Lucas Seehafer PT

The Minnesota Twins on Wednesday introduced their new face of the franchise. Shortstop Carlos Correa, who had previously signed near-record deals with the San Francisco Giants and New York Mets before each fell through due to “concerns” over his right ankle, agreed to a six-year, $200 million deal, the richest in franchise history. If Correa is able to stay healthy and perform at a high level, the deal could reach as high as 10 years, $270 million, only $15 million less than they originally offered him. But now the question on everyone’s mind is this: Can Correa stay healthy? Both the Giants and Mets reportedly did not like what they saw on MRI and physical examination regarding his surgically-repaired ankle that he fractured when he was 19 years old and in the minor leagues. What exactly was seen hasn’t been reported, but generally speaking, there are only a couple of pathologies—such as arthritis—that could result in the teams’ physicians taking the stance they did. I do not have inside information on Correa’s condition and this is only educated speculation on my part. (For what it’s worth, the Twins’ doctors were also aware of the status of Correa’s ankle and felt confident enough in its structure to hand out a multi-hundred million dollar deal.) The stench of the Giants’ and Mets’ findings resulted in Correa losing $150 million from what was originally promised to him, a fact that must sting deep within his core. Correa’s agent, Scott Boras, implied that the interpretation of the MRI his client underwent was the primary instigator behind his struggles to land with a team. “[T]his scenario is about a large separation in the orthopedic community about functional fitness and clinical exam versus looking at an MRI,” Boras said during Correa’s introductory press conference. “It is a dramatic chasm between how some doctors feel and how other doctors feel about the longevity of a player’s performance.” Boras is right on the money. Many doctors—particularly orthopedic doctors—subscribe to what is known as the biomedical model. To boil it down simply, the biomedical model believes that health is defined by the absence of pathology. To apply it to Correa, his ankle cannot be healthy because something was found on MRI; in other words, the ankle is something to be concerned about moving forward. In many ways, the biomedical model of health is logical, which is why it was so heavily adopted by doctors, particularly in the United States, upon its introduction. However, logic and the body don’t always mesh well. Let’s take MRIs for example. MRIs—which stand for magnetic resonance imaging—are wonderful for diagnosing soft tissue injuries, both those that are acute or chronic in nature. If an athlete tears their ACL or strains their hamstring, the extent and exact location of the damage is often determined by MRI. However, some in the field of orthopedics use what is found on MRI as a way to predict what will happen in the future. The thinking goes something like this: “Well, that individual has a tear in their meniscus. It may not bother them now, but it will in the future, so we better take care of it now.” Again, this is a perspective based in logic. Damaged tissue or bone is “not normal” (i.e. pathological), the thought goes, and therefore must be remedied (i.e. turn the pathology back to health). However, over the decades, MRI’s ability to accurately predict future injury has been found to be dubious, at best. The meniscus tear or arthritis in the back don’t always come back to haunt the individual; sometimes they simply lay dormant, never causing disruption. This isn’t logical and is a big reason why many in orthopedics—including myself, full disclosure—believe more in relying on past performance and abilities. “Functional fitness,” as Boras referred to it, is more concerned about “what have you done and what can you do” than “what could happen?” Carlos Correa has never once gone on the injured list nor has he ever missed time due to ankle pain over the last decade. He has accumulated 32.3 fWAR, won a Platinum Glove, and is on pace to finish his career as a Hall of Famer. Sure, he may have some arthritis and/or some metal in his ankle, but it’s never impacted his ability to perform. Why all of a sudden should we think it will now or anytime in the future? “One thing I learned throughout the whole process is that doctors have a difference of opinions,” Correa said during his press conference. “I had a lot of doctors tell me I was fine and I had some who said I wasn’t so fine.” That is really all that Correa’s rollercoaster offseason boils down to. We like to think that medicine is a completely objective field. Players undergo tests, the results are read, and a decision is made. However, much of orthopedics—and especially physical exams—contain a fair amount of subjectivity. Doctors often have differing opinions; that’s why second opinions exist (and aren’t called second “facts”). The Giants and Mets clearly had a larger issue with Correa’s ankle than the Twins, but that doesn’t inherently mean that the Twins are wrong (or, to be fair, does it mean they are inherently right). An additional factor in play during Correa’s free agency discussions, it should be noted, was the sheer volume of his potential contracts and the ability for a team to insure such a deal. Suffice it to say, either the Giants or the Mets could have gotten their deals with Correa insured with relatively little issue. (The Twins did, after all.) However, what both teams seemingly did was use Correa’s MRI findings to justify backing out of their agreement and offer something more paltry in return. The Mets took it even a step further. Their final offer to Correa was a six-year deal for $157.5 million, exactly half of their original, with multiple non-guaranteed years contingent on him passing a yearly physical. Additionally, according to USA Today's Bob Nightengale, they employed the opinion from the exact same orthopedic doctor as the Giants. (Said Boras, "I don’t understand the Mets. I gave them all of the information. We had them talk to four doctors. They knew the issue the Giants had. And yet, they still call the same doctor the Giants used for his opinion. There was no new information. So why negotiate a contract if you were going to rely on the same doctor?") As Aaron Gleeman, John Bonnes, and Dan Hayes discussed astutely in a recent Gleeman and the Geek Patreon podcast, why would Correa agree to such a deal, especially after experiencing firsthand the Mets’ physical exam process? At the end of the day, the Mets, and to perhaps a lesser extent the Giants, tried to utilize Correa’s body against him in the name of saving money. What is particularly egregious is that the Mets knew full well that they may see something upon exam that they did not like. They agreed to sign him for 12 years and $315 million anyway, only to swiftly pull out the rug from underneath him. It’s perfectly acceptable for doctors to approach a condition with different viewpoints and opinions. However, the case of Carlos Correa exposed the potential impact differences of opinions—and perhaps outdated medical models—can have on an individual, especially when “just doing business” is involved. View full article

Do you know that? Is that known (by clubs) or just a guess? There's a stigma around back injuries and arthritis (conditions that can undoubtedly be debilitating for many!). Most athletes have varying degrees of arthritis. Most athletes have had episodes of significant back pain. NEITHER of these conditions have impacted Correa for literal years. Not all arthritis or back pain is or is destined to become debilitating. I would wager that Correa's risk is no greater than any other professional athlete over the next 10 years simply because 10 years is a long time and anything can happen injury-wise.

Not that anyone asked, but I've posted this elsewhere, figured I may as well post it here as well: What I'm most interested in is whether or not this Correa fiasco impacts the next round of labor negotiations. How all of this was handled doesn't set a great precedent moving forward. Correa had "positive" findings on MRI but has never had an issue with the ankle. The implication of these prolonged negotiations is that the Mets/Giants "want to protect themselves." I.e. they want to spend less money than they originally promised because of "positive findings" that have never (and may never!) impact the athlete. You can't prove a negative. "But if I were paying $300+ million, I'd want a clean MRI." The truth is: There's rarely such thing in professional athletes. Look hard enough and you will find "abnormalities". But: Imaging is a poor predictor of future injury. "But two teams came to the same conclusion: There's something going on in Correa's leg." Sure, there probably is. But 1. Does it impact his performance? (Seemingly no) and 2. Will it ever impact his performance? (?). (And 3. Don't forget who pays their checks.) Owners are *billionaires*. $315 million over 11 years is *nothing* to them. Correa's ankle could explode and it would not impact them financially one iota. But not getting that money does impact Correa. Of course, the issue is not necessary with Correa. He'll be fine financially. But what about the Kumar Rockers or lesser known players of the world? Rocket left college early and then the Mets refused to sign him after "positive findings" on MRI. He got paid much less to go Indy. If owners can do this to the big fish, what's stopping them from doing it to the small or medium fish? (In truth, this has been and is still is happening.) I would imagine the MLBPA probably isn't pleased at the moment.

To be fair, Gallo had two 40 home run seasons before the juiced ball season.

The former Ranger, Yankee, and Dodger is perhaps the most statistically extreme player in all of MLB and that is what makes him a decent gamble for the Minnesota Twins. Image courtesy of Rob Schumacher, USA Today In the late spring of 2019, as temperatures rose in Texas and the night skies over Arlington were peppered with little white dots, a once-heralded prospect made an astonishing imprint on the game of baseball. You’d be forgiven for assuming that the increased heat was due to normal seasonal changes and that the little white dots were simply the stars in and around the Milky Way galaxy. No, both phenomenon were simply the result of Joey Gallo’s bat. Coming off back-to-back 40 home run seasons with a combined 114 wRC+, Gallo peppered the skies of the American League West with 22 home runs, often sending them into near orbit. He also elevated his triple slashline to a blistering .253/.389/.598 (.987) resulting in an MVP-esque 144 wRC+. Gallo was on track to more than double his fWAR (3.2) from the previous two seasons combined (5.9), but while his star burned hot and bright that summer, it ultimately went supernova after only 70 games thanks to a fractured hamate bone in his right wrist. He did not appear in a another game that year. Since his ill-fated 2019 campaign, Gallo has largely fallen back to earth. He was named to the American League All-Star team in 2021 before being shipped to the New York Yankees—an experience Gallo would later refer to as “rock bottom”—and registered a career-high 4.2 fWAR, but has yet to post an average above the Mendoza line or hit 40 home runs in a season over the last three years. Looking at the stats, it’s pretty easy to see why Gallo was so successful in 2019. It wasn’t because he was striking out less or walking more—his K% and BB% more or less stayed steady with his career numbers—nor was it because he was hitting the ball harder or adopting a new approach at the plate. The primary driver behind his success was a towering .368 BABIP, a value 43% higher than his career average. Suffice it to say that the odds of Gallo ever putting together another 70-game stretch similar to the one in 2019 are slim, but he doesn’t need to slash anywhere near .250/.390/.500 (.890) for a full season to find success with the Twins. (To be clear, if he did, Gallo would very likely be an MVP candidate.) Despite owning the highest strikeout rate in MLB history, Gallo has been 10% better than league average by wRC+ thanks to a fairly discerning eye at the plate as well as the aforementioned otherworldly power. Simply put, Gallo is a land of contrasts. Last summer he ranked in the 1st percentile in strikeout rate and Whiff% but in the 95th percentile in walk rate, which is consistent with his career numbers. He is also unlikely to bite on offerings that Statcast refers to as chase and waste pitches. He patiently waits for his pitch with such aptitude that he is worth positive runs even though he is, at best, 70/30 to hit pitches in the zone. (The MLB average zone contact rate is 82.0%. Gallo’s career number is 67.4%.) Gallo is the definition of a three true outcomes player. A laughably outrageous 59% of his career plate appearances have ended as either a strikeout, walk, or home run. In that sense, Gallo is Miguel Sanó on steroids. (A mere 54% of Sanó’s plate appearances resulted in one of the outcomes.) However, what separates Gallo from someone like Sanó—and why Gallo was the first of the two to sign a deal this offseason—is that he provides near elite defense in the outfield. Although he ranked in the 19th percentile in Outs Above Average last season, Gallo had consistently ranked in the top 25% of outfielders since 2017. He has a cannon for an arm, topping out on some throws near 95 mph, and has the ability to get a good jump on the ball. Defensively, Gallo isn’t all that far behind Max Kepler, an athlete who is considered to be among the best defensive corner outfielders in the game. So, basically, the Twins signed a corner outfielder that projects to be an amalgamation of some degree of Miguel Sanó’s offense and Max Kepler’s defense, which is a player well-worth a one-year, $11 million gamble. Steamer, one of the projection systems published on FanGraphs, projects Gallo to slash .188/.313/.397 (.710) with 19 home runs in 102 games next summer. That would give him a 107 wRC+ and 1.1 fWAR, almost exactly a value of $11 million. The signing of Joey Gallo is not the type of move that cements a solid offseason for the Twins in isolation, but it does allow them to potentially be a little more aggressive on the trade market, particularly when dangling Kepler or perhaps Luis Arraez and/or Trevor Larnach. If the Twins are able to swap some of their existing pieces for impact starting pitching or a shortstop, the Gallo acquisition could be seen as a boon, especially since he has largely been able to remain healthy for his career. It’s also possible that Gallo never rebounds from his morbid 2022 and is DFA’d before the season ends. However, the bar is so low for his projected offensive performance and his defense is so reliably good that it would take quite the drop in production, perhaps even more so than last season, for the Twins to simply give up on him. View full article

The Minnesota Twins signed former Houston Astros catcher Christian Vazquez to a three-year, $30 million deal Monday evening to serve as one of the team's primary backstops. Here's a breakdown of some of his pitch framing metrics. Image courtesy of Troy Taormina, USA Today Christian Vazquez has developed a reputation for being strong behind the plate, though the majority is due to his lightning quick ball exchange speed—0.67 seconds, tied for the second fastest in MLB in 2022—and solid pop time to second base—1.94 seconds, ranking in the 71st percentile. What he isn’t as well-known for, though, is his pitch framing. The ability to steal strikes is a valuable asset for modern baseball teams. Stolen strikes add up over the course of a season and can contribute to opposing team’s scoring fewer runs. The median catcher framing runs saved last season was 0, an intuitive figure. (New York Yankees catcher Jose Trevino was the best pitch framer in baseball saving his team 17 runs. In contrast, Baltimore Orioles catcher Robinson Chirinos placed 60th out of 60 as he cost his team 14 runs.) For the bulk of his career, Vazquez has graded out as a solidly above average pitch framer, with one season of elite performance. The last couple, however, he’s only been average. But there’s a reason. Below is an image depicting Vazquez’s framing performance since 2016. (Red squares are good, blue are bad.) What stands out is that over the past four seasons, Vazquez has displayed good ability to steal strikes at the top of the zone; this is shown by the presence of red boxes in the columns corresponding to Zones 11, 12, and 13. This is good news for the likes of Joe Ryan, Tyler Mahle, and Bailey Ober, all of whom love to pound the upper zone with their fastballs. However, Vazquez isn’t as strong at stealing strikes on the corners; Zones 14 and 16, and to a less extent Zones 17 and 19. Although he started out strong early in his career, his ability to convert balls to strikes on the outer edges has fallen multiple seasons in a row and reached their nadir last summer. Bad news for Sonny Gray and Kenta Maeda, who tend to work more on the outer half of the plate. Interestingly, though perhaps unsurprisingly, Ryan Jeffers has traditionally been slightly better at snagging the corners, but is by no means elite. (See the chart below.) Therefore, it wouldn’t be too surprising to see Vazquez catch Ryan, Mahle, and Ober while Jeffers gets Gray and Maeda. In this respect, Vazquez is a great platoon match with Jeffers despite both hitting from the right side of the plate. What will be interesting to following during the 2023 season is how much of Vazquez's drop in production on the corners is something that can be adjusted. Is the difference between Jeffers and Vazquez simply rooted in organizational philosophy or is it something that is inherent in their skill sets? Regardless, even if Vasquez remains simply slightly above average in the pitch framing department, his other defensive attributes and ability to put the ball in play regularly at the plate should provide a boon for the Twins. At $10 million annually, bringing on Vazquez was a prudent move by the front office. View full article

Was it smart of me to do this? Likely not. But was it worth it? Eh, sorta.

The end result: "Once upon a time, the Minnesota Twins were faced with a difficult decision regarding their star shortstop, Carlos Correa. On one hand, Correa had been a valuable player for the Twins, consistently providing strong defense and powerful hitting at the plate. He was a fan favorite and a leader on the team. However, the Twins also had to consider the fact that Correa was due for a hefty contract extension. They had to weigh the value of keeping Correa on the team against the potential financial burden of his new contract. On the one hand, the Twins knew that re-signing Correa would solidify their infield defense and give them a strong presence in the middle of their lineup. His ability to hit for power and average made him a valuable asset, and the team knew they would miss his contributions if he were to leave. On the other hand, the Twins also knew that they would have to pay a significant amount of money to re-sign Correa. With their current payroll, it would be difficult to fit his new contract into the budget without making some difficult decisions regarding other players on the team. In the end, the Twins ultimately decided to re-sign Correa. They believed that his value to the team was worth the financial cost, and they were confident that he would continue to be a key player for them in the years to come. However, not everyone agreed with this decision. Some fans and analysts felt that the Twins had made a mistake by committing so much money to a single player, and that they should have instead focused on building a deeper, more well-rounded team. Despite the criticism, the Twins were committed to their decision and were hopeful that Correa would continue to be a key contributor for the team. Only time would tell if their decision to re-sign him was the right one."

For now, Luis Arraez is a Minnesota Twin, but coming off his best season to date—one in which he won the American League batting title for the first time—the Venezuelan’s name has become a hot commodity in the trade market. That begs the question: Should the Twins trade Arraez? And THAT begs the question: Has Arraez already peaked? Image courtesy of Kamil Krzaczynski Okay, so maybe the premise of this story as portrayed above is a little click-baity and very off-seasony, but, at the very least, it’s worth considering, particularly as the rumor mill churns. Arraez’s exploits during the 2022 season are well-known among Twins fans. He won the team’s first A.L. batting title since Joe Mauer in 2009 and was named to his first All-Star team. He was also third on the team in fWAR trailing only Carlos Correa (4.4) and Byron Buxton (4.0), the two bona fide franchise cornerstone level players on the roster. If you look up “Contact Hitter” in your nearest Merriam-Webster or dictionary of choice, the definition you’ll find is “Luis Arraez.” The Twins atypical first baseman/DH ranked in the 100th percentile in K% and Whiff% last summer according to Baseball Savant. For the analytically disinclined, essentially, Arraez is the corporeal form of “see ball, hit ball.” But what Arraez is *not* is “see ball, hit ball hard and far.” He ranked in the 7th percentile in HardHit%, 11th in barrel rate, and 48th in average exit velocity in 2022. Add in his height (5’10” according to Baseball Savant, which is…kind…at best) and Outs Above Average (15th percentile) and Arraez’s fit at first base long term should come into question. That, of course, isn’t a new discussion. When Arraez was first moved to first base out of necessity due to the calamity of injuries the team suffered all that was talked about was how weird it was to see him playing there and that it wasn’t likely his long term home. The issue, though, is that this conversation was happening *after* he had been ruled out as a second baseman (Polanco is the stronger option at the position and Arraez’s knees struggled to handle the load during his first three seasons), third baseman (*remembers that one series in Oakland*), or outfielder (WOOF). In all reality, the Twins’ only option to keep Arraez’s bat in the lineup everyday was to either place him at first base or DH, which ultimately accounted for nearly 75% of his plate appearances. Despite his ability to rack up hits, Arraez graded out as a merely above average first baseman and a top-tier DH in many important statistical categories. Below is how he ranked among qualified position players—both A.L. and N.L.—last season. I can hear many of you saying, “Uh, isn’t being 'merely above average and top tier' a good thing?” and, rest assured, it is! But here’s the crux of my argument: There’s a good chance that Luis Arraez’s 2022 campaign was the embodiment of the peak of his powers. Arraez is young and possesses elite bat to ball skills. He will likely grade out as an above average hitter for the bulk of his career. But his ceiling can only be so high as long as he’s chained to either first base defensively or DH and/or not winning batting titles. Any negative deviation from his 2022 output and Arraez will likely only grade out as average offensively at either position. For instance, here is how Arraez ranked among the positions listed above during 2021, a merely good season by his standards. Oofda. (While Arraez's DH numbers look alright, it should be noted that only 12 players qualified as full-time DHs in 2021 compared to 16 in 2022, according to FanGraphs.) One potential mitigation strategy Arraez could employ is trying to hit for more power. As shown in the charts above, his ISO falls well below average among qualified players at all four positions over the last two seasons. More home runs would not only lead to a better ISO but also to greater statistical values across the board, except for batting average, in all likelihood. (This can be seen in how much better Arraez graded out in 2022 compared to 2021. His jump from six career dingers to eight in one season was *the* reason why he was so valuable last summer.) But hitting for more power—which would be an even greater increase than the increase he showed in 2022 (his 8 dingers brought him to 14 for his career)—would require a massive overhaul of Arraez’s approach at the plate, which isn’t impossible but highly unlikely. As such, now may be the perfect time for the Twins to move the fan favorite, especially to a team like the Miami Marlins. Swapping him for higher-end starting pitching would not only bolster the Twins already deep, but low throttle starting rotation but also free up more space at DH for the likes of Buxton and first base for Alex Kirilloff. The big winner of an Arraez trade could be Royce Lewis—who may need a graded return following his second ACL reconstruction—or Edouard Julien—who may very well just be a French Canadian clone of Arraez with more pop. Of course, holding onto Arraez is an entirely defensible position as well. But if there were ever a time to trade a reigning batting champ, now may just be the time for the Twins. At the very least, I’m sure Derek Falvey and Thad Levine are thinking real hard about whether or not doing so would be prudent. View full article

What this means beyond he's had a lot of batting stances, I'm not entirely sure. But it's clear he's been working on things for his *entire MLB career*.

I'm sure the family is happy about that! Both pitched for Concordia-St. Paul. Since Gus was selected, he'll have to remain on the Brewers active roster for the entire season or be sent back to the Dodgers.

For those interested, I wrote about Carlos Correa's defensive metrics for BP and tried to get to the bottom of why his numbers were so...average?...last summer. Here's the link: https://www.baseballprospectus.com/news/article/79152/carlos-correa-defense-health/. (You should be able to read it for free a basic subscription, so all you need to do is enter an email.) Defensive metrics aren't as solid as their offensive counterparts, but I think we're able to glean a little bit about Correa's defense from them. Basically, he's got a great arm and is a pretty solid defender going to his right, but struggles going to his left according to Outs Above Average. Also UZR has never liked him. It's an interesting case study, in my opinion, but I'm biased.

He'll be the team's assistant pitching coach: https://www.mlb.com/news/zach-bove-royals-assistant-pitching-coach

Agreed and then he should give me a contract as well :)

Entering the 2022 season, Minnesota Twins minor league starting pitcher was considered by many to be a borderline top 100 prospect and by most to be the top pitcher in the team’s farm system. However, a brutal campaign—which was delayed until mid-May due to a left knee strain—has dulled the Canadian’s once glistening sheen. Image courtesy of Theo Tollefson, Twins Daily Jordan Balazovic was held to a mere 70 2/3 innings at the Triple-A level where he posted a mind-numbingly poor 7.39 ERA, by far the worst of his career. His peripheral numbers weren’t much better. Below is a comparison of how Balazovic has performed in many key stats over his last three seasons. (He didn’t pitch in 2020 due to the pandemic.) Like many young arms with natural talent, Balazovic crushed the lower minors. However, as he ascended through the ranks, his performance has dipped, culminating in his forgettable 2022 season at Triple-A. It’s not uncommon for an individual’s stats to decline as he moves up the minor league ladder—each level consists of better and better players, after all—but Balazovic’s represent a relatively steep decline. What stands out the most is the increase in hard contact he has surrendered, particularly last season. As he has only appeared in the minors, we don’t have publicly available Statcast data for Balazovic, but at a certain point average exit velocities and hard-hit percentages aren’t needed. His BABIP against has increased nearly 40%, while his line drive percentage has gone up 81% and his home runs per fly ball by a staggering 471% from High-A to Triple-A. In short, his pitches are getting hit harder and harder by better and better hitters. Additionally, his walk rates have increased while his strikeout rates have simultaneously dropped from 2019 to 2022. Balazovic has never been one to have pinpoint command despite respectable strikeout numbers (see his K-BB%), and that lack of command has become more troublesome as the opposing batters’ patience has improved at each level. It would be interesting to see his opposing batter chase and whiff rates at all three levels—almost assuredly they would both decrease—but that data isn’t publicly available. So that belies the question: What can Balazovic due to improve his stuff and get back on the top prospect hype train? Well, I don’t know. At least not entirely. Pitching is a complex endeavor, both mentally and physically, so rarely is there a simple answer. But I do have a few ideas that my be helpful. Potential Option #1: Increase elbow flexion at foot plant This is something that the team of biomechanics wizards at Driveline has looked into quite a bit. Elbow flexion is measured by the degree of bend at the elbow. A fully extended elbow would have 0 degrees of flexion while a fully flexed elbow—biomechanically impossible—would be 180 degrees. Driveline has found that, on average, their most elite pitchers (i.e. fastest throwers) achieve 107 degrees of elbow flexion when the foot of their lead leg hits the ground. As seen in the picture above, Balazovic frequently fails to reach beyond 90 degrees of flexion, and at times seemingly doesn’t even reach 90 degrees. (Granted, it’s difficult to say with 100 percent certainty from the behind-the-mound camera angle, but this is the best option available to the public.) Potential Option #2: Decrease posterior trunk lean (i.e. extension) at foot plant Another Driveline favorite. They have found that most elite pitchers that train with them have, on average, negative 10 degrees of anterior trunk lean at foot plant. In English, that means that the best-of-the-best pitchers generally bend backwards slightly when their foot hits the ground. It’s difficult to put an angle on Balazovic without biomechanics tracking software, but eyeballing it, it seems as though he frequently leans too far back at foot plant. This can contribute to a number of flaws during the throwing motion, particularly making the arm “drag” behind, decreasing command. Potential Option #3: Increase knee extension power throughout arm swing All pitchers land with a certain degree of knee flexion (i.e. knee bend) at foot plant. The pitchers who through hardest are able to forcefully extend (i.e. straighten) the knee as they thrust their pitching arm forward. This creates a rigid lever that increases torque and, thus, pitch velocity. Last season, Balazovic seemingly struggled with this. Perhaps of note, his lead leg is his left and he was reportedly dealing with left knee discomfort all season. It’s possible that the lingering pain caused him to diminish his knee extension after foot plant, impacting his velocity and command. Potential Option #4: Increase efficient separation between his trunk and pelvis Watch the video below. The first frame resulted in a ball while the next three were strikes. See if you can parse a difference between Balazovic’s trunk and pelvis between the three pictures. balazovic 1.mov Ok, now here’s a video with my notes. balazovic 2.mov When Balazovic is able to get his hips pointing toward the plate at foot plant, he’s able to efficiently rotate his torso and throw strikes. When he isn’t his arm lags behind and the result is more often than not a ball. In short, in order for Balazovic to improve and become a solid MLB pitcher, I would argue that he needs to not only tighten up his mechanics but improve his motion's consistency. His windup consists of many long levers and moving parts, both of which serve to reduce consistency (and, theoretically increase strain on the low back; he's struggled with back pain at time during his brief career). The options I've laid out above may help accomplish the opposite. View full article

That's definitely a component. The key now is finding ways to maintain peak performance while reducing the strain placed on the body. Biomechanical analysis plays a role here. Basically, athletes may be toeing the line of the upper limit, but may be doing so inefficiently on the whole. Improved efficiency may reduce injuries.

In short, no. The longer version: days missed due to injury actually decreased from 2021 (44,516) to 2022 (42,925), but that's still a lot of injuries. In 2018, team's missed a combined 30,344. So while things trended in the right direction this year, there's still a massive problem going on.

The Minnesota Twins hired new athletic trainer Nick Paparesta to lead the team to more healthy waters. But how much impact can one athletic trainer have? Image courtesy of Lance Iversen, USA Today Forgive me for beating a dead horse, but the Minnesota Twins were among the most injured teams in MLB during the 2022 regular season. In total, Twins players missed a staggering 2,332 days due to injury, the second-most in baseball and the fifth-most since Baseball Prospectus began tracking injury data following the 2018 season. As a result, the team parted ways with head athletic trainer Michael Salazar, who had served in the position since 2020. The Athletic’s Dan Hayes cited the number of soft tissue injuries suffered by the Twins as well as questionable rehabilitation practices, particularly that starting pitcher Tyler Mahle had not been participating in a shoulder strengthening regimen despite landing on the IL three times with shoulder fatigue, played a large role in the team’s decision to move on. This past Thursday the team announced that they had hired former Oakland A’s head athletic trainer Nick Paparesta to fill the hole left by Salazar. Paparesta spent the last 12 years with Oakland and was named to the 2018 Major League Athletic Training Staff of the Year. (For what it’s worth, Salazar was also named to the team in 2016.) According to Baseball Prospectus, the A’s have been among the league’s healthiest teams over the last five seasons, though it should also be noted that the Twins weren’t far behind. Below is how the two team’s have stacked up as of late: While both teams overall have been well-managed, there is a noticeable trend over the past three seasons with the A’s ranking among MLB’s healthiest squads and the Twins falling down a well. Minnesota is hoping that the arrival of Paparesta will help right the ship, but the question is: How much can one athletic trainer impact a team’s injury rates? The unsatisfactory answer is that it’s difficult to know. Injuries and re-injuries are complex, multifactorial, and often random events, making it difficult, at times, to determine direct cause and effect. Nutrition, genetics, anatomical makeup, sleep hygiene, chronic workload, acute workload, and past injury history are all critical variables in determining an athlete’s injury risk and not all of them can be treated or modified, particularly by a single athletic trainer. As such, it’s critical that the entire performance team—often comprised of the athletic trainers, strength and conditioning coaches, and sports scientists—be in lockstep with each other and communicate with the athletes efficiently and effectively. The best rehabilitation and strength training techniques aren’t of much value if the athletes don’t buy into their individual management routines. From purely a treatment perspective, it’s unlikely that Paparesta will employ anything unique from what Salazar was performing. Most athletic trainers at the MLB level have similar skills and levels of knowledge. However, what may change are details around the margins, such as refined exercise prescription, soft tissue management frequency, sleep practices, interactions with the athletes, etc. It's impossible to know how the hiring of Paparesta will play in the clubhouse from the outside. By all accounts, Salazar was well-liked by the athletes and coaching staff and it's tough to stick around a team for over a decade in Paparesta's case if you aren't respected. While it's difficult to project how the transition from Salazar to Paparesta will impact the team's health, it isn't particularly difficult to make the following claim: Michael Salazar was not the lone reason why the Twins were depleted by injuries last season and Nick Paparesta won’t be the the lone reason why the team may be healthier next summer. It’s possible that Salazar did everything “right” and simply ran into bad luck. It’s also possible that Paparesta simply possesses intrinsic qualities that are difficult to describe and quantify, but simply lead to better outcomes. (There’s a lot of “soft science” in rehabilitation, such as psychology and personal skills in addition to the “hard science” of concrete data.) Regardless, there’s no way that the Twins can be more injury-plagued in 2023, right? View full article