page=2
  11. Hosken Bombo Disco
    It’s April 16, 2018. The Twins own a 7-4 record. The front office has added free agents at several key positions to complement an 85-win team from the previous year that earned its first post-season berth in seven years.
     
    It's April 16, and despite a string of postponements due to an early spring snowstorm, the team is playing well, and flying to Puerto Rico for an unusual two-game series against their division rivals.
     


    Minnesota Twins and Puerto Rico, April 2018 (copyright Brace Hemmelgarn, for Twins/MLB) 
    After dropping the first game of the series, native Puerto Rican Jose Berrios pitches 7 shutout innings in the second game, and the Twins win in the 16th inning on a Ryan LaMarre base hit. LaMarre was a minor league signing prior to the season who won a spot on the team with a good spring.
     
    With the win, the Twins reclaim first place with an 8-5 record and prepare to fly to Tampa to play a series against the Rays.
     
    Then it fell apart.
     
    In the first game of that series, free agent relief pitcher Zach Duke failed to touch first base on a toss from Joe Mauer that would have ended the 10th inning; instead, the winning run scored all the way from second base. The Twins lost to Blake Snell in the second game of the series, and in the final game, free agent addition Addison Reed surrendered a 9th inning, walk-off home run to Carlos Gomez.
     
    Then the Twins flew to New York for a four game series in Yankee Stadium.
     
    After losing the first three games in their typically inept Yankee Stadium way, the Twins had a chance to salvage the series finale. Starter Kyle Gibson held the Yankees to just one hit over 6 shutout innings, and the Twins entered the bottom of the 9th with a 3-1 lead. The first Yankees batter reached when first baseman Logan Morrison, yet another offseason free agent addition, failed to scoop a not-too-difficult short hop throw from Miguel Sano. That baserunner gave the Yankees life. Two batters later, free agent closer Fernando Rodney surrendered another game winning, walk-off home run, a three-run shot by Gary Sanchez.
     
    The Twins flew home from New York on a seven game losing streak. They tacked on another dismal loss to the Reds, extending their losing streak to eight. Their record sank to 8-13 and they would not climb back to .500 for the rest of the 2018 season.
     
    The free agent acquisitions prior to 2018 were meant to complement the young corps of players that had been developed internally in the organization, but instead, the free agents seemed to torpedo the season.
     
    This season, so far, is different. Much different. Those players from 2018 are elsewhere, and the players brought in by the front office for 2019 are making the plays.
     
    First baseman C. J. Cron, coming from Tampa Bay, has proven just as adept at first base as Joe Mauer, making all the scoops and showing more pop at the plate. Many fans (I was one of those) thought that the front office should encourage Mauer to sign an extension for 2019, but Cron appears to be performing just as well.
     
    Second base pickup Jonathan Schoop gives the middle infield youth and arm strength that Brian Dozier did not have. Here is his throw from shallow left in Houston April 22 to nab Josh Reddick at the plate:
     
    https://twitter.com/Twins/status/1120513457491795975
     
    And, “super utility” player Marwin Gonzalez, despite his slow start at the plate, is making the plays in the field, while filling in at third base, at first base, and in left. His sliding catch in the first inning against the Astros on April 29 saved perhaps two runs, in a game the Twins won with only a single run, 1-0.
     
    All of this, while free agent designated hitter Nelson Cruz is hitting even better than advertised.
     
    The additions to the pitching staff for 2019 did not seem impactful; however, Ryne Harper and Blake Parker have been assets in the bullpen, and Martin Perez has now strung together four good starts. It’s a group of pitchers who are far outperforming last season’s acquisitions Zach Duke, Fernando Rodney, and Lance Lynn. After 30 games in 2018, the Twins had already suffered five walk-off losses. Here in 2019, none as of yet.
     
    While it’s yet to be seen whether the pitchers will continue to protect leads, the new additions to the every day lineup are providing enough offense and defense to keep the team in the win column more often than not.
     
    As Jonah Keri, writing for The Athletic, summarized it: The combination of up-and-comers in their 20s, big-hitting veteran imports and managerial guidance [from Rocco Baldelli] has borne fruit. A lot can be said of Baldelli as well, the new Twins manager and perhaps biggest offseason acquisition of all. But that's another article for another day.
     
    Prior to the 2018 season, the front office might have thought they were acquiring the final complementary parts to a team that won 85 games the previous season. It did not work out that way. The acquisitions for the 2019 season, however, are working out incredibly well so far.
     
    And I haven’t even mentioned Willians Astudillo yet.
  12. Hosken Bombo Disco
    Today is Labor Day; in that vein, please remove your caps for the Curt Floods and Andy Messersmiths of the baseball world who challenge the reserve system and paved the way for the players union we know today.
     
    In any case, I'm doing some unrelated research on information found in some public domain newspapers, and thought it would be fun occasionally to take a detour and share some baseball writing from the turn of the century. Some of these account are both entertaining and fascinating, or, too good not to share! Here is the link to the Library of Congress project that is digitizing and making these old newspapers public. The papers are public domain. I encourage you to take a look if you are interested in history or just want to do something different on the internet sometime.
     
    One hundred years ago on this date is an account of a doubleheader played between the Marshalltown Ansons and Clinton Pilots. The teams were from Iowa towns competing in the Central Association league, an unaffiliated minor league that survived about six years. Most or all minor league teams at that time were unaffiliated with the American and National league clubs; in fact, they were often just little leagues scratched together and disbanded under the softest of pretenses.
     
    Without further ado...
     

    ANSONS CELEBRATE WITH DOUBLE WIN


     

    ________________________


     

    CLOSE SEASON BY DEFEATING CLINTON TWICE LABOR DAY


     

    ________________________


     

    COOPER WHITEWASHES HIS FORMER TEAMMATES


     

    ________________________


     

    Ex-Pilot Joins Ansons For Final Games and Scores Victory in Second Contest—Starts First Game, But Is Taken Out in Third, Richardson Finishing—Ryan's Fielding Feature.



    ________________________


     
    Clinton, Sept. 7.—The Ansons finished up like whirlwinds Monday, wiping up the Pilots for two. That they did so was not altogether their fault, neither was the game presented to them. Both contests were marked by more or less carelessness, due to the fact that they were the last games of the season, and as a result were uninteresting as baseball exhibitions. The first one dragged horribly, while the second was played in the remarkable time of an hour and ten minutes.
     
    Cooper, signed by Marshalltown for the last day of the season, made two efforts to humble his former teammates on their own grounds. He was unsuccessful in his first attempt, being forced to take position on the bench in the third inning. He came back strong in the second, however, and allowed only two hits up to the last inning, "goose egging" the Pilots........................
     
    ________________________
     
    Source: The Times-Republican (evening edition), Marshalltown, IA, Sept. 7, 1915, p. 9.
    Link: http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85049554/1915-09-07/ed-1/seq-9.pdf
     
    NOTE: I will get around to uploading a screen grab of the old paper itself to spice up the blog entry and provide a little more flavor for the time. Otherwise see link directly above.
×
×
  • Create New...