heresthething

The Twins are projected for 81 wins this coming season, which is fairly generous for a team coming off a 78-84 season that is losing its MVP in Carlos Correa. The front office is on the hot seat, having failed to win a playoff game in their six year tenure after inheriting a young, cheap and talented roster prior to 2017. That front office believes in its process to the point it apparently feels comfortable running back pretty much the same guys and hoping that fewer injuries vaults them up the standings. A recent Gleeman and the Geek mailbag episode featured a discussion of whether the Twins process lined up with its results. Gleeman and our fearless leader eventually came to the conclusion that the front office’s process was a little ahead of the results, but not by as much as said front office would hope. I am about to argue the opposite.
 
The plan going into the 2017 season was to develop the emerging young players (Kepler, Polanco, Buxton, Sanó) into cheap, controllable stars, avoid long-term commitments unless they came at a steep discount, develop home-grown pitching, try to find unlockable pitchers off the scrap heap using newfound analytics and tech, and become a sustainable winner on a budget, much like Cleveland. But is the front office sticking to that?
 
It certainly is an improvement. Part of the problem with the Terry Ryan regime was that the team never sold high on any of its assets, letting Michael Cuddyer, Joe Mauer, Justin Morneau, Torii Hunter, Jason Kubel and the like play out their years of team control or let them lose all their trade value through injury or under-performance and get flipped for a bag of balls. This kept the farm system gutted and resulted in the kind of painful rebuild this new regime is now trying to avoid.
Will they avoid it? Let’s examine their process and match it up to reality.
 
They definitely have kept the books clean, with only Byron Buxton’s team-friendly deal carrying any real weight. Many Twins fans blamed Joe Mauer’s contract extension as the reason the team fell out of contention in the early 2010’s, but any logical person knows that the previous core got old and there was no one to replace them. The Twins also didn’t get any value out of that core before they got old or ineffective. That’s how Cleveland, Tampa Bay and Oakland have contention windows open longer than a team like the Royals, who rode with its stars from its World Series runs, gave some of them extensions and watched it all fall apart. They did take advantage of the two playoff runs they got, but that’s an awfully short time to be relevant, and there doesn’t appear to be an end in sight.
 
As far as developing their own pitching, the Twins haven’t shown much. While Cleveland and Tampa Bay churn out a new four WAR pitcher every year, all we have to show for ourselves is Bailey Ober and the reliever versions of Griffin Jax and Jhoan Duran. Matt Canterino and Blayne Enlow look like sure relievers at this point, Jordan Balazovic is a mess, and Louie Varland has a ceiling of a third starter. Cade Povich looked good, but was traded for Jorge López. Ditto Steven Hajjar, who was included in the Tyler Mahle trade. Josh Winder gets lit up on every fastball he throws, so all hopes land on Connor Prielipp and Marco Raya at this point, neither of whom are close to the majors. After six years, one would expect a little more from a front office that claimed to specialize in this area. They have added pitching talent via trade, and it looks like that will need to continue.
 
The way the Twins’ roster currently sits is intriguing in its lack of second and third year arbitration players. That sets up a lot of value to be gained if some of those players turn into stars, like Luis Arraez for instance. He’s now an All-Star utility player who just won a batting championship. We know his flaws here locally: his knees wear down and he doesn’t offer much at third and second base defensively. But for a team looking for that difference-maker in the playoffs, Arraez looks plenty enticing, which I am sure is why the Twins are listening to offers on him currently. Doing so has the potential to bring back multiple Arraez’s who are potentially cheaper. Winning that kind of trade is exactly the kind of process Falvey and Levine should value if they want a Cleveland style contention window, but they haven’t done much of that, either. So far, the team has traded Jose Berrios for two likely big league contributors, (how much they contribute is very much in question) traded the last year of Taylor Rogers for three years of a talented starting pitcher in Chris Paddack, and traded a young pitcher, Brusdar Graterol, who was destined for relief work for four years of Kenta Maeda. All of those trades netted the team positive value, and none of them made the team worse in the immediate future considering how bad Rogers and Berrios have been.
 
The tough pill to swallow is that to truly compete at a Cleveland-Tampa level, young stars will have to be traded near the peak of their career, not just when they get expensive in arbitration. Look at the Mike Clevinger trade from 2020. In exchange for two and a half years of Clevinger, who to that point was coming off of three years with a combined 152 ERA+, Cleveland received Josh Naylor, Gabriel Arias, Austin Hedges, Owen Miller, Cal Quantrill and Joey Cantillo. Two of those guys, Naylor and Quantrill, are established starters on a division winning team. Shortstop Arias and starting pitcher Cantillo are rookies who both figure to play big roles in their next one to two seasons with Arias ranking number 57 on Baseball-Prospectus’ mid-season rankings. Hedges was their catcher this past year, and Miller their top pinch hitter. Those last two are disappointments for Cleveland, but the trade was a massive success even without their inclusion. Clevinger got hurt immediately once he became a Padre, sat out 2021 and was ineffective in 2022. The trades of Berrios, Graterol and Rogers were a net positive, but unless Austin Martin and Simeon Woods-Richardson significantly outperform expectations, they didn’t do much to stack the roster for the future. Getting Isiah Kiner-Falefa and Ronny Henriquez for Mitch Garver was a reasonable play, but trading him after 2019, knowing he wasn’t likely to age well and that his defense was just okay, could have set the team up at multiple positions. It just doesn’t seem like that’s part of the Falvine process.
 
Which is unfortunate because the front office has to make unpopular decisions if it wants to compete against teams that can spend more and absorb bad contracts. Of course the Twins could certainly raise payroll, but they have shown that they won’t, and even if they did, luring free agents to Minnesota has proven to be a tough sell. They need to overpay, but they have shown they will not look stupid by giving a player “too much money.” Brandon Nimmo, for instance, has never been a 162M player, but the Mets wanted him so they paid him 30-40% more than was projected. If Nimmo continues being who he is, a three WAR player without power who can stick in center field for a few years, the contract won’t age well. But the Mets don’t care, and if the Twins front office wants to toe the line between the Cleveland-Tampa model and the Phillies-Padres one, they will have to show a free agent they don’t care either. Once in a while, at least.
 
They could also follow the Atlanta Braves model and sign all their emerging stars to team-friendly extensions. These contracts can look bad, as well- just ask the Mariners about Evan White, or the Cardinals about Paul DeJong. The pay-off is enormous though, as you can keep your roster flush with stars without having to trade your next star for it. The Twins are in a position to make some of those types of deals, with Alex Kirilloff, Nick Gordon, Bailey Ober, Trevor Larnach, Joe Ryan, Jhoan Duran and Jose Miranda potentially big parts of the team’s future. Some of that crop has injury issues, which is bad, but also depreciates the value of any extension that player might sign. You might be able to get three years of Kirilloff’s or Ober’s free agency for 30M each. Duran might be the next reliever to secure a 100M contract, but if he agreed to a buyout of his arbitration years plus two more for a total of 40M, that could pay off handsomely and he might accept it, given his history of arm injuries in the minors.
 
All three routes, early trades, overpaying free agents and extending pre-arbitration guys, require a little luck, but that’s why you have a sophisticated and robust scouting and analytic presence. You have to trust your guys and take some risks, and right now the Twins are stuck in limbo, afraid to lose prospects who may blossom elsewhere, to overpay for free agents, or to hand out extensions to players who may end up chronically injured or bad.
The sad truth is that avoiding long-term commitments and getting value out of scrap heap pitchers isn’t much of a process, especially when the pitching pipeline is bare. They won’t overpay like the Padres, Phillies or Mariners, they won’t deal guys at the peak of their value like Cleveland and Tampa, and they don’t extend hardly any of them early either, like the Braves.They just wait for their prospects and hope to get lucky with a Josh Donaldson or Correa. They will describe this non-action as being opportunistic.
 
The team has assembled a good amount of talent, but without the intentionality of those other teams, there is less cohesion; the team just grabs what talent it can and crams it all together. That isn’t so much to say that Joey Gallo is a bad fit, as it is to say the front office never gets their first, second or third choice in free agency or in trades. The Twins needed a frontline pitcher at the deadline and it seemed like they got one in Tyler Mahle. Except Mahle was hurt. He and the Twins hoped it wouldn’t be a problem, but it was. If he hadn't just come back from shoulder problems, the Twins would have had to give up more than the three good prospects they did give up, such as someone the national media actually knew about or who played on the big league roster. Their likely first choice, Mahle’s teammate with the Reds, Luis Castillo, ended up going to the Mariners for a boatload of prospects that surely gave the Twins and Yankees a feeling of relief. But the Mariners wanted an ace for their return to the playoffs, he was the missing piece that team needed, and that team ended up beating a formidable Blue Jays team on the road in the wild-card round, and playing the Astros tougher than any other team, as it turned out. Even before signing Castillo to an extension, they didn’t regret the trade. It reminds me of a line from King of the Hills’s Dale Gribble, trying to goad his friend Hank into mooning a hotel lobby from a glass elevator::
Noelvi Marte may end up being a star, but everyone in Seattle remembers Castillo’s 7.1 shutout innings in game one.
 
Shopping for discounts leads to getting players on the downside of their careers, players who are trouble in the clubhouse, or players with injury questions. With Josh Donaldson, the Twins got all three! It’s hard to establish an identity when your additions to the roster are hurt, playing badly but need to play based on what you gave up for them, and are getting in insular beefs with Gerrit Cole.
I’m sure the Twins do target players they want, but when they do, they either aren’t dreaming very big, or they aren’t giving big enough offers. Other teams may even use the Twins lack of free agent appeal against them in trade discussions, and ask more knowing that they represent the only way for the Twins to improve from outside their organization. The Correa pursuit showed both the Twins desperation, as 10/285M was an enormous offer for the team historically, and the issue I am referring to, that they couldn’t add that one extra year that may have added 25-30% to the odds of Correa being swayed to stay in Minnesota.
 
Of course, even with all the inaction, the front office has made some unexpected and creative trades, such as unloading Donaldson’s contract to free up money to target Trevor Story last year. Story didn’t want to play in Minnesota, or at least he didn’t for the offer they gave him, and the front office was fortunate that Scott Boras called with his Correa proposition. Being nimble is a nice benefit of the payroll flexibility the team enjoys, but it doesn’t move the needle of turning this team into a real contender.
 
Here’s how I would say the team has performed using the processes they were brought in to execute:
Not taking on long-term deals: A+
Finding scrap heap pitchers and unlocking their potential: D-
Develop position players into major league contributors: C
Develop home-grown pitching: D-
 
Here’s how they performed using other, successful, processes:
Overpaying for free agents to add talent without dipping into farm system: F
Extending emerging stars before they break out: D
Trading players with years of team control who are playing at a high level to replenish the farm system and/or augment the major league roster: C
 
This is why injuries can’t be blamed for the lack of recent success. There is a problem with the process. One, their pitching expertise has proven dubious. Two, their process model doesn’t include the boldness exhibited by teams they are trying to emulate. The scrap heap pitchers they are trying to unlock are waiver claims, not major league bounce back candidates. The pitchers they target in trades are of the scratch n’ dent variety, not sure things. Imagine if the team had struggled getting its high position player draft picks to the majors and there was no Gordon, Miranda, Larnach, Kirilloff, Royce Lewis, Ryan Jeffers, or Buxton to even worry about projecting for the 2023 roster. That’s the only positive thing keeping this team from becoming Detroit or Kansas City.
 
My advice would be to get Chris Sale for a prospect and take on his entire salary, flip Sonny Gray and Max Kepler to San Diego, where they are short a starter and a corner outfielder and try to pry Ha-Seong Kim from them. But hey, that’s just my process.


 

OK, Honestly I really do not enjoy being critical or a pessimist.  But I nearly did a spit-take when I saw Dave St Peter give the Twins FO and "Falvine"   "High Marks".  Seriously, from what benchmark can you give this FO high marks?
Can you blame them for the injuries and the failures down the stretch?  Well yeah, at least a little bit. They trade for TWO starting pitchers that had injury histories.  Anyone could see Paddack's injury coming, and it was called here and many other places at the time fo the trade. No Monday Mornign QBing here.  Mahle had his shoulder. yet we gave away some good prospects for pitchers with injury histories, so yes, you can.  
 
They did sign some OK pitchers, Archer, even though could not go past 4 innings was serviceable most fo the year, and Bundy was also serviceable. but nothing overly exciting, and neither at this point is on the Twins moving forward, so still left in the same position pitching wise as last offseason (ok maybe a little better, should have Ryan, Ober, Gray, Maeda)
Our position players are in a state of flux at best.  Kudos for signing Correa, but he is gone. Sanchez and Urshela were decent, and you cant fault them for Buxtons contract, that was a pretty good signing, regardless of what BUxton does. 
A couple good young players, Miranda.. Coudl Wallner be decent?
otherwise top prospects busted for various reasons injury Kiriloff, Lewis, Larnach,  and some just didnt pan out.
So we made some decent moves, and our Major league club overall was good but fell completely off map at the end with little momentum or positivity going into th e offseason.  SO maybe they receive "marks" but "high marks"  they were average at best!!
 
Well maybe they have put our Minor League program in a stronger position...
 
Well MLB has our system ranked 23rd.  down from #12 as recently as 202 mid-season rankings.  and #8 in 2019 with (Lewis, Kirilloff, Graterol, Balazovic, Larnach as the keys).
So you sign ONE top of the shelf FA, who will be gone after this year,  a couple pitchers off the scrap heap, deal some top talent for injured pitchers (and one quality starter in Gray) to field a below .500 team, all while dropping your minor league system from #9 to #23 and that earns High Marks?
 
I just have oen question...
Mr. St. Peter, can you do my next performance appraisal for my end of year bonus???

Baseball is a marathon, not a sprint . . . but I'm willing to bet you can spoil a marathon with a weak start. Mental fortitude cracking with the arrhythmic slapping of your feet against the pavement. Planning and precision giving way to panic. Comparing yourself to the other runners, who seem to be running flawlessly.
Baseball is a marathon . . . for the fans, too. It takes commitment to stay abreast of a whole season. The game this afternoon felt like a must-win situation to keep some sense of hope. These were winnable games against a beatable opponent. We won one, by a single run. For the fans to stay in this race, we're going to need to win a lot more. 
Of course, who am I to talk about marathons and baseball seasons? I've never run a marathon, and my baseball days ended in elementary school with me standing in right field, praying the ball would never come near me. I'd like to run a marathon by the time I turn 50, which gives me a little over 5 1/2 years to get this body into shape. 
People have been very supportive of my marathon pipe-dream. The way they describe it makes it seem simple. You start running. 26.2 miles later, you stop. Along the way, you keep your feet moving. Everyone says it's a mental battle. Right now, I'm battling to get in the gym and get into 5K shape. Little victories mean a lot. Just going to the gym on a day where I'd rather see how many peanut butter Oreos I could cram in my mouth is a victory.
This one run victory is like that. It keeps everybody grinding on, hoping the Twins find their footing, pick up the pace, and we all feel the breeze at our backs. 
It's hard to write series recaps about three lukewarm baseball games where one lukewarm baseball team faces another lukewarm baseball team. The biggest narrative seems to stem from Aaron Gleeman's revelation that this is the first time the Twins have ever batted under .200 for the first 12 games. Maybe a little chatter about some surprisingly good pitching. I bet I'm not the only one struggling to find something to write about, even at this early stage of the season. Hey, we can't all be Randball's Stu and hit it out of the park every time.
So let's pick up those feet and put 'em back down again, Twins! Get into the rhythm. Find your stride before it's late June/early July. Because before long it'll be time to listen to "Dirty Black Summer" by Danzig and pretend sparklers are still fun when you're over fifteen. I'd like to still be in the race then.

With the 2021 season just about wrapped up for the Minnesota Twins, here’s yet another article to talk about starting pitching and why dumpster diving or even mid-tier free agent starters are actually much riskier than the top free agent starters with those big contracts.
Conventional Twins wisdom is that big name, free agent starters are simply too expensive and too risky. Jim Pohlad is very skittish when it comes to long contracts and big dollars. The idea of “crippling” a roster also sends some Twins fans into a panic. It makes sense, after all, the Twins free agent pitchers almost never actually pan out for more than a year.
For this year, the Twins’ front office decided not to pursue an arm to replace Odorizzi, leaving a major hole in the middle of the rotation. Instead, Happ and Shoemaker were signed to contracts all too typical of the Twins’ front office. The cost? $10MM utterly wasted. That said, the Twins are absolutely spending ace starter money in free agency and acquisitions every single year and have been spending $30-43MM annually for those arms for 7 consecutive seasons coming into 2021. I even adjusted the salaries for players which were traded away… Read it and weep.
Median WAR = middle bWAR season performance with 2020 being multiplied by 2.7 due to the shortened season. Total WAR = Total bWAR over the life of the entire contract, even if the player was traded away. $/WAR = Entire Contract Dollars, Adjusted for 2020 / Total bWAR, Not Adjusted for 2020. The salary figures shown are not adjusted for 2020 so they can be viewed in proper context.  
  Med. Tot $                 Player WAR WAR /WAR 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 Correia -1.1 -1.1 -5 6               Pelfrey 0.4 0.8 13.8 6 6             Hughes -0.1 5.5 11.9 8 9 9 13 8 7     Nolasco 0.5 2 24 12 12 8 4         Milone 0.8 0.9 8.1   3 5           Santana 0.5 9.8 5.6   14 14 14 14 1     Santiago 0.2 0.3 32.7     2 8         Odorizzi 1.2 4.4 6.1         6 10 18   Pineda 0.8 3.3 8         2 8 10 10 Lynn 0.4 0.4 25         10       Perez 0.1 0.1 40           4     Maeda 2.7 1.8 2.7             3 3 Bailey 0.5 0.2 22             7   Hill 2.1 0.8 2.4             3   Shoemaker -1.9 -1.9 -1.1               2 Happ -1.8 -1.8 -4.4               8                           Season Total 31 43 37 38.7 39.8 29.5 40.8 23
 
In fact, almost none of the Twins signings and acquisitions were worth it, including the starters who were actually “worth the money” because they still weren’t worth starting. For example, Tommy Milone only cost $8.1MM / WAR. That’s an A grade signing. He was worth every bit of the money he was paid, on am average season. But he still wasn’t good enough to actually want him in the rotation. What about Ervin Santana? We all know what a huge asset he was over his first couple seasons and the Twins got one WAR for only $5.6MM which is an A+ kind of deal. The big issue is he was terrible over his last two years, dragging his median performance way down.
Ace = 4.0 WAR+ #2 = 3.0-4.0 WAR #3 = 2.5-3.0 WAR #4 = 2.0-2.5 WAR #5 = 1.5-2.0 WAR I’ve also adjusted the median values for 2020’s short season. That’s the problem with dumpster dives and even mid-tier free agents. All it takes is a slight decline and poof, all the money is utterly wasted because you’re paying guaranteed money to a starter who isn’t worth playing.
Well, everybody knows big free agent contracts never work out though, right? Wrong. Big name, free agent starters are almost always worth it. This is for two reasons. First, they often perform at ace levels even if they decline a bit, but if they take a major hit or injury, they almost always bounce back as a solid starter in the rotation. The money is virtually never totally wasted like it often is on mediocre or low cost starters. Of the 8 front line free agent starters signed since 2014, every single one of them has been worth a rotation spot in an average year. Most are even good deals. Don’t believe me again?
  Med. Tot $                                 Player WAR WAR /WAR Future? 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Grade Lester 2.1 13.2 9.6 - 30 20 20 23 25 28                 B Greinke 4.2 17.9 10.3 - 34 34 34 35 35 35                 C Scherzer 5.5 41.4 4.1 - 17 22 22 22 37 36 35 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 A+ Price 1.8 11.1 13.9 F   30 30 30 31 32 32 32             F Darvish 5.6 7.6 9.9 A       25 20 22 22 19 18           B Corbin 4.1 5.4 8.6 F         15 19 24 23 24 35         A Cole 5.6 7.6 6.4 A           36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 A Wheeler 6.8 7.6 3.45 A           22 23 26 25 24         A+ Strasburg 0 0 Inf F           24 24 24 24 24 24 24 27 27 F- *The summary is updated to reflect the addition of Strasburg to the chart. I decided against adding Bauer. Bauer doesn't have a long term contract, and part of the reason FA ace caliber pitchers are a low risk is a single lost season is easy to overcome. Among the 9 listed starters, only 3 have lost an entire season (Price x1.5, Darvish, Strasburg x2). Of the 38 seasons on the contracts from the 9 starters, 4.5 seasons have been lost. A risk of a starter losing a season is approximately 10% per contract season.
Right now, Corbin and Strasburg both look like a bad deals, but it wouldn’t surprise me a bit if they rebounded. If you look at those contracts, something really stands out to me. Only Strasburg has played poorly enough so the team who signed them wouldn’t have wanted in the rotation and 6 of the 8 are bonefide ace level pitchers on their average season. Even David Price with all his injuries and down performance is worth trotting out there. Also, 7 of 8 of those front line starters have been absolutely C or better signings. Here’s how I’d arbitrarily grade signings based on the dollars spent per WAR.
$16MM+ = F- $14-16MM = F $12-14MM = D $10-12MM = C $9-10MM = B $6-9MM = A 0-6MM = A+ To sum it up, the scary big contracts for front line starters almost always work out over the life of the contract, and even when they don’t work out exactly as intended, the pitchers are almost always worth running out there every 5 days as part of the rotation. However, the low end and middle of the rotation arms are almost never worth it based on nearly a decade of track record by the Twins and over a dozen such starting pitchers. Considering the Twins absolutely do not need any #4-5 starters, the front office also needs to stop wasting money with their annual dumpster dive, refocus and acquire top pitching talent. After all, it’d barely cost more on an annual basis to replace the typical free agent signings they’ve been wasting money on to sign two top of the rotation arms as they’re available.

By David Weinshilboum
 
In 2013, the Golden State Warriors basketball team seemed on the verge. A franchise that had been a laughingstock for decades had been to the playoffs two years in a row. Led by coach Mark Jackson and a young injury-prone sharpshooter by the name of Stephen Curry, the steam had suddenly thrust itself into relevancy.
 
Yet, just three days after a playoff loss in 2013, the Warriors fired Jackson (who had a year left on his contract). He was a good coach who had many positive attributes. The team was headed in the right direction. Why fire him?
 
The Warriors hired Steve Kerr who implemented a new offense that maximized Curry’s long-range shooting abilities. The team went on to win Championships in three of the next four seasons. As the tired sports cliché goes, the rest is history.
The Minnesota Twins – until this train-wreck of a year—were a team and organization on the rise. Then rookie manager Rocco Baldelli led the Twins to a 100-win season in 2019 and another division championship in the pandemic-shortened 2020 season.
 
Today the Twins are mired in a disaster season that simply isn’t going to get better. Their best player is injured and half a dozen others are playing well below expectations (Sano, Maeda, Kepler, Polanco and, sorry to put this in print, Colome). When the Twins 2021 season comes to a close, they will be a failure: no playoffs and well below expectations of 90-plus wins.
 
In October, the Twins will have to ask themselves an important question: is Baldelli the leader who can take this team and franchise to the next level? I would argue that, for some very rational, logical reasons, the answer is no.
 
The Twins Twitterverse wants Rocco’s head now, and a few days ago, during a television broadcast, a fan wandered behind home plate and held a sign calling for a managerial change. There’s a lot of emotion going into the Fire Rocco movement. Baldelli has NEVER been a good in-game manager, oftentimes making fans scratch their heads or, at times, yank tufts of hair from scalp. His choice of defensive substitutions, pinch hitters and pinch runners feels arbitrary at best. The most obvious example was a couple weeks ago in Oakland when, in extra innings, Baldelli pinch ran Travis Blankenhorn for Josh Donaldson. The move compromised defense in a big way. And Baldelli made matters worse when he put second-baseman Luis Arraez at third and Blankenhorn at second – eroding the leather at TWO positions instead of just one. The game ended when Blankenhorn booted one grounder and Arraez air-mailed a routine throw to first.
 
Another reason fans might dislike him is his press conference demeanor: he is dullard diplomat who makes former Vikings Coach/statue Bud Grant look emotional. Worse, he never calls out terrible plays – both physical or mental – and seems to dismiss garbage baseball as “part of the game.”
 
Neither of these negative attributes are fireable offenses, though.
 
Baldelli is a good manager. Players love him. They want to play for him. He is flexible and allows them to select preparation that fits their needs. He maximized player abilities in 2019, getting the most out of Miguel Sano, Mitch Garver and Max Kepler.
 
All good things must come to an end, though. And Baldelli’s millennial approach to players might not be as conducive to good baseball as it once was. This year, many players aren’t properly prepared for games. Too often, players seem to be using their first at-bat to “learn” about a pitcher’s repertoire instead of reviewing the scouting reports. Players appear ok with early-inning strikeouts since they’ve seen the stuff. It’s not a stretch to assume many Twins are taking advantage of Rocco’s laissez faire approach to being game ready.
 
Also, Rocco’s concern for injured players seems incredibly detrimental to the team, particularly given how the roster has been assembled. The Front Office has routinely preferred more pitchers and a short bench. But Red-Cross Rocco sits players if they report a hangnail. Worse, he won’t even consider them for pinch hitting or late-inning defense. There have been over a dozen instances this season when Baldelli has chosen to pinch hit a weaker bat instead of a resting star who is at 90 percent. All for the sake of future health. In a year where rosters are 26 players deep, the Twins have been playing with 22 or 23 players.
 
Is Baldelli having a bad year? Absolutely. When the leader of the team forgets how many mound visits have been made, it’s a bad, bad look. The Twins in many ways have played the way Baldelli has managed this year: haphazardly, unevenly and obliviously. Baldelli certainly has the ability to manage better than he has. But when his contract ends, the Twins must decide whether he is the best fit for the club. Their decision will be huge because this team is on the precipice of irrelevancy.
 
David Weinshilboum lives in California and bemoans this year’s Twins ineptitude from afar. Follow @weinshie on Twitter.

So ESPN and Jeff Passan just published an article saying the White Sox are the team to beat now in the American League. He feels that way now due to them signing Hendricks. Now Hendricks is a very good reliever and might be the best closer in all of baseball. But how much better did he actually make them? If the White Sox had a bullpen like the Phillies last year and still only last out to us by 1 game I might buy all this hype but they didn’t. Alex Colomé pitched great as a closer last year and that is who Hendricks is replacing. Last year Colomé pitched in 21 games in the regular season and the White Sox went 18-3 in those games with Colomé saving 12 of those wins and having no losses. Of the 3 team losses, 2 were in extra innings where Colomé pitched a shutout ninth to get the games into extras. How much better could anyone have pitched in the closer position for the White Sox last year? They couldn’t have because Colomé was not responsible for the losing runs scored in any of the 21 games he pitched in. I know that Hendricks peripheral numbers were all better than Colomé but at the end of the day it is still about wins and losses. How much can Hendricks really improve them when Colomé was basically perfect last year from a win loss standpoint?
 
Are the White Sox a definite challenger for the AL Central? Absolutely they are. Are they the favorite for the AL? Maybe, but not because they just signed the best closer in the baseball. They already received “perfect” production from the closer position last season and all they can do is go down from there.

There have been several excellent "how would you spend $x?" articles written this off-season. There is some point in the winter when the ice breaks and teams start signing players; there are often several points at which these occur, and I've often wondered how that math gets done, realizing that one would be criticized for either moving too quickly (gross overpay for Player A) or too slowly (completely missed out on Player A, you numbskull!).
 
It is one thing to say that the Twins' payroll for 2021 should be in the $125-140M range, take the existing (probable, considering Maeda's incentives) payroll in the low 90s, and figure out a way to spend the remainder, given the estimates of value on all existing free agents, or the +/- in dollars exchanged in any trade.
 
This year, however, presents a different set of possibilities. One can scour the team pages here and there, and come up with a list of teams that are either a)shedding payroll; or b)not going to spend any more than they have already. That limits the number of teams still in the race for the existing assets. For each of those teams, a little deeper dive can also unearth a relative number available to spend on any of the talent out there (the Twins' $30-35M figure, for instance).
 
But what happens when you combine all that? Take the Twins, and several high-budget (or "available money") teams and pool them all. How much is available to spend, total? Then take the existing free agents, and their potential salaries, and see where that number lands you, in a.a.v. It occurs to me that we are in a market where the "available money" is far less than the "potential salaries." In that economic circumstance, it changes the dynamic of the when and where and how much in the acquisition of players. If a team can (accurately) project the available space for spending of all the competitors, and (logically or illogically) evaluates those teams' greatest needs, one can whittle down the available market for players. And somewhere in that analysis, bargains can be found.
 
A couple of good examples exist in JT Realmuto and George Springer. Of the teams who possibly could afford a reasonable Realmuto contract, how many of them need a catcher? Of the teams who possibly could afford a reasonable Springer deal, how many need an outfielder? Carrying that further, once those players sign, and the teams who sign them have their available money evaporate, where does that leave the remaining teams with money to spend?
 
Yes, I realize there is no hard cap in baseball (though the luxury tax and certain teams' stated desire to get under it does add some clarity), and a team who signs a Realmuto or Springer might well decide to change their budget, or go all-in. But in most cases, that won't be true. Now, we're left with a smaller number of teams, with a smaller budget, scrambling to sign the remaining free agents - and yes, the agents for these free agents can also do the math and see that there is now, hypothetically, only 75% of the available money to sign these players to "market value" contracts, and advise their clients accordingly that they are going to need to sign (now!) for 75% of what they hoped, or fall further and further behind in the dollars-to-talent available pool.
 
This is where several teams will end up - those with relatively few dollars to spend are going to have to wait until all the big dogs have eaten before looking around for what remains available. Somewhere in between, before the scrounging occurs right up to and including spring training, there is a proper moment to strike.
 
We aren't there yet. Once Bauer signs, the market for Odorizzi, Tanaka, Paxton, and a few others will heat up. Teams desperate (public relations-wise or otherwise) might overpay for the next available tier, but that leaves arms available that are beyond the price of the teams who are cash-strapped, and almost no competition from teams who have already filled their rosters.
 
It makes business sense, though risky, as you are allowing other teams to snatch up the "best available" talent and contenting yourself with the best of what is left over. I don't have a perfect match for the Twins (though to me getting Sugano for 3 years ($9M/yr), Kluber for 3 years ($8M/yr), Kiki for 3 years ($5M/yr?), and then selecting the best non-Cruz DH candidate on a one-year deal in the $5-7M range, and a solid LH/RH relief tandem at $3-4M each) adds the most to the club and keeps us in the $125-$130 payroll range.
 
Who do you think will have to come off the board before the Twins will react? What do you predict the next move will be? I'm curious to hear people's thoughts on the subject.

I had an idea. What if someone got a hit, stole second - maybe third and someone else got a hit and they scored?
 
In new school does that not count?
 
What if someone got a hit, someone bunted and then a single brought them home? Does that not mean that the run scores?
 
Do I have to wait for a HR? Should I look for a K instead of a sacrifice?
 
Do I have to fire up the computer. What to do? No HR? We cannot score that way. We need HRs without runners on base because analytics say that is really the cool new way to do it.
Let's eliminate the sacrifice, the bunt, the stolen base - I know they worked for 150 years but they did not have computers.
 
Mookie Betts looks great, but what is he doing stealing two bases?
 
Why would we hit to the weakness of a shift when we can score a high exit velocity on the ball we hit for an out? Why go the other way when we can get a launch angle? Doesn't exit velocity score us more points? Doesn't launch angle get us an extra mention on Sports Center?
 
Don't we get more runs for a HR with more distance?
 
What is it with the old school. Get a hit. Advance a base. Score. So boring.
 
And then there are RBIs - who cares. No one is getting a hit other than a HR anyway so why worry about a batter who can actually bring that baserunner to home plate? Runs, RBIs, Batting average - so yesterday.
 
And then there is pitching. We should all throw 100 mph because the batters can never adjust to that! Have them hit into a DP - what are you talking about it will impact my K/BB rate. The ERA is so old school lets just worry about K/HR.
 
And starting pitchers who go into the later innings - why? So what if we need 43 RP to handle all the extra innings. We do not need Spahn, Marichal, Mathewson - they are old school. Lets just have 9 pitchers per game per team. Boy is that fun. No saves, no complete games, no dominating Sandy Koufax or Bob Gibson. Let's have a lot of Duffeys, Romos, Aaron Bummers - who? Yup. No more pitchers in the HOF. Who needs them?
 
And, by the way, no more fans in the stands. Not because there is Covid, but because the game is getting so damned boring.
 
As an addendum - game three of the WS - the Dodgers had long balls, but they also scored on singles, they had a bunt for a run, and they stole bases. When you blend old school with some new maybe the game can get fun again.
 
Game 4 - Tampa Bay ties the series. Yes they got HRs, but a single and an error won the game. By putting the ball in play so many things can happen. It went for a single, it was dropped by the centerfielder and then the catcher - errors seldom happen on a K.
 
Game 6 - Kevin Cash proved what I hate - Snell was upset and should be. He is an Ace and he was ready to be Jack Morris but the damn team policy removed the human element and the Rays deserved to lose.

The Covid sickness that hit coach Tommy Hottovy created a memorable video https://www.espn.com/mlb/ as he discussed his case - it is good to watch since so many act like the Covid-19 is just another flu. As the TD contributor Doctor Gast states - the video is mostly about the pain of separation. Should you want to know more about the survival from this virus you might want to read this San Francisco report - https://www.sfgate.com/news/editorspicks/article/What-they-don-t-tell-you-about-surviving-15347792.php or this description of the Brain Fog that comes after the virus by the American Psychological Association https://www.apa.org/monitor/2020/09/aftermath-covid-19. The choices of Ian Desmond, Ryan Zimmerman and Jo Ross not to play should be applauded for their courage just as the Twins decision to protect their oldest coaches was wise and prudent. As much as I want to see and read about baseball I do not want to read about tragedies.
 
When we are young we all make poor decisions based on our own sense of mortality. I made climbs, ran rapids, and pushed the envelop thinking that nothing could happen to me. My son, at age 21 did the same thing, and he died as a result. Age does not protect us. Nor does physical fitness. This is a serious time and now we learn that there is a new swine flu that might follow Covid. It is frightening. And maybe time to remember how we can be chopped down by microscopic organisms in the prime of our life.
 
Baseball players are constantly facing injury - concussions, thoracic injuries, Tommy John surgery, broken bones. The good thing about them is that they heal. Bad backs ruined careers and freak accidents like the gas that Christy Mathewson was exposed to during training. His respiratory system was weakened and resulted in contracting tuberculosis, from which he died in Saranac Lake, New York in 1925. He was only 45. Tuberculosis also took seven other players who are mostly lost to memory because their careers were too short and too long ago.
 
We watched drugs ruin careers like Doc Gooden and Daryl Strawberry, two more who had a HOF path ahead of them. And Sandy Koufax had his amazing career stopped at its peak because of arthritis. Like so many elderly people I can only relate too well to the pain that he suffered from this debilitating disease.
 
I remember when J R Richards suffered a stroke and had to leave the field. This great Astros pitcher seemed like a sure HOF player, a person who would hold all the Astros records - he averaged 16 wins per season his first five years. In 1980 he was 10 - 4 with a 1.90 era and he was in magnificent physical condition. In two years he was homeless and sleeping under a bridge. He went on to the ministry and preached to those same homeless individuals. It was a big fall from the top.
 
Jimmy Piersall suffered from mental illness and a potentially great career was ruined by bipolar disorder and still he was so good he managed 17 years.
 
When it comes to disease what baseball fan does not know of Lou Gehrig and ALS - now called Lou Gehrig Disease. The Iron Horse was toppled and dead at age 38. He seemed invincible but disease does not avoid the strong and healthy.
 
Ross Youngs died at age 30 of Brights Disease (a kidney disease). He played 10 years with a 322 BA.
 
Dave Parker, former Pirate and one of my favorite players lives with Parkinson's disease a serious and long term disease that impacts so many aspects of your body functions. Kirk Gibson lives with Parkinsons and Dee Gordon plays baseball with it. But this is serious and life changing.
 
HOF pitcher Addie Joss from Wisconsin attended St. Mary's College (later part of Wyalusing Academy) in Prairie du Chien and the University of Wisconsin. "In April 1911, Joss became ill and he died the same month due to tuberculous meningitis. He finished his career with 160 wins, 234 complete games, 45 shutouts and 920 strikeouts."
 
Wikipedia provided this list of type 1 diabetes sufferers from MLB
Ron Santo, Chicago Cubs (1960–1973) and Chicago White Sox (1974) infielder, type 1, deceased (2010 at age 70).
Sam Fuld, Chicago Cubs (2007–2010), Tampa Bay Rays (2011–2013), and Oakland Athletics (2014–) outfielder, type 1.[13]
Mark Lowe, Seattle Mariners (2006–2010, 2015), Texas Rangers (2010–2012), Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim (2013), Cleveland Indians (2014), Toronto Blue Jays (2015), and Detroit Tigers (2016–) pitcher, type 1.[14]
Brandon Morrow, Seattle Mariners (2007–2009) and Toronto Blue Jays (2010–2014) pitcher, type 1.[14]
Dustin McGowan, Toronto Blue Jays (2005–2008, 2011, 2013–2014), Philadelphia Phillies (2015), and Miami Marlins (2016–) pitcher, type 1.
Jackie Robinson, Brooklyn Dodgers (1947–1956), type 2, deceased (1972 at age 53).
Bill Gullickson, Montreal Expos (1979–1994), type 1[15]
Adam Duvall, Cincinnati Reds (2015–), Type 1
James "Catfish" Hunter, Kansas City/Oakland Athletics (1965-1974) and New York Yankees (1975-1979) pitcher, type 1, deceased (1999 at age 53 of ALS)

There are more stories of Alzheimer's that may have come from concussions, cancers, and other, but finally, we should look to the Spanish Flu - "the flu took: Cy Swain, a minor leaguer from 1904 to 1914 who slugged 39 home runs in 1913; Larry Chappell, a big league outfielder for the White Sox, Indians and Boston Braves between 1913 and 1917; catcher Leo McGraw, a minor leaguer between 1910 and 1916; catcher Harry Glenn, a minor leaguer from 1910 to 1918 who spent time with the 1915 Cardinals; minor league pitcher Dave Roth, who played between 1912 and 1916; and minor league pitcher Harry Acton, who played in 1917." https://baseballhall.org/discover/1918-flu-pandemic-didnt-spare-baseball
 
The Twins have their own tragic stories too - Danny Thompson, a promising shortstop was diagnosed with Leukemia when he was 26, in 1973. He played four more seasons and died ten weeks after his final game. Walter Bond - died of Leukemia in the closing weeks of the 1967 baseball season — a year during which he had made the Twins' roster coming out of spring training. Wikipedia entry says this about the end - "Bond made the team and batted .313 in part-time duty during the season's first month. But the Twins released him on May 15, and although Bond caught on with the Jacksonville Suns, his declining health forced him to the sidelines after only three games.[2] He entered a Houston hospital for treatment, but died there at age 29. Said his physician, Dr. Hatch Cummings: "He showed the strength of character and will that only champions possess. It was an exhibition of courage, and in the best tradition of baseball."
 
We want baseball, but we can live without it if it comes down to a threat to players health and lives.